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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the choice of an exchange rate regime for 
a small commodity-exporting economy which experiences both 
monetary shocks and commodity price shocks. 
To investigate these matters, stochastic calculus is used ln a 
continuous-time setting. The Franc Zone serves as an 
illustration: it is a currency union between a small country and 
a large country, and was subject to enormous strains in the last 
decade. 
The model developed in chapters 3 and 4 stresses the role of 
expectations in affecting domestic price variability, when the 
commodity price is described as a Poisson process. It also points 
to an exchange rate policy of "leaning with the wind" on the 
basis of the prlce stability criterion. Chapter 4 further 
investigates how the degree of openness of the small economy can 
influence the choice of the optimal exchange rate. 
Finally the analysis explains why the recent devaluation in the 
Franc Zone was a necessity in contrast to other studies which 
failed to notice the need for a devaluation. In this respect, it 
s uggests a way to measure the degree of overvaluation. 
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Introduction 
To judge from the diversity of arrangements one observes around 
the world, the choice of an exchange rate regime continues to be 
an issue today, three decades after the Bretton Woods system of 
pegged but adjustable exchange rates ended in 1973. These 
exchange rate regimes range from the free float generally adopted 
by the industrial countries and a few developing countries to the 
fixed exchange rate regime that a number of developing countries 
still have. Over time, intermediate exchange rate regimes have 
increased in importance as more and more developing countries 
have shifted from a single currency peg to a basket peg or other 
forms of managed float. 
With the experiment of the EMS/ERM in Europe, the issue of 
currency union has drawn more and more attention. In this 
category of currency regime, the Franc Zone, which links some 
African countries and France, is a long-existing example. In the 
recent period, the Franc Zone has attracted more interest than 
ever before: it has experienced economic difficulties in the last 
decade in contrast to a relative success in the decade before, 
and this has led to the first ever devaluation in the Zone. 
The present thesis addresses the issue of choosing an optimal 
exchange rate regime in a model of a small commodity-exporting 
economy. The representation adopted would fit to most developing 
countries (and the African countries of the Franc Zone In 
particular) since their export revenues depend heavily on one or 
two (primary) commodities. The model considers two types of 
disturbances which affect the small economy. The first is a terms 
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of trade shock, highly characteristic of a commodity-exporting 
economy. A second shock is an internal (monetary) disturbance, 
characteristic of many developing countries. 
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 gives a portrait 
of the Franc Zone. Included is a brief historical overview, the 
link between the African side of the Zone and France, the 
functioning of the system for the African countries, the 
experience over the last twenty years and the challenges that the 
management of such a currency union raises. 
Chapter 2 provides a survey of the literature on exchange rate 
economics, (especially in preparation of the next two chapters) . 
Given the large volume of literature on exchange regimes, a 
selection appears necessary with emphasis on: currency areas, 
optimal peg including the papers more directed at the Franc Zone 
case, and target zones. 
Chapter 3 sets up the basic model for choosing an exchange rate 
regime in the context of a small commodity-exporting economy. We 
assume that the commodity price on the world market follows a 
Poisson process while the monetary shocks follow a Brownian 
motion process. Stochastic calculus in continuous time is applied 
in this and later chapters. The model brings about the policy 
implications for the small economy on the basis of a price 
stability criterion and enables a comparison of different types 
of exchange rate regimes. 
Chapter 4 extends the model designed in the previous chapter. 
It glves a presentation of a two goods (tradable and non-
tradable) economy, the tradable sector includes the export and 
import sectors. The small open economy continues to face two 
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types of shocks. Both are assumed to follow Brownian motion 
processes, although subsequently at the second stage, the 
commodity price is described as a Poisson process. The relative 
size of the two shocks matters as does the degree of openness of 
the small economy. 
Chapter 5 deals with the issue of the Commodity Stabilization 
Funds which exist in most commodity-exporting countries. We use 
a model of intertemporal optimization in a stochastic 
environment. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, there 
is the need to establish the economic rationale for these Funds. 
Secondly, we need to examine the extent to which the scheme of 
a Stabilization Fund might provide a satisfactory alternative to 
a flexible exchange rate regime. This question can be raised in 
the context of the African Franc Zone countries which have a 
fixed exchange rate regime. 
The last chapter 6 focuses on recent events in the Franc Zone, 
namely the first ever devaluation of the CFA Franc (i.e. the 
currency in circulation in the African countries of the Zone and 
pegged to the French Franc). Drawing in part from the results of 
chapter 4, it explains how the indicators used by other studies 
failed to reveal the overvaluation problem and proposes a more 
appropriate indicator. 
5 
Chapter 1: Salient features of the Franc Zone 
Introduction 
The Franc Zone (FZ) 1S an interesting case of currency union. 
First the FZ is historically ancient, originating from the 
colonial period and second it involves a certain number of 
countries, precisely thirteen African countries and France. This 
long existence and the extent of the area coverage give potential 
significance to the Zone. It has to be said that it is a union 
between areas of very different economic power. The FZ is 
essentially a currency union between a small economy consisting 
of the African side and a large economy which is France. 
Section 1.1 takes this small/large country portrait as the way 
the most appropriate to display the main characteristics of the 
Zone in economic terms. 
Section 1.2 discusses in more detail the organisation and the 
functioning within the Zone. Finally section 1.3 looks at the 
enormous strains to which the FZ has been subject to in the last 
decade. The strains which include the sharp fluctuations 1n 
commodity prices, gyrations in G7 exchange rates and Libor proved 
too great for the fixed rate 50: 1 (peg of the small economy 
currency to the French Franc) and led recently to the first ever 
devaluation of 50% in January 1994. 
1.1 The FZ as an un10n between a small and large country 
Although the FZ has only taken its present form since 1960, it 
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has its origins ln postwar currency arrangements set in 1948. One 
can distinguish three different periods which most significantly 
have laid down milestones in the evolution of the Zone until the 
1994 devaluation . The first period might be dated back to soon 
after the second world war. At that time, the African colonies 
of France were using the currency called CFA ("Colonies 
Francaises d' Afrique") and in 1948, the rate of 1 FF = 50 CFA was 
established between the French currency and that of its colonies 
in Sub-Sahara. At that time also , there was no Central Bank as 
such for these colonies and this role was played by a private 
bank, the BAO ("Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale"). 
What happened next will prove to have determined the main 
features of the FZ. For in 1960, came the independencies of the 
ex-colonies. As a direct consequence they had got also the right 
to print money. But this was organised through two Central Banks: 
one for the group of countries in the western African region, 
known as BCEAO ("Banque Centrale des Etats de I' Afrique de 
l'Ouest"), and another for the group of countries in the central 
African region called BEAC ("Banque des Etats de I' Afrique 
Centrale"). Each group constituted a monetary union functioning 
on the basis of its own Central Bank. Strong links were 
established between both these Central Banks on the one hand and 
the Central Bank of France. Even BCEAO and BEAC were located 
initially in Paris (France) before their Headquarters moved in 
1974 (to Dakar in Senegal and Yaounde in Cameroon respectively) . 
However, these events and changes did not affect the parity 
between the French franc and the CFA franc as it was still known . 
It remained at the same rate of 1 FF = 50 CFA. In addition the 
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two Central Banks continued to issue the same CFA. While it was 
still referred to as the CFA franc, the acronym changed meaning: 
("Conununaute Financiere en Afrique") replaces ( "Colonies 
Francaises d'Afrique"). The new framework to govern the 
relationships between France and the countries using the CFA was 
now formerly referred to as the Franc Zone. 
The third period of reference came with the 1974 reforms which 
concerned very particularly the UMOA. As will be seen in the next 
section, the rules governing the FZ put too much emphasis on the 
financial stability aspect, not taking enough account of the 
other needs for development of the african member countries. The 
reforms which occurred in 1974 aimed at the correction of this 
bias. 
In what follows we start with a look at how the FZ is formed. 
a . FZ membership. 
At the beginning in 1960, virtually all the French ex-colonies 
in Sub-Sahara were members of the Zone. This means they had in 
conunon the CFA currency and belonged to the UMOA or the BEAC 
groupl. The members of UMOA at that time were: Benin (ex-
Dahomey), Burkina-Faso (ex-Haute Volta), Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. On the BEAC side, the 
members were: Cameroun, Chad, Congo, Central African Republic and 
Gabon. Some changes concerned UMOA . First Mali left in 1962 but 
eventually returned back in the FZ in 19842 • 
1 Comoros which belongs to neither UMOA (BCEAO group) nor 
the BEAC group is also a member of the FZ. 
2 Crum (1984) gives details on this point of the Malian 
membership. 
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The case of Mauritania was different. In 1966, it quit the Zone 
and never returned. It is worth mentioning at this stage that the 
monetary grouping was paralleled by a trade grouping. In the 
western region of UMOA for example, the CEAO ("Communaute 
Economique de I' Afrique de I' Ouest") was created to promote trade 
between member countries. In a sense the CEAO was meant to 
complement the UMOA on the trade side. It was a tariff free area. 
One of the weaknesses of a structure like UMOA appeared clearly 
in the trade relationships of its members. The bulk of their 
trade was with France and to a less extent with other European 
countries. The institution of the CEAO was directed to impulse 
the trade at the local level. But the experience has shown 
little success since the intra-area represents only 15% of the 
external trade of the UMOA countries. 
As for the BEAC group, a new member joined it in 1985. 
Equatorial Guinea, a former portuguese colony became the 6th 
member of BEAC and the 13 th member of the CFA Zone. This is 
significant considering that the FZ included up to then only 
former French ex-colonies, although one could note that 
Equatorial Guinea represents a very small economy offshore Gabon, 
a geographical location and an economic context which favoured 
very much this move. 
b. Small/large country portrait. 
To start with, let us consider the relative size of the 
economies in question. It is obvious that each individual African 
country of the FZ represents a small economy with respect to the 
French economy in the sense this categorisation is used in 
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economics. In addition, the same can be said of the UMOA and/or 
BEAC as a whole, that the relative size of the African side in 
the FZ remains small and corresponds well to the reality of their 
little power in the decision-making of the FZ besides France. To 
give an illustration, UMOA's GDP in 1992 represented 2.0 % of 
France's GDP. The corresponding percentage for BEAC is even 
lower, 1.7 %. In comparison Belgium which may be considered a 
small economy with respect to the US has a level of GDP equal to 
3.8 % of US GDP, that is the equivalent of the African side of 
the FZ compared with France. So the asymmetry in the decision-
making and the relative size of the two economies give substance 
to our representation according to which the FZ appears as a 
monetary union between a small country, namely the group of the 
African members and a large country, namely France. 
Now let us say more about the characterization of the FZ as a 
monetary union between a large economy and a small economy. The 
most important feature is without doubt the peg of the CFA 
currency to the French Franc which remained at a fixed rate 
unchanged since 1948 to the end of 1993. The fixed exchange rate 
regime gave the appearances of a monetary union between France 
and its partners because of this long standing fixity of the 
parity. Even the developments of the international monetary 
system in the early 1970's did not affect it. Indeed during the 
Bretton Woods era, fixed exchange rate regimes were the rule with 
very few exceptions such as the float of Canada. Developed 
countries of the western world maintained fixed rates around the 
dollar standard. Changes in parity were allowed along strict 
rules as defined by article IV of the IMF Statutes. Developing 
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countries followed the same pattern and most of them pegged their 
currencies to a key currency (dollar, sterling or french franc) . 
When the system of fixed parities came to an end in 1973, the key 
currencies started to float among them. For the developing 
countries, they did not let their currencies float as such except 
for a few of them, but most of them started to quit the 
traditional peg regime. Instead they resorted more and more to 
a basket peg, crawling peg and other regimes which provided more 
flexibility. The peg to the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) for 
example provided a proxy of a basket that a number of countries 
have used. In 1976 the cases of peg to a single currency peg 
represented 62.6 % compared with 23.4% of pegs to a composite and 
14 % of flexible arrangements. In 1989, these figures became 
respectively 38.2%, 28.2 % and 33.6% respectively3. The pegs to 
a composite include SDR pegs and other currency basket pegs. The 
flexible arrangements regroup all of the other categories, the 
managed float for example. 
Another feature of the FZ is that the convertibility of the CFA 
currency is guaranteed by France. In counterpart, the African 
members of the Zone are required to deposit 65 % of their external 
reserves with the French Treasury in an account known as the 
operation account where all reserves are pooled . This account is 
seen as a central piece of the cooperation between France and its 
partners. But for long, the support by France as the guarantor 
per se of the system might not be that significant or at least 
proved to be very facilitated for two reasons. On the one hand, 
the overall balance of payments of the african members gave 
3 These figures are given in Joshi (1990). 
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constantly a surplus up in the early 1980's. On the other hand, 
there is a proviso in the rules governing the CFA zone which 
requires that the necessary adjustments be implemented by the 
countries in deficit when the net assets go below a critical 
level. One might question whether or to what extent the latter 
rule itself had actually worked. The functioning of the FZ 
operation account as a pool of reserves needs nevertheless some 
emphasis as this allowed countries to run deficits of their 
balance of payments provided this does not last too long or 
result in an overall deficit for the group as a whole. France 
which acts as the guarantor of the last resort plays a key role 
to overview the mechanism and to decide in practice when an 
imbalance is deemed unsustainable. 
Another characteristic is that there are no capital controls 
within the Zone. Capital can move freely between any two 
countries including France. The three elements (fixity of the 
parity, convertibility of the CFA and free mobility of capital) 
combine each other to give to the FZ the characteristics of a 
monetary union between France and the members of the FZ. It 
holds true that the three Central Banks (the French Central Bank, 
BCEAO and BEAC) are different, managed by different bodies. But 
it is quite clear that BCEAO and BEAC cannot act independently 
of the Central Bank of France. One might say that for long, BCEAO 
and BEAC appeared as branches of the latter: 1n the UMOA case for 
example, the Board of Executive Directors4 consisted of 12 
representatives from France and 12 from the UMOA countries (2 per 
4 Let us note also that the Board of Executive Directors is 
not a currency Board. 
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country). But, and in support of the asymmetric representation 
small/large country, the UMOA did not have any representation of 
this sort at the French Central Bank bodies. One could note that 
later with the reforms the number of 12 representatives from 
France was reduced to two . 
1.2. The CFA area: the case of UMOA 
A description more in detail of the FZ is proposed in what 
follows. But the description will be limited to the UMOA case to 
simplify and also given the strong similarities between UMOA and 
its counterpart in the central region. In fact the same 
construction has been applied to geographically different groups 
so to say if one had to compare the two institutions. 
a. Structures 
The UMOA countries have in common the CFA currency and a common 
Central Bank as mentioned above. The body charged with the 
management of the monetary policy within UMOA is the Board of 
Executive Directors in which each country including France has 
two representatives. It 1S presided by the Governor of the 
Central Bank (BCEAO). The voting procedure has put emphasis on 
the solidarity between the member countries. Although the 
economies have significantly different sizes (Cote d'Ivoire and 
Senegal constitute the two main economies), the voting system 
does not introduce a differentiation along these lines: it 
follows "one member one vote " rule . If one had to find some 
trace of the way the relative importance of the economies of the 
member countries is taken into account, it might be in the fact 
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that up to now, the Governor is a representative of Cote d'Ivoire 
and the Headquarters of BCEAO are located in the capital of 
Senegal while the other countries take the posts of Vice-
Governors in turn. In any case the principle of solidarity seems 
to work well and it includes the system of reserve pooling 
through the operation account. 
Above the Board of Executive Directors, we have the UMOA 
Conference of Ministers, attended by the Ministers ' of Finance and 
Plan from each country. This Conference supervises the work of 
the Executive Directors and represents the appropriate forum 
setting for the monetary policy. Finally we have the Summit of 
the Heads of State which meets annually upon questions of general 
orientations and also constitutes the appropriate level to 
examl.ne for example issues of membership (withdrawal or new 
entry) or nomination of the Governor. At the Summit level as well 
as the Ministerial level, each UMOA member country takes the 
presidency in turn. 
The Central Bank, BCEAO, from its Headquarters in Dakar ensures 
its coverage of the different economies of the area by means of 
its national branches. The national branch has a key role to play 
for the success of the overall policy of the BCEAO. Its staff has 
clearly the status of belonging to the Central Bank staff and in 
no sense to the national administration. Its Director is chosen 
from the Central Bank staff and nominated by the Governor after 
consultation with the national Government . 
The role of the national branch has two main aspects. First it 
is present at the starting point when the Central Bank engages 
in the process of assessing the needs of each economy. Every 
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year, the staff of the national branch undertakes, 1n liaison 
with the national administration an assessment based on the 
forecasting of the economy for the year ahead. The task aims at 
the determination of the money supply which will be required. The 
results of the exercise are then put through to the Headquarters. 
At the level of the Headquarters, after having received the 
different proposals from the national levels, the Central Bank 
has to put them together, evaluate their consistency with the 
level of net assets of the individual country in question and 
also their consistency with the overall financial situation of 
the group and the resources of the Central Bank. Having 
completed this task, the Governor then presents the new 
proposals, modified as necessary, back to the member countries 
via the Board of Executive Directors and the Ministerial 
Conference. 
The second aspect of the role played by the national branch 
regards the implementation of the monetary policy. How it carries 
out this 1n liaison with the national Government can be best 
captured by looking at the activities of the Credit Committee 
( "Comi te National du Credi t" ). Placed under the presidency of the 
Finance Minister, the Credit Committee as its name suggests, 
monitors the credit counterpart of the money supply. Indeed the 
decisions taken at the level of the Central Bank and the UMOA 
allocate the aggregate money supply between the member countries 
on the basis of the balance of payments constraints, the 
inflation target and the projected level of output. Monitoring 
the level of credit channelled into the economy represents the 
mean of achieving the objectives of the monetary policy. 
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The task of the Credit Committee is greatly facilitated by the 
UMOA rule about the financing of Government deficit. The finance 
provided by the Central Bank to the Government should not exceed 
20% of the fiscal receipts obtained in the previous year. This 
leads the Committee to focus on the other allocation of credit. 
There ~s even a further simplification in the sense that a 
significant amount of the private economy goes to the financing 
of the cash crops like coffee, cacao, groundnut, cotton etc ... 
The Government determines the prices to the producers as official 
prices. The quantities of the harvests sold in the official 
market are well known. In general, the Central Bank accepts to 
finance these agricultural products automatically, without any 
restriction and to adjust its initial target of money supply if 
necessary, for example when the level of harvest proves to be 
higher than initially expected. The cash crops are essentially 
export goods and the more a member country has of them, the 
better for the balance of payments. However one difficulty which 
arises very often relates to the relative price paid to the 
producers of the cash crop compared with the world market price. 
If for example, the export price gets less than the price to the 
producer and that the Government chooses to subsidize the cash 
crop , then the national Treasury has to pay for the differential 
to the primary banks which participate in the financing scheme. 
In case the Treasury fails to pay on time, the corresponding 
amounts are converted into normal credit and this may crowd out 
the other sectors of the private economy. 
The way the Credit Committee deals with the money lending to the 
companies takes the following form. It decides a maximum amount 
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beyond which the commercial bank which is lending money needs 
approval 0 f the Commi t tee. The procedure goes through the 
national branch. The maximum amount criterion applies to the 
total of money a given company can borrow in a year. 
The functioning of the UMOA as just outlined seems to g~ve more 
freedom of action to the Central Bank than is usual in the 
developing world where the independence of the Central Bank is 
usually curtailed. This is most damaging in terms of inflation 
record to the extent that the Government does not find other 
domestic sources of financing its deficit but the cash from the 
Central Bank. In the context of UMOA, the multilateral status of 
the Central Bank seems the most prominent factor to -give it more 
leverage for the conduct of the monetary policy. One can take the 
case of the rule about Government financing which requires the 
credit from the Central bank not to exceed 20% of the fiscal 
receipts of the previous year. Any given member country will be 
deterred from free-riding because it will face not only the 
opposition of the Central Bank but also the disapproval of the 
other member countries. In the domain of Government financing and 
other domains, free-riding for whatever reason would represent 
a real threat to the system. 
A collusive behaviour may occur however. Let us imagine the case 
where the sum of the money supplies which are desired at the 
level of the national level exceeds the level that the Central 
Bank would recommend. If each country was concerned only with 
obtaining its desired level of money supply , in principle the 
Central Bank seems powerless to oppose such a demand in view of 
the present structure except for the representation of France at 
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the Board of Executive Directors. One may therefore think that 
the system will not work well without the French representation. 
But it is difficult to establish a priori an element of validity 
about the assumption of collusive behaviour. In any case taking 
account of such fears, the departure of France would imply 
reinforcing the powers of the Governor. 
The present structure has some advantages which need to be 
preserved as far as possible. Namely, the di versi ty of the 
situations and specific needs of the different member countries 
should find a way through to the Central Bank concerns. The 
representations of the member countries in the institutions of 
the UMOA seems to provide a channel for the expression of the 
national preoccupations and needs. Is it feasible to augment the 
independence of the Central Bank without wiping out these 
possibilities of communication and feedback? Again, in case 
France happens to leave for whatever reason, the way forward for 
the member countries would consist of accepting some sacrifice 
by delegating more prerogatives to the Governor. At the same 
time, an improved structure may be put in place to approximate 
the representative role of the present structure. The real 
challenge will be about the relationship between the monetary 
policy and the other economic policies for each individual 
country and the national policies between them. 
b. The 1974 reforms 
The UMOA system as it worked during the first decade of its 
existence showed a number of unsatisfactory aspects . This had led 
to the decision to undertake reforms in November 1973, the so-
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called 1974 reforms. Our review includes two years only of the 
period before the reforms. Consequently the description given 
above refers to the new system after the reforms took place . 
Whatever the limits of the results obtained by UMOA since then, 
it seems worth having a look at what the reforms attempted to do 
and to what extent they represented a milestone in the life of 
the organization. 
First, it is with the new Statutes that came the institution of 
the Conference of the Heads of States as indicated earlier on. 
Also the new Treaty decided the change of the location for the 
BCEAO headquarters from Paris to Dakar. During all the first 
decade, the common Central Bank operated from Paris. It did so 
through the national branches it established in each country. The 
national branches were themselves managed by representatives from 
France. The changes led to the replacement of the latter by the 
domestic staff of the BCEAO, the sense of which was given to mean 
"a step not directed against a particular or collective interest 
but as a fair and legitim aspiration ... " 5 . 
The new Statutes continued to give much weight to the financial 
stability in UMOA. The provision to undertake the necessary 
adjustment, by increasing the rediscount rate and other 
complementary actions as soon as the ratio of external assets to 
the short term liabilities falls to a critical level (as a result 
of deficits of the balance of payments) remained at the same 
place. But two key words appeared in the new text, that is, 
development and harmonisation (of the economies). The creation 
5 Speech by the BCEAO Governor at the ceremony of nomination 
of the Senegalese Director of the BCEAO agency in Dakar. 
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of a common Development Bank, BOAD ("Banque Ouest-Africaine de 
Developpement"), occurred to respond to the development 
objective. The BOAD was created to support the investment effort 
in the UMOA area. Its capital had been subscribed half by the 
Central Bank BCEAO and half by the UMOA member countries. 
The coordination of fiscal policies had been a concern. The lack 
of it can impinge on the effectiveness of conducting a common 
monetary policy. For example, Government deficits have a direct 
effect on the balance of payments of the country in question and 
also of the group as a whole, everything else being equal. 
However coordination in the fiscal domain remains very limited 
in the light of what the reforms introduced . Before 1974, the 
overall ceiling or allocation to each country by the Central Bank 
bore on the credit to the private sector, to the exclusion of the 
financing going to the Treasury. The latter category of financing 
was governed by the Statutes that it should not exceed 15%. The 
reforms set the limit up to 20%. In addition, the overall ceiling 
of credit that the Central Bank will allocate to each country 
will extend to include the bank financing received by the 
Treasury, according to the new Statutes which leave to the 
National Credit Committee the charge to determine the share 
between the private sector and the Government Budget. But the 
right of each Government to resort to the financing by the 
Central Bank, provided the amount does not exceed the 20% limit, 
was clearly expressed. Because in practice, the limit has proved 
to be a binding constraint, there is little change compared with 
the previous situation. 
The reforms aimed also at dissipating the view that the 
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financing by the Central Bank was automatic. This Vlew resulted 
from the fact the Credit Committee used to set refinancing 
ceilings to commercial banks as well as to individual 
enterprises. The new rules abolished such specific allocations 
although the practice to some extent seem to have settled again 
along the pre-1974 lines. Also the distinction between the credit 
eligible to the Central Bank discount and the non-eligible credit 
was dropped as well. The Central Bank was however still faced 
wi th the problem of the banks using their own resources to 
finance the demand for credit from their customers. This case 
arose in periods for example of commodity prlce booms. In 
addition, the banks used the facility given to them and allowing 
them to borrow external sources for their domestic lending. 
The reforms gave to the Central Bank the green light for a more 
active policy with regards interest rates. The developments on 
the international financial market required some adjustment in 
the role of the BCEAO about interest rate policy. The diagrams 
1.1 and 1.2 show how the deposit rate and the money market rate 
had to mirror the changes in the interest rates in France. The 
same could be said of the lending rates, marking the departure 
from a policy of cheap money which characterized the approach of 
the Central Bank during the pre-reform period. At the same time, 
the objective of development emphasized in the new Statutes led 
the Central bank to introduce preferential rates for some 
categories of credits. The favourable treatment applies 
essentially to the financing of cash crops and the lending to 
small and medium enterprises. The concerns of the reformers also 
led to the set-up of a money market covering the UMOA area. The 
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management of the money market was given to the Central Bank. The 
reformers with this creation aimed at promoting the possibilities 
of capital movements within UMOA and more efficient allocation 
of resources at the sub-regional level. The decision was 
complemented by the limits placed on the banks about the amounts 
of liquid assets they can keep abroad. 
It appears that the parity between the CFA currency and the 
French franc to which the former is pegged was not affected by 
the reforms. As before, any change in the parity will require the 
agreement of every member country and France. The convertibility 
of the CFA currency was continued with the support of France, and 
the UMOA countries having to deposit part of exports with the 
operations account open in French francs in the books of the 
French Treasury. 
Other measures brought about by the reforms concerned the issue 
of bank control. The mechanism of control in each country was a 
body which involved both the Government and the Central Bank. But 
the situation of financial troubles that the banking system 
experienced in the late 1980's tends to demonstrate that the 
safeguards did not work. The main weakness was that the aims and 
means of action were not clearly specified. In Senegal the 
difficulties affected very seriously banks such as ex-BCS, ex-
BIAO, ex-USB and other financial institutions. While BIAO and USB 
managed to remain alive through restructuration plans with a 
modified ownership becoming respectively CBAO and Credit 
Lyonnais, all of the others in trouble disappeared, including 
those which were set up to promote development in specific 
sectors (agriculture, tourism, fishing ... ). 
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The difficulties which confronted the banking system recently 
has led to the creation of a new institution of control, separate 
from the Central Bank, acting at the UMOA level as a whole. 
c. The policy instruments 
The previous subsection has touched upon the financing of the 
economy by the banking system. This is a central aspect for the 
concern of the monetary policy. We have already indicated the 
procedure whereby Governments of the UMOA can get financing from 
the banking system. The rule which allows member countries to 
resort to the domestic banking system only up to a given 
proportion of their fiscal receipts as fixed by the Statutes, 
represents a powerful deterrent against too much inflation 
finance. But it is worth examining what the practice has 
indicated. 
One can say that the rule has been literally followed. However 
this has not influenced Government budget imbalances. In 
practice, the Treasury usually has tapped other sources of 
finance instead of restraining itself to the amount available 
from the Central Bank. The main alternative has been to resort 
to external borrowing. Huge amounts have been borrowed from 
abroad to finance public investments essentially but not 
exclusively, the experience has shown that some of this amount 
has gone to finance the current consumption in the form of 
subsidies for example. The two other elements of Government 
financing have taken the form, first of payment arrears due by 
the Treasury to domestic companies which provide it with services 
, and second, of the financing given by the banks to parastatals. 
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In the latter case, it does not make much difference whether the 
lending goes to the Treasury or to the parastatal since the 
Government provides the explicit or implicit guarantee of last 
resort to the parastatal. 
The refinancing by the Central Bank and the reserve requirement 
against commercial banks deposits represent the two main tools 
the Central Bank has to influence the liquidity in the economy. 
In principle, any primary bank which has lent to a company can 
turn to the Central Bank and submit the loan for refinancing. 
Also, a priori, the Central Bank can enforce reserve requirements 
on to the commercial banks. This aims to the reduction of the 
liquidity the banks can use for lending. In practice, the Central 
Bank has not used the tool of reserve requirement. As for the 
refinancing, it has been considered for long as quite automatic 
or at least it has actually functioned like that. At other times, 
the difficulty took another form. Because it did not use the 
instrument of deposit requirement, the Central Bank was faced 
with the problem of some banks which had enough liquidity to 
bypass the refinancing constraint, especially in periods of 
commodity booms. 
In the UMOA, quantitative control has constituted more and more 
the instrument for monitoring the level of credit. The method can 
be described as follows. Each year, the growth of the total 
credit for the national economy towards the companies and 
households is determined as a result of the decision which sets 
the objective and means of the monetary policy. That growth rate 
is then applied to the amount each commercial bank lent in the 
previous year. This determines the quantity of money a given 
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commercial bank will be allowed to lend to its customers. The 
advantage of the method seems its simplicity. But some concerns 
arise because it gives an edge to the biggest banks and it does 
not reward those banks which strive to be more successful and to 
increase their share of the domestic market. Combined with 
unrealistic interest rates, this may lead to inefficiency in the 
allocation of resources. 
The UMOA has a common policy about interest rates. The deposit 
interest rates are the same in the different countries. The same 
rule applies for the other categories of interest rates: lending 
rate and money market rate. In addition, these rates cannot 
differ substantially from the rates prevailing in France: as 
indicated earlier on, there exist no capital controls within the 
FZ. Consequently any divergence between interest rates in France 
and UMOA would provoke in principle a significant movement of 
capital towards the former if it offers a higher rate. 
The comparison between the deposit interest rates can be seen 
in fig 1.1 which covers the period 1972-92. The period of the 
e arly 1970's corresponds to a sharp rise in the interest rates. 
But the interest rate of UMOA was relatively stable between 1976 
and 1982 compared to the rate in France. From 1982, a strong 
correlation links the two rates. The same can be said of the 
money market rates all along the period 1978-1992 6 • One can note 
that from 1984 and increasingly I the interest rate in UMOA 
displays a margin with respect to the rate in France. We 
attribute this differential to the effect of expectations that 
6 The data set starts from 1978 for the UMOA money market, 
corresponding to its date of creation following the 1974 reforms. 
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there might be a change in the parity of the CFA currency. Indeed 
this period is where some devaluations of the FF occurred. Also, 
as a matter of fact, the prospect related to the "Project'92" of 
a common market in Europe was seen in some sections of the UMOA 
area as the signal of possible changes In the FZ system. Several 
times, the monetary authorities had to make declarations to 
reassure the market that the parity of the CFA/FF would not be 
affected. 
Fig 1.3 compares the discount rate in France and UMOA during the 
period 1972-92. The discount rate in France went up sharply 
between 1972 and 1974. It fell back close to the 1972 level and 
then fluctuated somewhat between 1975 and 1977. From 1977 until 
1992, it remained constant at 9.5%. The sub-period can be viewed 
as the transition period after the end of the Bretton Woods 
standard of fixed exchange rates and the beginning of the system 
of floating exchange rates. The fixity of the discount rate seems 
to indicate that the float has enabled France to have in control 
the domestic monetary policy. Fig 1.4 shows that the ratio of the 
money supply to GDP (Gross domestic product) has remained 
relatively stable during most of the period under review. 
In contrast, the discount rate In UMOA had been prone to more 
fluctuations. From 3.5% in 1972, it kept increasing step by step 
up to 12.5% in 1982. It then varied significantly: first a 
decrease down to 8.5% in 1987 followed by an increase up to 12.5% 
by 1992. The money growth in UMOA seems to have been a worry and 
to constitute the reason for this increase in the discount rate 
(fig 1.5). The ratio of the money stock to GDP for both Cote 
d'Ivoire and Senegal, the two main economies of UMOA, increased 
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significantly between 1972 and 1977/78. Inflation was running 
high at 15% in Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. The discount rate was 
increased in a sort of response to counter the increase in the 
liquidity. 
A closer look at the picture reveals the difficulties one faces 
in establishing an appropriate monetary policy in UMOA. After the 
initial increase, the discount rate was maintained constant from 
1975 to 1979, probably at the view that the money/GDP ratio 
decreased in 1975 both in Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. Then the 
ratio started to rise again until 1977 for Cote d'Ivoire and 1978 
for Senegal. The decrease which followed lasted six years for 
Cote d'Ivoire but only one year for Senegal. In the latter case 
the ratio increased sharply in 1980 and 1981. Consequently the 
discount rate was raised from 8 % in 1979 to 10.5% in 1980 and 
1981 and 12.5% in 1982. 
But we note that the liquidity ratio in Cote d' Ivoire was 
decreasing during the sub-period 1978-82. The increase in the 
discount rate was directed to counter the liquidity problem in 
Senegal, which may penalise the other e conomies which do not have 
such a problem. 
The situation is reversed afte rwards. One can see that the 
reduction in the discount rate had responded to the decrease in 
the liquidity in Senegal, down from 12.5% in 1982 to 8.5 % 1n 
1986-87. Meanwhile the liquidity in Cote d'Ivoire started to rise 
again from 1983. Eventually the Central Bank responded to this 
increase by raising the discount rate to 9.5 % in 1988 and 11% in 
1989. During this period the liquidity in Senegal was down to a 
record low. The increase in the discount rate this time was meant 
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to address the liquidity problem 1n Cote d' Ivoire. But this 
penalized the other member countries with normal or even less 
than normal liquidity. 
We see the type of difficulty in setting a common monetary 
policy. The method adopted by the UMOA seems to have been the 
following, that the instruments or actions were directed at the 
specific economy in which an overliquidity had appeared, even if 
this means that the other economies might have suffered from 
these actions. 
The same type of problem can be seen for the establishment of 
the deposit rates. After taking into account the inflation rate 
in the three countries, the real interest rates have different 
profiles. The real interest rate in France fluctuated and 
remained negative up into the early 1980' s. But it became 
positive for the rest of the period and in an upward trend. The 
real rates in Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal seemed to vary in an 
inverse relationship. Because the inflation rates differ 
significantly, the common deposit rate in nominal terms leads to 
a different behaviour of the real rates. Only from 1988, do we 
observe a positive rate for both countries as can be seen in fig 
1.6. 
The curves of fig 1.7 relate to the lending offered to the 
private sector, namely the line "Claims on the Private Sector" 
in the Monetary Survey of the IFS classification. They depict the 
ratio of these claims to GDP for France, Cote d' Ivoire and 
Senegal. If one takes the case of France as the standard, then 
the financing of the private sector seems to have performed not 
very well in UMOA. The levels for Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal at 
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the starting point in 1972 are clearly lower, and after a mild 
increase they remained roughly constant except for Cote d'Ivoire 
which benefited a sharp increase in 1981. After 1983, the 
relative claims to the private sector decreased in the two 
countries. One can observe a very large gap in the 1980's between 
the curve for France and the curves for Cote d' Ivoire and 
Senegal. 
1.3. Strains on the system 
In the last decade, the African countries of the FZ faced 
serious difficulties in the form of slow or negative economic 
growth and financial disequilibria. This relative bad performance 
seems to contrast with the results achieved in the decade before. 
A climate of crisis and unfavourable mood (i.e. prior to the 
devaluation of January 1994) seems to have affected most of the 
African member countries. This section gives in highlight some 
factors which have very probably contributed to this. 
a. France more in Europe 
The long relationship between France and its African ex-colonies 
in the FZ appears more and more challenged by the appeal for 
France to get closer and closer to its partners in Europe. France 
has rights and duties in Europe which appear different from the 
situation in the FZ. The rules of the game on one side differ 
from the other side 1.n a sense unfavourable for the member 
countries of the FZ. 
One example of illustration 1.S the trade relationship between 
France and some countries like Senegal. The latter received a 
favourable treatment from France with regard some of its exports 
29 
in that the commodity export price was kept above the world 
level. This special treatment had to be dropped in the process 
of establishing the Common Market in Europe. More generally, 
African members of the FZ took simply the status of ACP (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific) partners of the EC and there was no longer 
a difference between the FZ members and the other ACP members as 
far as France was concerned through the activities of the EC, in 
matters of trade for example. The existence of the FZ and what 
might be viewed as a permanent peg of the CFA to the French franc 
would normally imply a framework oriented to facilitate further 
the movement of goods and production factors within the Zone. 
Instead the trend has taken the inverse direction with regard to 
the relationships between France and its FZ partners. 
Also a matter of concern the adjustments of parity affecting the 
FF. They can be traced back to 1969 for the period relevant to 
the experience of the FZ countries, that is from 1960 on. The 
devaluations of the FF have always been associated with the bumpy 
road of France into Europe. This is important to the FZ issue 
since these devaluations have cast the most striking contrast 
with respect to the unchanged fixity of the parity between the 
CFA and the FF for almost haIfa c entury. Why, it could be asked, 
can it be right for one rate to be rigid while the other adjusts 
so often? This is a key issue which needs to be examined. 
Considering the FZ raises the question of what next, such as 
more economic integration or something like that between African 
members of the FZ and France. An observer from the 1960's would 
have asked the question several times only to realise the 
standstill. The fact is that France could not embark upon closer 
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economic links on both fronts at the same time. The program of 
a Cornmon Market in Europe set the limits beyond which the trade 
links and related forms of cooperation between France and its FZ 
partners could not go. As a matter of fact, the progress towards 
an economic integration in Europe has presented the FZ system as 
actually falling behind, more marginal than ever. 
The FZ has really no prospect more than to remain a simple 
currency peg between a small country and a large country, as far 
as the economic relationships are concerned. The experience up 
to now in the construction of a monetary union in Europe tends 
to confirm that view which is quite obvious to some respect, were 
not the long fixity of the parity CFA/FF. 
On the monetary front, the program and the developments in 
Europe all display the profile of " le fait accompli" from the 
point of view of France's partners in the FZ. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the CFA countries attended the journeys 
in and out of the "Tunnel" as well as the periods of turmoil in 
the EMS, but their attendance was the most passive possible. One 
positive interpretation of these facts would be that the FZ 
countries behaved as partners devoting their lot to their large 
partner which in turn was in charge to promote the conditions of 
exchange rate stability at the international level. A less 
favourable view would present the actions of France as simply 
more motivated by its concerns about Europe, completely 
deconnected with the situation in the other FZ countries. 
In any case, most observers admit that the difficulties of 1969, 
resulting in the devaluation of the FF and the revaluation of the 
Deutch Mark brought about the resolution to set up a framework 
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towards more monetary integration in Europe. The second Barre 
plan and the second Werner report represent centrepieces in the 
process which constituted the background of the "Snake" (in the 
Tunnel) arrangement created in 1972. But France left in 1974, 
returned in 1975 before leaving it definitively the following 
year. A number of other countries experienced difficulties ~n 
maintaining their currency stability with the Snake. 
In 1979, a new system, the EMS, replaced this arrangement. The 
view of close observers of the EMS at its creation considers that 
the decision to set it up was a political one more than an 
economic one. To that extent, it may be difficult to assess 
directly the relevance with the question of the FZ countries . 
However one can note the relatively large number of currency 
realignments within the EMS during the period 1979-86, again from 
the viewpoint of the FZ countries. To take the cases most 
relevant given the level of trade with the FZ, there were seven 
reevaluations of the DM, five devaluations of the Lira and, four 
devaluations and one reevaluation of the FF. For the latter, the 
devaluations occurred successively in 1981 (3.5 %), 1982 (5.75%), 
1983 (2.5%) and 1986 (2%). After a period of stability from 1987, 
another shock occurred in the summer of 1992 which led to the 
reform of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and "the widening of 
the maximum fluctuations limits for the bilateral rates". 
Despite the 1992 crisis, one important feature of the EMS is the 
commitment of the member countries to coordinate their economic 
policies. For the mechanism to work, a certain degree of economic 
coordination ~s required. This means the need for inflation 
convergence. In the first half of the 1980's, some EC countries 
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including France and Belgium undertook deflationary policies to 
meet the constraints as implied by the mechanisms of the EMS. In 
case where the national rates did not converge enough, the 
differential led to the realignments of the concerned currencies. 
Clearly, the European dimension has taken an increasingly part 
in the definition and the implementation of the economic policies 
in each EC country. France is no exception. Its economic policies 
have more and more abode to its European membership. The 
Maastricht Treaty, in creating the European Union is the latest 
move towards more integration. In that sense, France has got 
closer to its European partners in contrast to its relationships 
with the other FZ member countries, which may be characterized 
as a mere rigid status-quo. 
b. The dimensions of the shocks 
During the period under review 1972-93, the world economy 
witnessed a number of perturbations which cast a contrasting 
picture compared with the period before. The developing countries 
were adversely affected. This marked actually the "end of the 
golden era" for most of them. The disturbances in question range 
from the commodity price variations to the fluctuations between 
the key currencies and the movements ln the interest rates on the 
international financial markets. As very small but largely open 
economies, the African FZ countries faced directly these external 
disturbances. Some of them experienced, in addition, severe 
domestic shocks such as droughts and crop failures. Against this 
background of a particularly unstable environment, the continued 
fixity of the CFA peg provided the very contrast of the period. 
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(i) The commodity prices 
The African members of the FZ are typically commodity-exporting 
economies. Generally, each of them relies for its exports on one 
or two of the following commodities: coffee and cacao, cotton, 
fishrneal, groundnut oil, palm oil, petrol, phosphate and uranium. 
On the other hand, rice represents a largely imported good and 
its price may affect significantly the terms of trade. Diagrams 
1.8 to 1.10 give an illustration of the fluctuations. Some 
additional comments will concern some of the commodities. 
The price pattern between 1972 and 1992 is similar for cocoa and 
coffee, marked by a sharp increase during the sub-period 1972-
1977. The price reached an all-time record in 1977 with 172.0 US 
cents per pound compared to 29.1 US cents per pound in 1972 for 
cacao, and with 234.7 US cents per pound compared to 50.3 US 
cents in 1972 for coffee. Then for the rest of the period, there 
was a sharp and sustained decrease in the price of both products, 
except for a slight upward change in 1983-84 for cacao and 1984-
86 for coffee. Towards the end of the period in 1992, the price 
of cacao was back at its level in 1973 with 50.4 US cents per 
pound. The same applies to coffee: the price fell back to 63.66 
US cents per pound close to its 1973 level. 
Cotton price had also an erratic behaviour during the period. 
The main changes occurred from the mid-1970's when the price 
soared to reach 77 US cents per pound in 1976 compared with 36 
US cents in 1972, and then remained high until 1984. It 
fluctuated afterwards. Equally erratic was the price of fishrneal 
and groundnut oil. The latter undergoes on average a reversal 
every two years. 
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The case of crude oil is of course well known, notably with 
regard its three-fold increase in 1974, the first oil crisis. The 
second oil shock occurred at the end of the 1970's and early 
1980's. The price remained high until 1986 when it dropped by 50% 
at a level relatively stable thereafter, except for the rise 
which occurred relating to the Gulf War. 
As for the phosphate, the price increased six-fold in two years 
from its level in 1972 to 68 US $ per metric ton. It started to 
decrease to 29 us $ per metric ton in 1978. Then one can 
distinguish three sub-periods corresponding to different price 
levels: 1980-82 at a price level of around 46 us $ per metric 
ton, 1983-88 at 34 us $ per metric ton and the last sub-period 
1989-92 at 41 US $. 
The data available on uranium prices indicate a cumulative 
decrease of 63% between 1980 and 1990. There is only one major 
exporter of uranium among the FZ countries and that is Niger. 
While the above commodities constitute export goods for the FZ 
economies, rice is an imported good, for the people living ~n 
town especially. Because rice represents a staple good, its price 
receives a great deal of attention. Important fluctuations 
characterized the period. The coefficient of variation for the 
rice price defined as the ratio between the squared root of the 
variance and the average value equals 0.296 during the period 
1972-92. 
We can note that in terms of the coefficient of variation as an 
indicator of their variability, the following commodities appear 
as having the most volatile prices: cacao, coffee ' and phosphate 
and the less volatile are cotton, fishmeal and groundnut oil. The 
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highest coefficient of variation (obtained with cacao price) and 
the lowest coefficient of variation ( obtained with cotton price) 
are 0.424 and 0.195 respectively. 
(ii) The fluctuations between key currencies 
Because of the CFA peg to the FF, any fluctuations between the 
FF and key currencies (US dollar, yen, DM, £ pound and Italian 
lira) constitute exogenous shocks for the FZ countries similar 
to the fluctuations in their export commodity prices or terms of 
trade. We note that the FZ members have attempted to diversify 
their external trade, and some progress has been achieved about 
the destination of exports 'as well as the source of imports 
although France remains clearly their main trade partner. The 
trade of the African FZ countries with France represented 54.0 
% in 1972 of their trade with the group of industrial countries. 
In 1992, this share was down to 38.5 %. The change has concerned 
more the exports than the imports. The share of France in the 
exports of African FZ countries started with 46.7 % in 1972 and 
decreased to 26.7 % in 1992. The share in the imports of the 
african FZ countries decreased much less from 60.4 % in 1972 to 
52.2 %.The pattern of the relationships between key currencies 
matter for the FZ countries to the extent of this trade 
diversification. 
Diagrams 1.11a and 1.11b show the fluctuations of the currenc~es 
with respect to the US dollar. The data show that significant 
variations happened all along, notably in the first half of the 
1980's. 
Actually from 1980, the European currenc~es started to 
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depreciate vis-a-vis the us dollar, although the pound began a 
year later. Also the yen depreciated from 1979. This overall 
movement of the European and Japanese currencies reflects the 
rise of the American currency on all financial markets and which 
made many of these nervous. 
In the case of the FF for example, at the end of 1972, one 
dollar exchanged for 5.12 FF. The value of the French currency 
rose to 4.71 FF/US$ in 1977 and 4.02 FF/US$ 1n 1979. From then, 
it decreased continuously to reach 9.59 FF/US$ in 1984. 
Eventually, the "landing" of the dollar with respect to the FF 
as well as the other key currencies occurred and it reached a 
stable level from 1987 on. Our calculations ·confirm the 
representation given with the graphics, that the FF was more 
stable than the Italian lira but less stable than the DM,and the 
pound, during the period 1972-92. The non-stability of the FF 
vis-a-vis the dollar might affect the trade of FZ countries with 
us. As for the other currencies, the behaviour of the FF seems 
to have been fairly well correlated with the Italian lira and the 
pound but not with the DM (except for the most recent period) and 
the yen, as can be seen from diagrams 1.12 and 1.13. The overall 
pattern of the fluctuations between the FF and the other 
currencies combined with a fixed peg of the CFA currency to the 
former again exposed the efforts for trade diversification of the 
African FZ member countries to considerable exogenous shocks 
regards the efforts for the diversification of FZ external trade. 
(iii) The interest rates 
Like the other developing countries, the FZ countries suffered 
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from the debt problem, the causes of which are attributed to both 
internal and external factors by most analysts. One can see the 
extent of the difficulties by the fact that the FZ countries 
resorted largely to the Paris Club (nearly every year for most 
of them), to reschedule their debt with the donor countries. 
The profile taken by the interest rates on the international 
markets played an important role in the advent of the 
international debt crisis. It is no coincidence that the year 
(1982) when Mexico failed to honour its debt, which triggered the 
crisis, was also the year when the six-month basis Libor (London 
interbank offer rate) reached its record level (see fig 1.14). 
In the years before 1982, the Libor kept rising from 10.75% ln 
1978 to 12.54% in 1980. It then increased sharply to 19.64% in 
1982. A reduction followed, which in 1985 took the Libor back to 
the 1979 level. It holds true that the FZ countries receive a 
large part of their external capital inflows in the form of 
official development assistance. But for some of them a 
significant part their external borrowing included funds from 
private sources and export credits. In addition, the conditions 
of interest rate attached to official aid are related to the 
prevailing Libor. Indeed for a given element of grant, let us say 
25% as this may characterize a typical aid package, the interest 
charges that the low income country bears will be affected by the 
conditions on the international financial markets since these 
represent the basis to determine the interest rate that the donor 
country will decide to offer, taking account of the grant 
element. 
When assessing the effect of interest rates, some analysts go 
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beyond the nominal rates to consider the real interest rates. 
These are derived using the commodity prices as a way to measure 
how the capacity of the debtor and commodity-exporting country 
will be influenced from one year to another by what happens on 
the external markets. Using this indicator, we find that 1982 was 
actually the most difficult year in terms of the real interest 
rate for a country exporting essentially coffee for example, but 
also 1992 is relatively comparable to 1982. For a cacao exporting 
country, the year wi th the biggest real interest rate corresponds 
to 1987 followed by 1982. The case of the other commodities 
confirms the fears that the difficulties the FZ countries faced 
in servicing their debt were inaugurated by, but not limited to, 
the situation of 1982. 
(iv) The Sahelian problem 
The Sahel is the geographic area bordering the Sahara in the 
south. Some countries of the FZ are located in this area: Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal. The Sahelian area has the 
specific feature of erratic weather conditions. Very severe 
droughts occurred during the period under review, with their 
dramatic effects on the level of production in the agricultural 
sector and related sectors in these countries. 
Let us take the case of Senegal for illustration. The harvests 
fluctuated considerably over time. The case of groundnut which 
constitutes the main cash crop for export is shown in fig 1.15 
The surface of land used for this crop did not vary much. All of 
the trough levels correspond to years of drought, with the level 
of production falling to one third the normal level. As the 
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graphic shows, the drought phenomenon happened too frequently, 
nearly every two years on average. 
c. The limits to internal deflation 
The option for internal deflation in the FZ, that is the option 
for relying solely on the reduction in domestic expenditures, in 
choosing to adjust while maintaining the single currency peg at 
an unchanged rate instead of combining the expenditure reduction 
with the use of the exchange rate instrument, imposed a real 
burden on these economies. The description of some 
characteristics help to illustrate this. 
We have seen that the FZ countries are relatively very small and 
open economies. A less favourable characteristic is that except 
a few, they belong to the category of low-income countries in the 
classification of the World Bank. In 1991, the median income per 
capita in the African FZ was only US$390. The median value of 
other indicators give ln 1990: an infant mortality of 111 per 
1000 live births, a primary school enrolment of 59 %. These 
figures 7 on primary health and youth education, when compared 
with the situation in the early 1960's indicate that significant 
progress has been made in three decades. Nevertheless, it appears 
clearly that the situation remains fragile. 
Some countries like Senegal started their adjustment programs 
as early as 1979. But most of the FZ countries entered the 
adjustment process later on, by the mid-1980's. In all cases 
except for one, the IMF and World Bank provided their assistance. 
7 Source: Social indicators of development, 1993 
World Bank 
40 
The exception was Burkina Faso which undertook its own adjustment 
at least until 1991 when the first agreement was reached between 
the Government and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
On the basis of the data avai1ab1es , we provide a brief 
illustration for five countries on the sub-period 1985-89. 
Calculations on the demand elements in nominal terms indicate 
that in four out of the five countries, the aggregate demand 
decreased. Only Senegal managed to increase its aggregate demand. 
We note that each country represents a specific case in the way 
the change in aggregate demand was broken down in the different 
elements: Government consumption, investment and private 
consumption. In Senegal, where the aggregate demand increased by 
5% per year in nominal terms, the increase was 1,9% for 
Government consumption, 5% for investment and 5.6% for private 
consumption. In Cameroun, the aggregate demand decreased by 0.75% 
per year l.n nominal terms. This was the result of an 1.3% 
increase in Government consumption, a decrease of 0.1% and 1.2% 
in investment and private consumption respectively. Benin 
represents a strong bias to the detriment of investment and 
private demand. The Government consumption increased by no less 
than 10% per year while investments fell by 6.3% and private 
consumption by 1%. In Congo, it is the investment component which 
suffered the most, falling by 17.8% per year. The Government 
consumption decreased by 2.5% and private consumption changed 
little with a mere 0.3% increase. The Niger case presents some 
similarities with the Benin case. The Government consumption 
increased by 6.5% per year. The decrease in the aggregate was 
8 Source: IFS/IMF yearbook 1992 
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brought about by the decline 1n investment and private 
consumption by 2.0% and 2.4% respectively. 
The above results are presented as changes 1n nominal terms. 
When set in real terms and per capita, they leave no doubt on the 
effects of the economic crisis on the standards of living. For 
low income countries, deteriorating living standards of this 
scale represent real hardship. But this did not prevent the 
financial situation, that is, the overall balance of payments of 
each of these countries, to worsen without exception and some 
times dramatically. Or put 1n other terms, the adjustment 
although very painful had not gone far enough to reverse the 
balance of payments situation, given the dimension of the 
exogenous shocks. 
If the above sample 1S well representative of the group, the FZ 
countries with a fixed peg of their currency can only cut their 
absorption to adjust and did it to a large extent. They faced the 
following dilemma: either to proceed with the adjustments and 
impose more hardship on the popUlations or face an immediate 
financial bankruptcy unless France and maybe other donors extend 
their financial support. 
The data on the balance of payments indicate that despite the 
efforts of adjustment, the financial situation has deteriorated 
during the period. The overall balance of the African FZ 
countries as a whole showed a surplus each year between 1972 and 
1978: the average surplus was 190 millions US$ per year. For the 
rest of the period, the balance was negative each year and 
increasingly so. The average deficit of the overall balance 
started with 370 millions US$ during the sub-period 1979-85. It 
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went up to 949 millions US$ in 1986 and 2701.5 millions US$ in 
1987, and remained high for the rest of the period: an average 
of 3074.8 millions US$ between 1988 and 1993. 
The effect of the steep decrease in the commodity prices as 
occurred in the mid-1980's seems to have outstripped the efforts 
of adjustment. The description of the situation taking account 
of GDP gives a better idea of the financial imbalances . The 
surplus of the overall balance represented 5.7 %. When the deficit 
appeared for the first time, it was 4.2% of GDP during 1979-85. 
The ratio increased to 7.4% in 19 86, followed by a three-fold 
jump to 22.0% in 1987. It increased even further to 25.7 % on 
average during 1988-93. 
Here the context of the recent period differs from the situation 
in the early 1980's and before in the sense that it has become 
more and more difficult to administer the austerity programs. 
This ~s a new dimension resulting from a process of 
democratisation that the FZ countries have expe rienced more than 
ever before. Multiparty politics will necessarily mean more 
attention to the art of governing, with decision-making hopefully 
being based on the long term objectives on the one hand, but 
having to face the short run concerns on the other hand. 
Conclusion 
The exchange rate regime which characterizes the FZ differs from 
the usual type of exchange rate peg. The highlights given above 
have aimed at drawing this distinction. The number of countries 
involved, the historical dimension and the duration of the fixed 
rate all provide specific features to the FZ. From the economic 
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standpoint, the FZ appears mainly as a monetary un10n between a 
small economy (the group of African FZ members) and a large 
economy (France) . This is a crucial point, and the framework used 
for the modelling exercise in the rest of the paper will 
basically reflect such a portrait. 
A brief look at the functioning of the FZ has given an account 
of some questions about setting up a monetary policy in a 
multilateral context. The reforms which occurred at the end of 
1973 represented an effort to improve and an act of correcting 
some imbalances 1n the system. The development objectives 
received a new emphasis besides the financial stability 
objectives which dominated the first period of the FZ experience. 
Also, the reforms brought about a reduction in the direct 
involvement of France in the management of the monetary 
institutions on the african side of the Zone. The present study 
corresponds essentially to the post- reform period. The use of 
the small/large country model is still justified however, since 
the reforms did not affect the exchange rate regime, known as the 
basic characteristic of the FZ. 
The period of the early 1970' s on had witnessed important 
developments on the international scene, which seemed to combine 
and put increas ing strains on the system of the FZ. The end of 
the Bretton Woods standard of fixed exchange rates and the 
subsequent fluctuations between key currencies, the large 
commodity price variations and the high interest rates on the 
world markets set the contrast between an external environment 
highly instable and the rigidly fixed exchange rate CFA/FF. Where 
the Bretton Woods standard would have even recognized a 
44 
"fundamental disequilibrium" and allowed a change in the parity 
of the CFA currency I the FZ system failed to do so for many 
years. 
Another source of strain comes from the option for Europe of 
France. This lS certainly its natural choice. But the 
consequences might be to increase the frustrations on the african 
side of the Zone. The events which marked the last decade at 
least testify on the difficulty for France to reconcile the 
interests with regards the partners on either side. 
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Chapter 2: Literature on exchange rate regimes: a survey 
Introduction 
The study of exchange rate regimes has conveyed an extensive 
literature ln the last 50 years since the Bretton woods System 
of fixed but adjustable parities was set up in 1944. Considering 
the period starting from the 1950' s to the 1980' s one can 
identify two major factors which had influenced this literature. 
One is the shift from the regimes of fixed exchange rate regimes 
to the regimes of flexible exchange rates ln 1973 when the 
Bretton Woods System finally collapsed. For a long time, the 
analysis of international economics payed much attention to the 
determinants of the balance of payments. Indeed during the period 
of fixed rate regimes, the problem of external balance 
represented one of the main concerns of economic policy about the 
combination of the available instruments to obtain a delicate 
e quilibrium both at the internal and exte rnal level. But the 
discussion on the alternatives to the Bretton system began long 
before 1973. One of the turning points in the debate can be 
traced back to Friedman (1953) and had certainly an important 
role in the advent of the flexible exchange rate regimes, which 
ln turn led the literature since then to focus on the question 
of exchange rate determination instead of balance of payment 
determination. 
The second major factor came with the idea of an economic unlon 
in the European context of the Common Market. The discussion on 
the specific issue of countries forming a currency area was 
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initiated by Mundell (1961) who asked when it would be optimal 
to form an optimum currency area. Two other key contributions 
followed soon with McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) . Still in the 
European context, a number of developments led the EC countries 
to manage their currencies inside predetermined bands, in a 
system of managed floating presently known as the ERM (exchange 
rate mechanism). The target zone literature (Miller & Krugman, 
1992) has dealt with the modelling of this more recent European 
experience. 
With regard to developing countries, the practice before 1973 
was dominated by a fixed peg of their individual currency to a 
key currency (dollar, £, FF). When the Bretton Woods system 
ended, these countries started to consider alternative forms of 
exchange rate policy. Correspondingly, the literature raised the 
issue of optimal peg (Wiliamson, 1982) including the possibility 
of a managed float or a flexible exchange rate regime. 
In what follows, we give a review of these main strands of the 
literature: optimum currency areas, optimal peg and target zone 
in sections 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The present review prepares 
more specifically for chapters 3 and 4 while the two chapters 5 
and 6 will contain an introductory presentation of the relevant 
part of the literature. 
2.1 Optimum currency areas 
In defining an optimum currency area, the literature first 
referred to one specific economic characteristic. The approach 
then extended to a multicriteria analysis. 
a. Mundell (1961): " A theory of optimum currency areas" 
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The paper starts with an observation about the implications of 
a shift in demand between two countries. When such a shift 
happens, the countries l.n question will face the problem of 
ei ther unemployment or inflation. Is there an exchange rate 
formula to get round of the difficulty? In the fixed exchange 
rate case, the dilemma appears clearly: the balance of payments 
constraint requires the country which benefits from the shift in 
demand to inflate or alternatively the deficit country to deflate 
and suffer unemployment. The concept of currency area may define 
a fixed rate regime between countries which agree to sustain a 
fixed relationship between their currencies or it may describe 
a common currency situation. In the latter form, the difficulty 
still appears when the shift in demand occurs between two 
different regions of the currency area. A full employment policy 
at the level of the area would 'mean more inflation pressure. 
Similarly, a stable price policy will imply the acceptance of 
more unemployment. 
Now let us consider the regime of flexible exchange rates. Then 
the problem of balance of payments does not arise any longer 
between the two countries which allow their currencies to adjust 
so that to maintain external balance. Nevertheless, the shift in 
demand may still cause concern. This can be seen with the example 
of two countries such as US and Canada. We may assume that the 
Eastern and Western regions are specialised in the production of 
goods 1 and 2 respectively in the US and Canada alike. Then in 
each country, the change in the relative demand for the two goods 
would raise the same difficulty described above, with a deficit 
region and a surplus region. The flexible rate regime ensures 
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that the balance of payment will be ~n equilibrium between the 
two countries but it does not solve the disequilibrium between 
the Eastern and Western regions that the shift in demand has 
created. 
The problem can be solved, at least theoretically when the areas 
are drawn along the patterns of production and trade. Under the 
specialisation assumption, one of the currency areas will 
correspond to the Eastern region which produces good 1 and the 
second currency area will correspond to the Western region which 
produces good 2. The two regions sell to each other their excess 
supply of the two goods. A flexible exchange rate between the two 
newly defined currency areas will insulate each area from the 
disturbance on demand, ensuring both internal and external 
balance in the Eastern and Western regions. 
In practice, of course the redefinition of national boundaries 
to fit the theoretical scheme of appropriate currency areas 
appears highly unlikely. But the argument has strong 
implications. It leads to the search for characteristics which 
could prevent the unemployment or inflation pressure situation 
from arising because of the disturbance on demand. An area within 
which such conditions exist will represent an appropriate 
currency area. The main case which comes to mind in this respect 
is factor mobility. If one takes a group of countries between 
which labor moves freely, an excess demand in one part of the 
area and an excess supply ~n another, both resulting from the 
same shock would tend to create inflationary pressure where 
excess demand exists and risks of unemployment where excess 
supply prevails. Responding to the emerging disequilibrium, labor 
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will move from the deficit country or area to the surplus 
country. This way, labor mobili ty, provided the move occurs 
quickly enough, will smooth out the inflation and unemployment 
pressures. In sum factor mobility draws the dividing line between 
a currency area to be characterized by internal labor mobility 
and the rest of the world, labor being essentially immobile 
between the two. One may note also that the argument bears on the 
stabilization issue following a shock. 
b. McKinnon (1963): "Optimum currency areas" 
This contribution can be placed in the direct continuation of 
the work by Mundell on optimum currency areas in the sense that 
it seeks to identify another economic factor ( other than labor 
mobility) which may playa significant role in the definition of 
an optimum currency area. The factor in consideration here is the 
degree of openness. A given economy is said to be open to the 
extent of the ratio between its tradable goods and its non-
tradable goods. The higher the ratio, the more open the economy 
by definition, and vice versa. The aggregate variables to 
consider for the measure of how relatively important are the 
tradable goods might be the domestic production or consumption 
of the economy in question. 
Ensuring internal and external balance remains the concern for 
the authorities. But the distinction between the tradable and 
non-tradable sectors helps to emphasize the way inflation will 
be affected by the exchange rate policy. Let us consider the same 
type of shocks as in Mundell (1961), that is a shift in demand 
for the tradables. The resulting trade imbalance needs to be 
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corrected in a way or another. If a combination of monetary and 
fiscal policies can suffice to bring about the necessary 
adjustments within the currency area with little costs compared 
with the use of the exchange rate tool, then the currency area 
can be considered as optimal. Conversely, if changes in the 
exchange rate achieve better the internal and external balance, 
then one should recommend a flexible exchange rate between the 
countries instead of regrouping them in a currency area. 
Modelling the case of a small economy, the conditions under 
which the fixed rate regime dominates correspond to a high degree 
of openness. Indeed, in this case, a change in the exchange rate 
will translate in an equivalent change in the price of the 
tradables and since these goods represent an important share in 
the economy and in the typical bundle of goods on which the 
representative consumer spends for his consumption, money 
illusion can hardly prevail. The domestic price will vary as a 
consequence. In comparison, a small change in the monetary and 
fiscal instruments might be enough, given the size of the 
tradable sector, to absorb the trade imbalance without causing 
much unemployment and without affecting the domestic price. 
In contrast, a flexible exchange should be chosen if the ratio 
of tradable/non-tradable is rather low. One needs to consider the 
same trade imbalance in an economy with a small tradable sector. 
The monetary and fiscal action would be more important to restore 
the external balance, everything else being given. The non-
tradable good sector and the internal balance bear the 
consequences of the action. On the other hand, the change ln the 
exchange rate necessary to offset the trade imbalance will affect 
51 
the price of the tradables. But because the price of these goods 
have little effect on the domestic price, the adjustment required 
will be reduced to that extent if one resorts to a flexible 
exchange rate. 
One can note that throughout, the analysis keeps the assumption 
of given terms of trade, compatible with the consideration of a 
small economy. Also, the justification of putting an emphasis on 
price stability seems to be that this stability will be 
synonymous of currency liquidity and of efficient allocation of 
resources. 
c. Kenen (1969): 
eclectic view" 
The theory of optimum currency areas: an 
The paper recognizes the merits of the seminal work by Mundell 
(1961). The consensus is that perfect labor mobility between a 
group of countries would define that group an optimum currency 
area. Only minor objections could be raised on this main result. 
They relate to the differences which may exist in labor 
intensities among industries across countries of the currency 
area and which may cause "residual" unemployment after the 
expected move of labor takes place following a shift in demand. 
Also the perfect link between labor mobility and balance of trade 
adjustment as implicit in the argument that labor mobility will 
ensure optimality cannot be guaranteed as a matter of fact. Other 
qualifications might be called for in consideration of the 
behaviour of investments or the extent to which the fiscal and 
monetary policies support each other through coordination. 
Kenen's main argument results from the doubt about the 
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usefulness in practice of the optimality definition based on 
perfect labor mobility. He puts forward an alternative criterion, 
namely, the product diversification of a given economy. The main 
points can be made with respect to this criterion. First the more 
an economy is diversified, the less it will face terms of trade 
disturbances since the independent shocks on the different 
products will tend to average out, according to the statistical 
property known as the "law of large numbers". For the same 
reason, a well diversified economy will suffer less unemployment 
than a non-diversified economy when faced with an adverse shock 
on terms trade. 
To make the second point more explicit, the author develops a 
model to handle different configurations: small econom1es versus 
large countries on the one hand and diversified economies versus 
non-diversified economies on the other hand. In the cases of 
shocks taking the form of shifts in demand, the results derived 
from the model indicate that under a flexible exchange rate the 
diversified economy will experience less variation of the 
exchange rate to restore equilibrium than the less diversified 
economy, whether it is a small country or a large country, in 
other terms the fixed exchange rate regime will prove more cost 
effective in terms of unemployment for the diversified economy 
than the less diversified economy. 
Considering another category of shock in the form of 
differential 1ncrease in money wages at home and abroad, one 
obtains the following result that no difference exists between 
the diversified and non-diversified economy in the case of a 
flexible exchange rate. In the case of a fixed exchange rate, the 
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diversified economy will stand better the shock and confront a 
less severe problem of unemployment than the non-diversified 
economy. But this result holds only for the small country case. 
The policy implications point to the adoption of a fixed 
exchange rate for a developed, diversified economy. However, it 
will remain the difficulty which will arise with the monetary 
shocks. The suggestion is to resort to an appropriate combination 
of monetary and fiscal policies to handle this category of 
shocks. In contrast, a less developed non-diversified economy had 
better choose a flexible exchange rate. 
Kenen's paper together with Mundell's and Mc Kinnon's represent 
the most distinctive pieces of work on the theory of optimum 
currency areas. 
At that time the debate about monetary integration in Europe 
was part of the discussion. This is reflected not only in 
Mundell's paper but also in Johnson (1971) and Fleming (1971). 
Johnson's paper stresses that the crucial factor for a successful 
monetary union will the closeness of national policies and 
attitudes towards inflation and/or unemployment. This 
introduction of the political dimension is also echoed in Corden 
(1972) while drawing a distinction between a complete monetary 
union and a pseudo-monetary union. Fleming (1971) underlines the 
risks of "fundamental disequilibrium" in a unified exchange rate 
system, the presence of divergent relative costs and trade-offs 
inflation/unemployment. Ishayama (1975) notes the limits of the 
traditional approach based on one economic characteristic and 
points to the need for a multicriteria, cost-benefit analysis. 
Also he considers the difficulty to reconcile McKinnon's and 
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Kenen's criteria. But the new approach raises itself another 
difficulty, that is how to measure costs and benefits and how to 
weigh them. On the conditions for a sustainable currency area, 
Presley & Dennis (1976) observe that in addition to the 
convergence in national inflation rates, other important 
conditions include similarity of price and income elasticities 
as well as the structure of external trade partnerships with the 
rest of the world outside the area. 
2.2 Optimal peg 
This section will consider some contributions of the optimal 
literature before looking at three other contributions more 
specifically directed at the FZ case. We will draw in part from 
Williamson (1982) which provides a survey of the literature on 
optimal peg. 
While the key currencies were in fixed rates to each other along 
the rules of the Bretton Woods system, the developing countries 
in general pegged their own currency to one of the key 
currencies. When the international monetary system shifted to 
flexible exchange rates, these countries faced the decision 
problem about the type of exchange rate policy to adopt. 
Continuing with the old peg b e came less attractive but the 
alternative of literally free float exchange rates appeared to 
be beyond their capacities in most cases, due to the thinness of 
the exchange markets and the presence of a potentially huge 
exchange market pressure. The II managed II float either in the form 
of an adjustable peg or in another form seemed to provide an 
affordable, probably more suitable to the new environment. 
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a. In general 
The question is discussed extensively in Black (1976): "Exchange 
policies for less developed countries in a world of floating 
rates". For the authors, there is a reason why the less developed 
countries did not shift to the generalised float as did the 
developed countries. A number of weaknesses seem to characterize 
the financial and money markets in less developed countries. 
Domestic securities are little substitutable to foreign 
securities, which will explain that modifications in the money-
market conditions will have asyrrunetric effects at home and 
abroad. The thinness of the market for domestic securities has 
therefore the effect of segmentating the financial market. This 
fragmentation plays against the domestic market which appears 
vulnerable to speculative waves with the destabilizing risks they 
may have. The non-existence of forward markets in general means 
that there will less capital mobility and the burden of 
adjustment will bear on the spot exchange rate following 
disturbances l.n the exchange market. A small Sl.ze of the 
financial market worsens the situation of asyrrunetry that the 
small country stands with regards the large country. 
The author chooses domestic price variability as the criterion 
upon which the exchange rate policy will be based in the 
stabilisation effort when facing internal and external shocks. 
The domestic price is meant to represent the price of tradables 
in domestic currency, and consequently by the PPP relationship 
it corresponds to the effective exchange rate between the 
domestic currency and the other currencies since the price of 
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tradables in foreign currency are assumed to be gJ..ven. The 
domestic price variability will amount to the variability of the 
effective exchange rate. The analysis is carried further on the 
basis of a model constructed to fit the situation of less 
developed countries. These are generally small open economies. 
The model therefore belongs to the tradition of the dependent 
economy model with the consideration of a two goods economy: one 
tradable and one non-tradable. The tradable is chosen to 
corresponds to a composite of exports and imports. 
since the focus will be on the effective exchange rate, the 
problem of choosing the weights arises. The recommendations point 
to the use of trade data on exports to, or imports from, the 
trading partners or even the average of exports and imports. The 
relevant data may generally be computed on the basis of direction 
of trade although the alternative basis of currency denomination 
may require some attention in specific cases. 
A priori, the alternative exchange rates to choose from include 
free floating, managed floating, single currency peg and pegging 
to the SDR (Special Drawing Rights) . The managed floating in fact 
J..S meant to be the same as a basket peg with possibly the 
continuous depreciation or appreciation to allow for inflation 
differentials. One can distinguish two types of single currency 
peg, depending on whether the peg operates exchange controls, 
import quotas or similar restrictions or whether the defence of 
the single currency peg uses reserves either from the existing 
stock or from external borrowing. The comparison of the costs and 
benefits J..n these different cases starts with an evaluation 
rej ecting the type of single currency peg which resorts to 
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exchange controls since it leads to crude misalignment and 
misallocation of resources, and results very often in the 
development of black markets and ln forced large devaluations and 
consequently high variability In the exchange rate . This 
represents excessive costs compared with gains from not holding 
reserves. 
The other type of single currency peg prevents these costs but 
it will require more commitment to government budget discipline 
and related lines of action, otherwise the costs in terms of 
reserves depletion or external borrowing will become soon 
unsustainable. Calculations to minimize the variance of the 
effective exchange rate indicate that if this type of single 
currency were to be adopted, it should relate to the key currency 
of the large country which demonstrates that its currency 
displays both low variance for itself on the one hand and high 
covariance with the other key currencies on the other hand. 
An improvement on this regime might be obtained with a basket 
peg which aims at stabilizing the effective exchange rate, at 
least by reducing the variance of the effective exchange rate. 
The managed float or basket peg typically will respond to 
external shocks by changing the exchange rate (with respect to 
the intervention currency) and to internal shocks by keeping the 
exchange rate unchanged. In addition to reducing the variance of 
the effective exchange rate, the basket peg presents some other 
advantages in terms of reserves holdings with respect to the 
single currency peg. 
The comparison puts ln theory the free float in the position of 
belonging to the alternative regimes to choose from. But the 
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prerequisites for the free float more than in the other cases 
include investments to develop an enabling financial market with 
in particular the existence of a forward market. 
The other contributions include Crocket & Nsouli (1977), 
Flanders & Helpman (1979) and Lipschitz (1979). As noted by 
Williamson (1982), these different papers on the optimal peg seem 
to share the common view that the exchange rate fluctuations 
between third currencies represent disturbances the domestic 
(small open) economy need to be protected from. So all is about 
to stabilize the economy. Understandably, the focus bears on one 
or another aspect about the state of the economy. But it more or 
less easy to relate each of them to the concern of internal 
balance, external balance or resource allocation and/or income 
distribution. This has raised the question of which macroeconomic 
variables the exchange rate peg might affect in the first place. 
Differences of views appear on this point, about the terms of 
trade for example as well as on the models constructed. On the 
problem of the weighting method to choose for the peg, the 
recommendation for (total) trade weights emerges as the most 
favoured. But these papers have in a sense bypassed a number of 
operational issues (e.g. averaging method in the basket peg, 
quotations and other procedures) as indicated in Takagi (1988). 
b. Contributions on the FZ 
The existing literature on the FZ can be divided into three ma~n 
components. The first one which dominated at the beginning dealt 
with the "evaluation" of the economic performance of the member 
countries. The concern was to assess the achievement the FZ 
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countries as a group were obtaining in terms of output growth, 
inflation, trade balance etc... In this evaluation, the 
neighbouring countries or even the other developing countries may 
serve as a control group. Among the papers which belong to this 
category, there are Devarajan & de Melo (1987a), Guillaumont & 
al (1988) and Lane & Page (1991). The second category of studies 
such as Devarajan and de Melo (1987b) related to shock analysis 
to see how the FZ behaved in face of shocks. But the assumption 
was maintained that the stabilization would be implemented taking 
the fixed parity of the CFA currency as given. The third category 
took up the shock analysis and at the same time sought to assess 
the optimality of the single currency peg. The latter category 
has retained our attention and includes the three following 
papers: Nascimento (1987), de Macedo (1987) and Devaraj an & 
Rodrik (1991). 
The observations on the above three studies specifically on the 
FZ will include elements of the debate between de Macedo and 
Nascimento9 and additional remarks. Although using quite 
different frameworks, the two authors obtain resul ts which relate 
specifically to the question of to what extent the FZ countries 
undergo an "automatic external adjustment" or alternatively their 
reserve losses are sterilized by a transfer from the large 
country to the small country. The answer given to this question 
1S different, and the explanation will be sought in some features 
of the two models which have been pointed to as source of the 
divergence: PPP assumption in the Nascimento's model and use of 
9 See" The political economy of risk and choice 1n Senegal" 
ed J. Waterbury & M. Gersowitz (1987). 
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export or import weights instead of total trade weights in the 
Macedo's model. Some doubts are also cast relating to the result 
on the one hand by Nascimento of the crawling peg being less 
optimal than the fixed peg and on the other hand among the 
findings by de Macedo the existence of the monetary rule and 
significance of the transfer. 
These observations have some bearing on the scope of the results 
obtained. In addition, one might point to the fact that both 
studies did not deal explicitly with the terms of trade. Also the 
comparJ..son was limited to a few exchange rate regimes, in 
particular in de Macedo (1987) which in fact focused on the 
single currency peg and its implications with respect to the 
basket peg. The latter remark applies to the paper by Devarajan 
& Rodrik (1991). Furthermore as noted by the authors, the study 
has bypassed some important benefits such as the currency 
liquidity. In contrast to the other two papers however, this one 
has an explicit treatment of the terms of trade. But the model 
as specified does not include money shocks and in addition the 
empirical analysis relies on some control of the inflation 
differential. This seems to be an imperfection of the model. 
While the non-inclusion of money supply shocks may not be an 
important omission for the FZ countries, it is when comparing 
these with other experiences of flexible exchange rate regimes. 
In addition, the horne-good price is not affected by the terms of 
trade as a result of the specification by the authors. Otherwise, 
the price index of the home-good would not be constant in a fixed 
rate regime as they assume. 
The three models represent an immense contribution to the 
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understanding to the experience of the FZ countries and the 
implications of the fixed exchange rate regime: they represent 
a significant step ln modelling the FZ experience, 
notwithstanding the possible shortcomings as pointed out. The 
next chapters will alm at carrying further the modelling 
exercise, taking into full account of both money and terms of 
trade shocks. But before coming to that stage, we will present 
another relatively recent strand of the literature, namely the 
target zone. 
2.3 Target Zone 
The literature on exchange rate economics has witnessed a number 
of developments in the recent period. Among these, one can 
mention the features of the modern asset view and rational 
expectations as exposed in Frankel (1983) for example, as well 
as the target zone presented in Krugman & Miller (1992) 
Some models of exchange rate determination used to take, along 
the traditional view, the trade flows for the main explanatory 
factors. But the alternative approach according to which the 
exchange rate is an asset price determined by the relative supply 
of, and demand for, money came to prevail. Indeed, the size of 
international capital flows more and more proved to be far higher 
than the amount related to trade transactions, thus giving a 
strong support to the modern analysis. But it is worth mentioning 
much less support came from empirical testing. Haacche & Townsend 
(1981) and Meese & Rogoff (1983) indicate the little success 
obtained when testing this mainstream framework of exchange rate 
determination. 
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The asset approach itself includes two main ramifications: the 
monetary model and the portfolio model. Their difference results 
from the assumption about the relationship between domestic and 
foreign funds. The former assumes perfect substitutability and 
uncovered interest rate parity while the latter allows for 
imperfect substitutability and the existence of a forward risk-
premium. 
The target zone literature has built upon the monetary model and 
has used stochastic calculus, with the aim of documenting 
exchange rate regimes such as the EMS or experiences of regime 
shifts such as the return of Britain to the Gold Standard. It has 
developed quite rapidly since the idea was launched in the mid-
1980's. In what follows, we intend to give a presentation of the 
main features of the target zone model also known as the currency 
band model. Two versions of the currency band model exist, one 
based on the flexible price monetary model and the other on the 
sticky price monetary model. 
a. Flexible price and currency band model 
With regards the first category to start with, the canonical 
form is given in Krugman (1991). In this representation, the 
determination of the exchange rate (spot rate), takes the form 
of a simple equation in which the first two terms represent the 
money supply and the other relevant macroeconomic variables. A 
third term denotes the speculative component in the spot rate and 
is proportional to the expected depreciation of the currency. 
Typically, the equation may take the form: 
S = m+v+AE(dS)/dt (1 ) 
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where S is the spot rate (domestic currency price of foreign 
currency), m the money stock and v the other fundamentals while 
A can be interpreted as the interest rate semi-elasticity of the 
demand for money. The notation E(dS)/dt stands for the expected 
depreciation on the basis of the information available at time 
t. 
The model also specifies the way the fundamentals behave. 
Usually it is assumed that they follow a stochastic process in 
the form of a Brownian motion process, that is the corresponding 
in continuous time setting of a random walk in discrete time: 
dv = 11dt + adz (2 ) 
where 11 and a are parameters (11 is the drift and 0'2 the 
variance) and dz represents a standard Wiener process with (dz)2 
= dt. When 11 = 0, we refer to k as a Brownian motion process 
without drift. Other alternative forms of equation (2) exist, for 
example the case of a mean reverting process which is deemed to 
prevail in a context of significant interventions to keep the 
exchange rate or correspondingly the fundamentals around a given 
level Va: 
dv = -~(v-va)dt + adz (3) 
where the parameter ~ 1S a measure of the speed at which the 
adjustment operates. 
Before going further, let us emphasize the rational expectations 
feature of the model by writing an equivalent form of equation 
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(1) : 
( t - 't") 
s- ~f:e-A-E(k(~))d'" (4) 
where k=m+v represents the fundamentals 1n general. The 
express10n (4) presents the exchange rate as the present 
discounted value of expected future fundamentals. Also one can 
note that equation (1) appears as the reduced form of the 
flexible price model: 
s = p-p* 
E (dS/dt) o 0 * = 1-1 
(1) , 
(1) , , 
(1) , /I 
with the familiar notations of variables in logarithms: 
m: money stock 
v: velocity of money demand 
and * domestic and foreign price indices p p: 
and o * domestic and foreign interest rates 1 1 : 
yo: full employment output 
The equations represent the money market equilibrium, the 
purchasing power parity and the financial market arbitrage 
respectively. One needs only to normalize yo=p*=i*=O and 
substitute both (1)" and (1)'" into (1)' to obtain equation 
(1) . 
Let us consider the three exchange rate regimes of fixed rate, 
free float and currency band to see how they can be derived from 
the same equation (1) (one might consider equivalently equation 
4). The fixed rate does not raise any difficulty. It means that 
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equation (1) reduces to: 
S = m+v 
To keep the exchange rate unchanged, the monetary authorities 
will respond to a change in the fundamentals v by modifying the 
stock of money so that m+v remains constant. In diagram 2.1, the 
fixed rate regime can be represented by the point A. 
To determine the solution for the free float, we have also 
E(dS/dt) = 0 if there is no trend in v for the reason this time 
that when driven by the Wiener process, the exchange rate is as 
likely to increase as to decrease. Consequently the exchange rate 
takes the form: 
S = m+v 
In diagram 2.1, it corresponds to the 45° line FF. In case of a 
stochastic process with drift like in equation (2), the solution 
for the free float becomes: 
S = m+v+All 
With regards the currency band, the monetary policy will consist 
of keeping the exchange rate between a maximum value SM and a 
minimum value Sm. We assume that the monetary authorities will 
intervene to keep the exchange rate inside the band every time 
it gets close to one of the edges. Inside the band however, the 
exchange rate and the fundamentals are let free to move. In 
particular the fundamentals will move according to equation (2). 
The band will be referred to as fully credible if these policy 
actions succeed. 
For the solution of the currency band model, we can consider the 
family of functions S(m+v) which satisfy equation (1) and apply 
s 
S ~~--~-9~-+------------------
new 
ba nd 
SM 
Fig 2.1: Various exchange rates 
A: fixed exchange rate 
FF: free float without drift 
F'F': free float with drift 
Cc: currency band 
S 
Fig 2.2: Nominal band and exchange rale rule 
SM: Siable Manifold 
CC: Sl1100lh pasling condi lion 
OO'A: Realignmenl rule 
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Ito's lemma to set a stochastic differential of S(m+v). This 
gives: 
S(m+v) = m+v+AE(S'dv+cr2S"dt/2)/dt 
or equivalently: 
(5) 
The solution of these differential equations can be shown to 
have the form: 
~ (m~v) ~ (m+V) 
S(m+v) - m+V+ATpAe ,,2 +Be 0 2 (6) 
where the parameters 1..1 and 1..2 equal: 
But the constants A and B remain to be determined. They will 
result from what is known as the "smoothing pasting" conditions 
or tangency conditions (not written here). This means the 
exchange rate in the case of a band will take a S form as shown 
in diagram 2.1 for the non-drift case. 
With regards the S-shape, two points need to be clarified. 
First, one can observe that as the spot rate gets closer to the 
edge at which the interventions occur, the distance between the 
free float line and the S-curve increases . This is due to the way 
the state of expectations modifies according to the relative 
position inside the band. Near the upper edge for example, the 
agents in the financial market know that a move of the exchange 
rate downwards would go freely but a move leading outside the 
band will be resisted by the monetary authorities in the case of 
a credible band. The increase is likely to be less than the 
decrease, and on average the exchange rate is expected to be 
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lower than the level in the free float. By extension, this holds 
true though to a lesser degree towards the middle of the band. 
The same procedure applies when the spot rate gets near the lower 
edge. 
Secondly, the tangency between the exchange rate and each of the 
upper and lower limits appears necessary since from an arbitrage 
point of view a kink would provide an infinite rate of return to 
speculators . This corresponds to the concept of "higher order 
contact" in optimum pricing theory. 
The S-shape of the solution for the exchange rate implies that 
towards the upper edge S"<O so that the interest rate 
differential is negative, and conversely towards the lower edge. 
We note also that the exchange rate in the target zone is more 
stable than in the free float from the fact that the S curve 
everywhere lies flatter than the 45 ° line, although Flood & 
Garber (1992) find that this is at the expense of raising the 
interest rate variability. 
One can note the very stylised characteristic of this model. One 
of its limi ts compared with the experiences in the ERM for 
example is that it assumes infinitesimal interventions and these 
interventions occur only at the edges of the band. Flood and 
Garber consider the case of discrete interventions and attempt 
to present the tangency condition as the limit towards which 
smaller and smaller interventions would lead. Furthermore, the 
model does not cover the cases of realignments as analyzed by 
Bertola & Svensson (1993) or the question of time dependency 
addressed in Ichikawa, Miller & Sutherland (1992). 
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b. Sticky price and currency band 
Miller & Weller (1991) derive this model by considering that the 
domestic price is not flexible as in the model described above 
but adjusts slowly enough to cause changes in the real exchange 
rate. Also the full employment assumption is dropped. The 
analysis looks at the implications of a real band or target zone 
as well as of a nominal band. It uses as in the flexible price 
currency band model, a continuous time setting and stochastic 
calculus. 
(i) Stochastic Dornbusch specification 
The representation consists of five equations describing the LM 
and IS curves, the currency arbitrage, the price adjustment 
formula and the inflation expectations respectively: 
m-p = ay-Ai (7 ) 
Y = -),(i-7t} +1'1 (S-p) (8) 
E(dS) = (i-i*}dt (9 ) 
dp = <j>ydt+crdz (lO) 
7t = E (dp) /dt (II) 
The variables are logarithms and the notations are relatively 
familiar: 
m: money supply 
p: domestic price 
y: actual output 
i and i *: domestic and foreign interest rates with 
i * normalised to zero 
7t: expected rate of inflation 
All the parameters are deemed positive. We note the introduction 
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of the actual output as a function of the real interest rate and 
the real exchange rate (competitiveness) in equation (8), and the 
price level which adjusts to the level of output with an 
additional term adz corresponding to the (supply) shock ln 
equation (10). 
This specification, specially by means of equation (10) deals 
with the "overshooting" case and the realignment rules (see fig 
2 .2 to 2.4). There is no explicit solutions however. Only 
qualitative features are available. 
Conclusion 
The discussion on flexible versus fixed rate regimes took 
another step with the theory of optimum currency areas as 
launched by Mundell (1961): this theory attempts to identify an 
economic characteristic, typically labor mobility along which to 
define an optimum currency area. Mc Kinnon (1963) and Kenen 
(1969) gave contributions in the same sense, but putting forward 
instead the criteria of degree of openness and product 
diversification respectively. Other contributions include Johnson 
(1971), Fleming (1971), Corden (1972), Ishayama (1975) and 
Presley & Dennis (1976). 
Most of the arguments developed by the theory of optimum 
currency area such as factor mobility show the limits of the FZ 
as an union between a large and small country. But the FZ 
portrai t has also the important characteristic of a small economy 
pegged to a large economy. This leads us to consider the optimal 
peg literature. The work by Black (1976) gives a good 
representation on this part of the literature. The set-up is that 
c 
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Fig 2.3: Effect of the realignment rule on 
Ihe rea l exchange rale 
p ~ 
Fig 2.4: The exchange rate ovcr.;hooling case 
69a 
70 
of a small open economy. The fluctuations between third 
currencies are the main external shocks. The choice will be 
between a free float, a single currency peg or a composite peg 
with the objective of stabilizing the economy J.n face the 
disturbances. But views differ on some aspects of the 
stabilization: emphasis on stabilizing domestic price, incomes, 
trade balance or resource allocation . In general, the free float 
requires as a prerequisite the development of the financial 
market, and the recommendation goes for a basket peg (managed 
float), using a total trade-weighting. 
Three among the studies on the FZ are also reviewed. They have 
a substantial element of modelling. Nascimento (1987) finds the 
basket peg better than the other regimes including the present 
exchange rate regime while de Macedo (1987) suggests that the 
transfer from the large country to the small country might make 
a difference in favour of continuing the FZ exchange rate system. 
Devarajan & Rodrik (1991) compare the fixed rate regime to the 
float and conclude that the African countries of the FZ would be 
better off if they adopted a more flexible exchange rate. 
There are some features in these models which might call for 
improvement, for example about the nature of disturbances 
considered or some particular assumptions. In the next chapters 
we intend to further carryon the modelling effort about the FZ 
case, taking into account a more extended range of shocks and 
also a larger choice between different exchange rate regimes, for 
a typical commodity-exporting economy. One of these exchange rate 
regimes is the currency band or target zone, sometimes presented 
as an intermediate case between a flexible rate and a fixed rate 
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system. 
The target zone literature is more recent and its development 
might be related to the experience of ERM in Europe as well as 
the modelling of the regime shifts such as the return of Britain 
to the Gold Standard (Miller & Krugman 1992). It is based on the 
monetary model including the feature of rational expectations, 
combined with the assumption of flexible price or alternatively 
of sticky price. An explicit solution of the exchange rate inside 
the band as a function of the fundamentals is feasible in the 
flexible price specification while only qualitative features are 
available for the sticky price specification. The latter deals 
with the effect of the realignment rule on the real exchange rate 
and the case of overshooting for the nominal exchange rate. 
Chapter 3. Comparing different exchange rate regimes: 
a simplified model 
Introduction 
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For a given economy, the monetary authorities have usually to 
choose a fixed rate or a float regime upon which to conduct their 
exchange rate policy. This may appear as a very limited choice. 
But the fixed rate as well as the float regime can receive a very 
broad definition and each of them contains in fact a number of 
sub-categories which give the monetary authorities a more 
extended range of possibilities. 
The present chapter explores the different options available. 
More precisely, it aims at determining the best exchange rate 
regime for a small commodity-exporting economy. In the context 
of a simplified model, price stability will be the criterion for 
the decision- making. 
An important feature of the model will concern its stochastic 
setting on the one hand and the introduction of a Poisson process 
to represent the commodity price fluctuations on the other hand. 
Section 3.1 presents the standard monetary model together with 
the specification of the Poisson process. Section 3.2 examines 
the choice for a criterion and discusses different possibilities 
at the hands of the monetary authorities, regarding the exchange 
rate policy to adopt. The next sections (3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) will 
respectively deal with: 
- the managed float and its policy implications 
- the target zone in the presence of anticipations. 
- the basket peg in a three-country model and the extension to 
a four-country representation to take into account the 
fluctuations between the key currencies. 
3.1 The case of the standard model 
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In the following, the standard monetary model is used, including 
the PPP rule. For clarity of exposition, we will first consider 
the case where the shocks follow a Brownian motion process. Later 
on, the Poisson process will be introduced. 
a. The model 
The model considered below consists of the following equations 
(all variables are in logarithm except for the interest rate) : 
m-p='¥Yo-Ai (I) 
p=S+p* (2) 
E{dS)=i-i* (3) 
where : S= nominal exchange rate (foreign currency price ln terms 
of the domestic currency) 
m= money stock 
p and p *: domestic and foreign price levels 
1 and i *: domestic and foreign interest rate s 
Yo= full-employment output 
the parameters have a positive sign: 1..>0 y>O 
This set of equations give a very simplified representation of 
the economy. Equation (1) repre s ents the money market equilibrium 
where A is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to 
the interest rate and y is the income elasticity. Equation (2) 
is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) relationship. It indicates 
that the same type of goods exists in the domestic economy and 
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abroad, and that the same price tends to prevail on either side 
of the border when expressed in the domestic currency or the 
foreign currency using the exchange rate. This means that the 
transport costs and other obstacles to international trade are 
negligible. 
Equation (3) denotes the arbitrage condition on the financial 
market. The model assumes the existence of only two categories 
of assets: money as the non-interest bearing asset on the one 
hand and the bonds on the other hand. The domestic and foreign 
assets are considered as close substitutes. This justifies the 
uncovered pari ty specification 1n equation (3) whereby the 
domestic (nominal) interest rate equals the world interest rate 
augmented by the expected depreciation of the domestic currency. 
In sum, this is the typical case of a small open economy with 
permanent equilibrium on the goods market. Also, perfect capital 
mobility will prevail. Another important feature of the model 
concerns the rational expectations hypothesis to describe the 
behaviour of the economic agents. 
The latter point can be best emphasized by obtaining a reduced 
form from equations (1) to (3). To do so, the exogenous variables 
Yo and 
... 
1 are normalized to zero 1n order to simplify the 
calculations. Note that implicitly other exogenous variables such 
as the foreign money supply and output are also normalized to 
zero. Equations (1) and (2) lead to: 
.. '\. 
m-S-p =-1\.1 ( 4 ) 
Replacing the nominal interest rate 1 in equation (4) by 
E(ds/dt) from equation (3) gives the following expression: 
m-S-p"=-AE(dS/dt) (5) 
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According to equation (5), the nominal exchange rate appears as 
the present discounted value of the future "fundamentals" or key 
macroeconomic variables (cf chapter 2). It is a forward-looking 
variable or "jump" variable in the sense that its current value 
depends on present values as well as expectations about the 
future state of the fundamentals. In the present context, the 
fundamentals are represented by the money stock and the foreign 
price level. By assumption the shocks facing the domestic economy 
will come from these two variables. In general terms, the set-up 
identifies the exchange rate, the nominal interest rate and the 
domestic price level as the endogenous variables. The other 
variables in particular the money stock are exogenous. 
As a result of the rational expectations assumption, equation 
(3) determines the interest rate i. Equation (1) gives the price 
level. If starting from equilibrium on the money market, an 
increase in Yo or a decrease in i occurs for example, the demand 
for money will rise as a result. To restore equilibrium, the real 
balances need to increase sufficiently, which implies a decrease 
in p. On the other hand, if the initial equilibrium ~s disturbed 
by an increase in the money stock, then there would be an excess 
of money supply resulting in an excess demand for goods and a 
rise in p. This would reduce the real balances back to their 
initial level. 
Equation (2) determines the exchange rate. The implicit 
assumption underlying this equation is that any change in p W or 
p will be matched by an equivalent change in S to keep the parity 
between the goods prices on the home market and the foreign 
market. 
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On this issue of how the exchange rate 1S influenced, there 
exist two points of view. The first one corresponds to the above 
specification in which the sequence lets the money supply 
determine the price level which in turn gives the exchange rate. 
An alternative approach as advanced by Dornbusch (1976) would 
view the link between m and p as a long run process. In the short 
run, his argument goes, the money supply influences more directly 
the exchange rate which will in turn affect the price level. A 
case related to this second approach will be analyzed later on. 
b. The solutions 
Additional assumptions will be necessary in order to indicate 
how the stochastic process will drive the system. The solutions 
of the model will depend on the characteristics of these shocks. 
The discussion of exchange regimes very often focuses on the 
case of a flexible exchange rate with a fixed money supply or 
alternatively the case of a fixed exchange rate with an 
endogenous money supply. The above framework directly fits the 
case of the flexible exchange rate. 
To proceed with the analysis of this case, let us retain the 
usual description which specifies m and p* as following a random 
walk. This is equivalent to describing them as Brownian motion 
processes in a continuous time setting as the one considered 
here. Under this assumption, the solution can be derived using 
equation (5) for example. If the exchange rate S is viewed as the 
present discounted value of the future fundamentals and if these 
fundamentals behave as random walks, then the expected change of 
S is zero. Indeed at any period t the exchange rate just as the 
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fundamentals is equally likely to increase or to decrease, and 
in consequence it stays constant on average. 
Setting the terms on the right hand side of equation (5) equal 
to zero brings about the solution: 
* S = m-p (6) 
It follows that: 
* p = S + P = m (7) 
We have also the necessary equality between the domestic and 
foreign interest rate in the context where the prospects give no 
trend in the exchange rate. 
The interpretation of equations ( 6) and (7 ) 1S quite 
straightforward. They describe the steady state solutions for the 
exchange rate and the domestic price level. In the long run, the 
exchange rate verifies a positive one-to-one relationship with 
the money supply and negative one-to-one relationship with the 
foreign price level. With regards the long run domestic price, 
it simply varies as the money supply. 
The results in equations (6) and (7) are illustrated in figure 
3.1 . They correspond to the 45° degree line (by setting p *=O in 
equation 6) . 
What are the solutions in the case of a fixed exchange rate? To 
find the answer, one may set s=o in the model since S is constant 
and then it follows that: 
1 = i * (8) 
m = p = p * (9) 
The adoption of a fixed exchange rate in the context of perfect 
capital mobility implies that the domestic price should be 
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equated to the foreign price level. 
c. Introduction of a Poisson process. 
The solutions obtained above apply when both m and p* can be 
described as random walks. The present section introduces a 
Poisson process to describe the behaviour of the commodity price 
in the world market. Before proceeding further, some mlnor 
changes will be brought about to the above framework. These 
modifications seem necessary to distinguish the case of the 
commodity price from the other tradable goods price. 
Let domestic production consist of two goods, both in the 
tradable sector: a commodity and another traded good. The 
domestic price level (p) is defined as a weighted average of the 
commodity price (Pc) and the price of the other tradable (POT): 
p = PPc + (l-p)PoT (10) 
where P denotes the share of the commodity sector in the 
domestic economy and 1-P the share of the other tradable sector. 
The PPP relationship applies for each of these tradable goods: 
Pc = S + Pc* (11) 
POT = S + POT * ( 12 ) 
The notations p / and POT* indicate the prices in the foreign 
currency or equivalently the world prices of these goods. It 
follows that equation (10) can be rewritten ln the form: 
p = S + PPc* +(l-p)po/ (13) 
We will assume that the foreign production of the commodity is 
almost negligible so that the changes ln the price Pc* 
essentially affects the domestic economy. 
As a matter of fact the world prices of a range of primary 
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commodities have fluctuated a great deal for the three last 
decades, but most notably since 1973 which witnessed the first 
oil price crisis. Graphics in chapter 1 provide a few 
illustrations for the commodities such as cocoa, coffee, and 
groundnut. 
Sometimes the changes occurred between a maximum and a m1n1mum 
in the proportion of five or more to one. For example the pr1ce 
of cocoa was 25 US cents per pound in the first quarter of 1972. 
In the third quarter of 1977 it reached its maximum of 184 US 
cents per pound. The price of coffee presents a similar pattern 
: a minimum of 45.5 US cents per pound in the first quarter of 
1972 and a maximum of 288 US cents per pound in the second 
quarter of 1977. From this general picture, one might derive the 
idea to approximate the movements in the commodity price in the 
way as described below. Let us first consider a representative 
low level and a representative high level around the average 
price level during the period under review. Then, the commodity 
price is viewed as taking alternatively on these low and high 
levels only. To describe the fluctuations in the commodity price 
as a Poisson process amounts to an attempt at mirroring the 
succession of booms and busts on the commodity markets for at 
least two decades now. Such a representation differs somewhat 
from the more common treatment of the commodity price like the 
other assets as space-continuous stochastic processes. As argued 
by Merton (1971), there may be some reason to prefer a Poisson 
process representation which allows discrete, instead of 
continuous, variations in the state variable. The fact that the 
commodity price typically jumps to its low or high level and 
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stays there for a while justifies the recourse to the Poisson 
process specification. 
The Poisson process of p * is described as follows: there are 
formally two states of the nature: Low and High. The low and high 
values of Pc* are denoted PL* and PH* respectively. The transition 
probabilities from one state to another are summarised in this 
box: 
Transition probabilities 
of the Poisson process 
II 
L H 
" L 1tLL I 1tLH 
" 
1 
" H 1tHH I 1tHL 
" 
1 
II 
For example, 1tLL and 1tHH are the probabilities of the commodity 
price p * not changing the n ext period whe n it is already at its 
low level PL* and high level PH*' r e spectively. The change from PL* 
to PH* occurs with probability 1tLH, and from PH" to PL* with 
probabili ty 1tHL . Newberry (1990) notes the profile that generally 
characterises the time series of commodity prices with rather 
long flat troughs compared with sharp peaks. In the context of 
the present model, this implies that the probabili ty distribution 
of the commodity should satisfy the following conditions: 
The notation for the exchange rate will be similar: SL and SH 
are used to denote the low level (maximum depreciation) and high 
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level (maximum appreciation) corresponding to and 
respectively. 
d. Solution with a Poisson process 
i) m: fixed and p c* :Poisson process 
Let us first assume that m is not subject to shocks (m=~) in 
order to concentrate on the analysis of the Poisson process in 
Pc* . For example one may, from equation (13), denote by p * the 
weighted average of the commodity price in the world market Pc* 
and the foreign price of other goods Po;. Both Pc· and Po; are 
valued in foreign currency. Let us assume that p . represents the 
foreign price using local weights. It gives the price index of 
the small economy when the exchange rate is fixed and equal to 
zero. Thus 
• A · A • P = ...... Pc + (1- ..... ) PoT (14) 
where ~ represents the commodity share in domestic production. 
We assume that the relative changes in p . originate from the 
disturbances on Pc· so that p . will behave l.n the same way as Pc· . 
One may even simplify the notations by setting POT· equal to 
zero, which gives: 
• A * P = ..... ·Pc (15) 
which implies, taking account of (13), that: p = S + ~Pc· 
Before we derive the solution, one may recall that in the usual 
case where Pc· is considered as fixed while m follows a Brownian 
motion process or where both m and p . are supposed to be Brownian 
motion processes, the free float solution has the form (cf 
equation 6): 
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(16 ) 
Equation (16) is obtained by setting E(ds/dt)=O in equation (5) 
under the free float regime. 
Now we assume that Pc* evolves as a Poisson process and, since 
the transition probabilities are known, the expected variation 
of the exchange rate in response to the commodity price shock can 
be obtained, depending on the starting point of the system. For 
this purpose, equation (5) may be rewritten in the form: 
E(dS/dt) = A-1 (S-mo+pp/ ) (17) 
If the system starts from a low level, that J.S at PC*=PL*' then 
equation (17) takes the form: 
1tLH ( SH-SL) =A -1 ( -mO+SL + PPL *) ( 18 ) 
Similarly, in the case the system was initially in the position 
P C* =PH* we would have: 
1tHL (SL -SH) =A-1 (-mO+SH+pp/) (19) 
What is contained in both e quations (18) and (19) gives an 
illustration of the way the participants in the financial market 
conduct their expectations about the future value of the nominal 
exchange rate. The left hand side indicates that the exchange 
rate may stay at the same l evel SL* if the commodity price does 
not jump with probability 1tLL (or 1tHH if the starting point wa s S/ 
instead of SL*) , implying that the variation is nil or 
alternatively it may move to the other position with probability 
1tLH (or 1tHL ). On average the expecte d change amounts to: 
These expectations are assumed to be rational in the sense that 
they convey all the information available at the current period, 
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that is by the time the expectations are formed. 
Solving the system (18) and (19) brings the solutions SL and 8 H 
as follows: 
(20 ) 
(21 ) 
The rate SL or SH appears as the sum of two terms: mo and a 
second term which is a linear combination of ~PL* and ~PH* . The 
weights involve the transition probabilities and the semi-
elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the interest 
rate. 
The results of equations (20) and (21) can be generalized to the 
case where m follows a Brownian motion process instead of being 
constant. 
ii) m: Brownian motion process and Pc* : Poisson process. 
In the above analysis, we assumed that the velocity-adjusted 
money was not subject to shocks. This assumption is now lifted 
and m will follow a Brownian motion process: 
dm=crdz (22) 
equation in which z is a Wiener process and cr2 denotes the 
variance of the Brownian process. 
The characterisation of the money shocks as a Brownian motion 
process represents simply a restatement of the common practice 
of considering the money variable as a random walk variable . An 
alternative assumption may view m as a stationary variable but 
84 
plenty of empirical evidence has rejected such a description ln 
favour of a series integrated of degree one usually denoted 
I(l}lo. This means that the increments of the money supply are 
stationary. 
We may rewrite equation (5) as follows: 
s-k=AE(ds/dt} (23) 
where the variable k represents the fundamentals and equals 
m-~pc* . It contains two stochastic elements. The variable m 
follows a Brownian motion process as defined above. With regards 
Pc*' it follows a Poisson process as before, so that the total 
differential of k takes the form: 
In the sense of equation (24), the fundamentals k have the form 
of the so-called jump diffusion process because it combines a 
random walk and a jump process. This shows that the specification 
of the commodity price behaviour itself might be extended to a 
jump diffusion process without any additional difficulty. 
The standard model of the above subsection will be retained so 
that to analyze the specific implications of combining equations 
( 23) and ( 24) . 
Regarding S as a function of k, we intend to calculate its 
differential. For this purpose, let us assume that the system 
rests in the position P C* =PL*. 
Alternatively this initial position might be PH*. By means of a 
generalized form of Ito's lemma, the differential of S may be 
written as follows: 
lOThat the money stock can be described as an I(l} variable 
was given a supplementary evidence using the data of South Korea 
in my MSC dissertation (1992). 
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dS = a.S' (k)dz+a2 /2.S" (k)dt+[S(k-B(PH*-PL*))-S(k)]dP* (25) 
where P* denotes the variable describing the Poisson probability 
distribution, and the changes (PH*-PL* ) in the state variable (i.e 
world price of the commodity) denote the size of the commodity 
price jump from the level PL*l1. 
Taking the expected value of equation (25) gives: 
The parameter n LH corresponds to the mean of the Poisson process 
and gives the density of the "event": jump of the state variable 
which is here the commodity price Pc* ' when the system is already 
at the position corresponding to Pc*=PL*. It can be interpreted 
here as the "transition probability". 
At this position, we have also k=m-BpL* 
Substituting (26) and the value of k into (23) leads to: 
or equivalently: 
11 The probability distribution of P * has been broken into 
c • 
two components: the first component relates to the Slze (random 
variable) of the jump and the second is related to the occurrence 
of the "event", that is, the change in the state variable. The 
latter is represented by P* and corresponds to the proper Poisson 
distribution. The former equals PH*-PL* with probability one (cf 
R. Merton, 1971 and A. Dixit & R. Pindyck, 1994). 
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By symmetry, we can obtain the relationship in the case where 
the system rests in the position corresponding to Pc* =PH*' 
( 1 + A . 1tHL ) S (m - ~PH * ) =m - ~PH * + A . cr2 / 2 . S 01 (m - ~PH * ) + A . 1tHLS (m - ~PL * ) ( 2 9 ) 
The results 
For the solution of equation (28), we refer to the method used 
by Perraudin (1990) and will look for a solution of the form: 
More specifically, ln the case of the free float being 
considered here there is need to set B1=B2=0 to avoid explosive 
situations. 
Similarly, the solution corresponding to PC* =PH* will be set as: 
SH == S(m-~PH* )=Ao .m+A2 (31) 
Substituting (30) and (31) into (27) gives: 
(32 ) 
or equivalently: 
Aom+ ( 1 + A. . 1tLH ) A1 =m - ~PL * + A. . A2 (33 ) 
This implies: 
Ao=l 
and (1+A.. 1tLH ) Al = -~PL * +A.. 1tLH . A2 
Similarly, we obtain: 
-+ A 0 
l+A o1t HL 
1! He. 
A Al 1 + 0 Tt HL 
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(34) 
(35) 
Combining equations (34) and (35) enables us to solve for Al and 
A. [ 1 + A 0 Tt HL • A1 --., P L + 1 + A 0 Tt L H+ A 0 Tt He. 
(36 ) 
A. A 0 Tt HL • 1 + A 0 1t L H • ] A2 - -., [ P L + PH l+A 0 Tt LH+A o1t He. l+A. Tt LH+ A . Tt HL 
(37 ) 
Therefore the solutions are as follows: 
1 +A 0 Tt HL • Sl. - m-p [ P L + 
1+A. 0 Tt LH+A.. Tt He. 
(38) 
(39 ) 
The results in equations (38) and (39) are essentially the same 
as in the previous case which gave equations (20) and (21). The 
free float framework means that the terms in e xponential which 
may appear in the Brownian+Poisson process12 model are 
12This notation means that the shock in m is a Brownian 
process while the shock in Pc* is a Poisson process. 
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eventually put to zero to get a linear form. An illustration 1S 
given in diagram 3.2. The representation is the (m, S) space. The 
4 straight lines SLO and SHO correspond to the solutions when no 
anticipations of reversals in the commodity price are present, 
starting from positions Low and High respectively. The straight 
lines SL and SH are introduced to represent the solutions taking 
account of the anticipations. In both cases, a lower level of Pc* 
means a depreciation of the exchange rate: SLO > SHO and SL > SH' 
The comparison of equations (38) and (39) with the solution 
corresponding to a deterministic . Pc or Brownian+Brownian 
13' ° A * ° A * case , 1n equation (16), denoted by SL =m-,....PL and SH =m-,....PH , 
indicates that introducing the Poisson process results in 
dampening the impact of the commodity price shock on the exchange 
rate. The change in the exchange rate has the same direction as 
before with a rise in the commodity price causing an appreciation 
of the exchange rate and vice versa but, one has the relative 
posi tions SL < SLO and s/ < SH as illustrated in figure 3.2. The 
exchange rate switches between points A' and B' instead of A and 
B. 
The distances d and a provide a measure of the effect of 
anticipations about the changes in the commodity price and 
is greater than d=sL-sH' The compared 
distances provide an indicator of the smoothing undergone by the 
exchange rate due to these expectations. The calculations give: 
13 The Brownian+Brownian case is when both m and Pc· follow 
Brownian motion processes. 
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or equivalently: 
The difference between d and d can be viewed as the direct 
effect of the agents anticipating the future level of the 
commodity price on the world market on the basis of their 
knowledge that the latter behaves like a Poisson process. It is 
interpreted as reflecting the smoothing effect of expectations 
on the exchange rate. A low value of d corresponds to a large 
smoothing effect. When the commodity price is at level PL· for 
example, the market believes there is some chance that it will 
increase in the next period. Consequently, the exchange rate 
appreciates on average. It does so in particular because a higher 
world price of the exports will bring more foreign exchange which 
should be rendered to the Central Bank for the domestic currency 
in return. An excess demand for the domestic currency will 
result. Then the exchange rate needs to appreciate for the money 
market to get back to equilibrium. The prospect of a rise in the 
value of the domestic currency adds to its attractiveness now and 
its appreciation as a consequence. Indeed the rational behaviour 
of the economic agents rules out that infinite plus-values be 
ripped at the moment the rise in the commodity price occurs. This 
account goes some way in accordance with the remark by Frankel 
(1983) about the predominance of unanticipated movements ln 
fundamentals to explain the short term movements in the exchange 
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rate: a very strong anticipative behaviour of the agents would 
mean a reduction in the distance d (as illustrated by the 
difference between d and d) . 
Conversely, expectations will lead to a depreciation on average 
when the commodity price is at its high level PH* . 
We note from equation (41) that the smoothing effect decreases 
when either of the parameters 1tLH and 1tHL , or A. decreases. In 
particular, when 1tLH and 1tHL are very small, that is when the 
jumps occur very rarely then the external disturbance implied by 
these jumps comes almost as a surprise, and there will little 
smoothing effect as the agents were not well prepared to these 
events. The distance d will tend to reach its maximum d. 
As regards the parameter A., we note the similarity with 1tLH and 
1tHL since it multiplies them in equations (40) or (41). This 
parameter reflects the extent to which a change in the 
expectations for the nominal exchange rate, whatever the source 
of these variations will affect the real balances via the 
interest rate and consequently the domestic price and the actual 
exchange rate. 
The point to underline here is essentially that the solution 
obtained by the introduction of the Poisson process puts more 
emphasis on the role of expectations for the determination of 
the exchange rate. Furthermore this solution appears as a 
weighted average of the solutions in the Brownian process model 
corresponding to the low and high levels of the commodity price 
respectively. More specifically: 
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where 
(45) 
Further discussion on the implications is contained in section 
3.4 
3:2 Choice for a criterion 
The comparison between different exchange rate regimes will 
involve the use of a criterion. Different possibilities exist. 
The authorities of the domestic economy may choose to stabilize 
some macroeconomic variable such as output, the price level or 
the exchange rate. Because of their risk adverse attitude, 
consumers and producers encounter a loss in their utility and 
efficiency when faced with uncertainty. There is a number of 
variables which potentially matter in this respect, in the sense 
that their instability actually affects negatively the welfare 
of the representative consumer. 
a. The different possibilities 
Very often, the construction of a welfare function bears on the 
concept of output and/or price stability. Before a further 
discussion on this general practice, let us review other 
possibilities in which exchange rate stability or balance of 
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payments are used as a benchmark for the decision-making. 
To start with, one may argue that the exchange rate constitutes 
an important variable and its variations may disturb 
significantly the equilibrium of the economy. For example, the 
profitability, of investment in traded good sectors could be 
adversely affected by the uncertainty due to the changes in the 
exchange rate. The counter-argument though would compare the size 
of the assets and liabilities in domestic currency and in foreign 
currency respectively. In practice, the former is much more 
important than the latter, Korteweg (1982). On this basis, the 
domestic price stability contributes more to the global stability 
of the economy than the exchange rate stability would do. 
The real exchange rate represents a measure of relative 
prices, typically the relative price of the tradable goods (with 
respect to the non-traded goods). Its changes imply a 
modification in the allocation of resources between sectors. This 
is also about changes in the degree of competitiveness. The 
adjustment costs involved by variations in the real exchange rate 
may be high, depending on the degree of the flexibility which 
characterises the economy. The argument for targeting the real 
exchange rate most powerfully applies when this means offsetting 
an inflation differential with respect to the foreign trade 
partners. But it may not apply under some particular conditions, 
for example when real shocks are the underlying cause of the 
divergence. In this case, it is generally agreed that an 
accommodating policy seems better. The main reason emphasized by 
the literature comes from the fact that the determinants of the 
real exchange rate prove to be rather difficult to trace. 
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Therefore, there exist some uncertainty and risk in fixing and 
pursuing a target for the real exchange rate. 
The balance of payments or more precisely the current account 
of the balance of payments represents another variable of 
interest. The monetary authorities may not perceive it as an aim 
in itself but more as a constraint. An open economy needs to run 
a sustainable current account balance. By this, it is generally 
meant that the deficit of the balance of payments should not go 
beyond the level which can be financed by II autonomous II borrowing, 
that is, the normal functioning of the capital account without 
notably heavy involvement of the Government. Generally a deficit 
which is larger than that level would bring about an active role 
of the Government to borrow to finance the gap. There is a cost 
attached to such a high deficit and borrowing in the form of a 
higher and increasing interest rate, reflecting very often a loss 
of creditworthiness of the economy . Some benefit may accrue from 
running a trade deficit since it allows to reach a higher level 
of consumption than would otherwise be. In a sense, the 
adjustment may be delayed or smoothed but this presents a 
favourable policy profile only to the extent that the underlying 
cause of the deficit is temporary. If on the contrary the cause 
has a structural nature, the extra cost very quickly will 
outweigh the benefit. The balance of payments is probably best 
viewed as a constraint than an objective function -although one 
should not deny that it has welfare implications. 
The different variables, reviewed so far: the exchange rate 
(real or nominal) and the balance of payments constitute as a 
matter of fact intermediate targets for the ultimate targets 
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which are the real income/consumption and prlce stability. From 
a historical perspective, the demand-oriented models tended to 
retain the output stability as the main argument in the welfare 
function. These models assumed the price level to be relatively 
fixed. The analysis then evolved to incorporate both the price 
and output stability to reflect the sort of simultaneity in the 
determination of these two aggregates. Furthermore, the models 
which assume price flexibility to some extent tend to consider 
the output determined and fixed at its full employment level so 
that the welfare function consists mainly of the price stability 
argument. 
The simplified type of model as the one considered here which 
takes output as fixed, leads to place the emphasis on price 
stability as the main criterion. Inflation matters maybe more by 
experience because its devastating effects are largely known than 
theoretically established. A durable and sustainable economic 
growth requires a sine-qua-non condition which is price 
stability. Most of adjustment programs include fighting inflation 
among their most important policy actions. Lal (1991) gives an 
account of "growth collapses" for a sample of developing 
countries. The rate of inflation seems to have been one of the 
most important factors. For the demonstration, the sample had 
been divided into two groups of countries following the 
categorisation proposed by Harberger (1987) between countries 
with acute inflation and the others. The failures in terms of 
growth occurred most in the acute-inflation group. 
Whatever the initial cause, fiscal deficit for example, price 
instability has adverse distributional effects. Most importantly 
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it provokes inflationary expectations which result in an 
accelerating trend. This causes uncertainty which works against 
a sustainable growth : more inflation would result in increased 
uncertainty and consequently in more hindrance in the decision-
making of the agents. 
In the domain of inflation as in others, it is also a matter of 
degree . "Moderate, anticipated inflation" is believed to do no 
harm. Instead it may be more compatible with a given target of 
output growth and employment level . The problem arises when it 
reaches a critical level at which it is difficult for the 
monetary authorities to convince the public and to reverse the 
expectations of accelerating inflation. 
In most circumstances, an economy plagued with an acute 
inflation has no alternative but to adjust, and this is a painful 
process and it proves very often to involve high costs both in 
social and political terms. 
This provides the background behind the choice made here to use 
price stability in the comparison between different exchange rate 
regimes. 
b. Price variability 
We are going to use the variance to measure prlce instability. 
In more precise terms, the variance of the price level equals by 
definition the expected squared variations around the expected 
mean value. This confers the property of optimality to the 
expected mean value which corresponds to the notion of target: 
the expected mean value will equal the target when such a target 
exists. 
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i) Solution for the prlce 
The calculations above have given the solutions for the exchange 
rate. Similarly, we can derive the solutions for the domestic 
price. 
Combining the solutions for the nominal exchange rate and the 
PPP relationship will provide the solution for the domestic price 
at positions Land H respectively. 
(46) 
(47) 
It appears that an increase in the commodity prlce undoubtedly 
results in an increase in the domestic price. 
(48) 
But in contrast to the case of the exchange rate, the difference 
between the high and low levels of the domestic price increases 
wi th the parameters A, 1tLH or 1tHL • The reason is simply because 
when the smoothing of the exchange rate is lower as a result of 
smaller values of these parameters , the shocks will be better 
absorbed by the exchange rate, and the domestic price level will 
experience less variation, everything else being equal. But the 
indication of the domestic price variability is best given by its 
variance. 
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ii) Variance 
A differential equation similar to (26) may be used for the 
domestic price as a function of m and Pc" . This will enable us to 
look at the issue of the price variance. For a linear form of p, 
this would give, around position L: 
dp = (ap/am)adz+1tLH (PH-PL)dt)l* ::::} Edp = 7tLH (PH-PL)dt (48) 
Considering that the terms in dt2 are negligible, we have the 
variance of p, Vp: 
Vp - E (dp) 2, L - (E (dp) 'L) 2 z E (dp) 2, L and thus 
Vp = (ap/am) ,\ cr2dt+7tLH (PH-PL) 2dt 
+2 (ap/ am) 2a1tLH (PH-PL) PLHdt (49) 
The expression of the solution for the domestic price indicates 
that at equilibrium we have: ap/am = 1 , which implies: 
Similarly, around position H: 
where PLH and PHL represent the coefficients of correlation 
between m and Pc" , when the system is at levels corresponding to 
PL* and PH" respectively. They are assumed to verify: 
-PHL = PLH = P (52 ) 
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where p will be used to denote the coefficient of correlation . 
This simply means that the effect of an increase in the 
commodity price on the money stock is the opposite of the effect 
resulting from a decrease. The question whether p equals zero or 
not will not be addressed directly here. But one can argue that 
in the long run, p will tend to take on zero values when the 
current account of the balance of payments returns to 
equilibrium. However, in the short run, we should expect positive 
values since an increase in Pc* will result in a trade surplus 
and cause the money supply to increase. 
* According to some studies (e.g. Edwards 1986), m and Pc may be 
considered to have a positive correlation. 
A more detailed form of (50) and (51) will be obtained if the 
explicit expression of PH-PL is derived from (46) and (47) as 
follows: 
(53 ) 
The variances of the domestic price at positions Land H take 
the form : 
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As one would expect the varlance of the domestic price level 
will be greater, the larger is the variance of the money shocks 
and/or the size of the jump ln the commodity price. 
As one might expect the variance of the domestic price increases 
one for one with the variance of velocity shocks and positively 
with the size of the jumps in commodity prices, with a weight 
shown by the second term in the equations above. It is important 
to note that the variance also depends positively on the 
probabilities of transition 1tr.H and 1tHL (and if these differ, then 
the ex-ante variance will be state contingent, i.e. depend on 
whether the price is high or low). In particular if high 
expectations about the change in the commodity price characterize 
the economic environment, then they will translate into a higher 
variance of the domestic price. This provides a further 
illustration in a particular context of the role of anticipations 
in price instability, as argued abov e . Looking at the recent 
events in the ERM and at exchange rate variability, Restoy (1994) 
notes that exchange rate risk under imperfect credibility may be 
divided into two components: the fir s t one corre sponds to the 
traditional indicator (within regime ) while the second one is a 
correction term which depends on the probability of regime 
switch. 
In addition, the expression of the variance indicates that the 
existence of a correlation betwee n the two shocks will matter 
since a higher correlation would mean a higher price instability. 
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The effect of the two shocks reinforce each other. A rise in the 
commodity price (in foreign currency) causes an increase in the 
domestic price. In the presence of a positive correlation between 
the shocks, the rise in the commodity price will also cause the 
money stock to increase, which will add to the first increase in 
the domestic price. 
The expression derived for the pr1ce variability concerns the 
case of a flexible exchange rate. The remainder of this chapter 
will proceed with the comparison between different exchange rate 
regimes on the basis of the variance that the domestic price 
takes on in each regime. 
3.3 Flexible versus fixed exchange rate 
The choice for an exchange rate is taken here to be motivated 
by price stabilization. Given that the small economy faces shocks 
which cause price variability, the aim that the monetary 
authorities seek to achieve will consist of minimizing the 
domestic price instability. As a consequence, the Government 
budget in particular is not included in the simplified framework 
presented above. 
There exists an extensive literature on the issue as reviewed 
in chapter 2. The general conclusion which seems to emerge is 
that a flexible rate stabilizes the domestic price better than 
the fixed rate in the presence of external disturbances and 
conversely price stability is more easily achieved with a fixed 
rate regime in the presence of internal (monetary) disturbances. 
The case to be examined here relates to the simultaneous presence 
of these categories of shocks. Furthermore, the analysis 1S 
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extended to the case where for one of the disturbance, namely the 
commodity price, a Poisson process specification applies better 
than a random walk specification. 
A priori a number of phenomena may shock a small open economy. 
They include unanticipated changes in the domestic supply or 
demand on the goods market, exogenous changes 1n inflation, 
shifts in demand for money, fluctuations in the world price or 
capital inflows or even between the major currencies. 
As a matter of fact, the calculations undertaken for the 
flexible rate regime implicitly adopted the simplification that 
these different possibilities can be summarized by two categories 
of shocks: the money stock or velocity shock as the first 
category to represent the internal disturbances and the terms of 
trade shocks as the second category to represent the external 
disturbances. The same assumption will apply to carry out the 
calculations and to derive the solutions for the fixed exchange 
rate. 
a. Solutions of the fixed exchange rate regime. 
In the fixed rate regime, the nominal exchange rate is given at 
a level So. The monetary model takes the following form: 
m-p='YYo-Ai (1' ) 
p=So+P" (2' ) 
. . .. 1=1 (3 ' ) 
As before, the nominal interest results from the third equation. 
In the context of a fixed exchange rate and perfect capital 
mobility, it simply equals the interest prevailing on the 
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international financial markets. Any divergence from . * ~ , for 
example a decrease in i would provoke a permanent outflow of 
capital unless the domestic interest rate is increased back to 
its initial level. A particular feature to emphasize in the fixed 
rate case ~s that the money stock becomes endogenous. Its 
determination is contained in equation (I') while now equation 
(2') determines the price level. The peg of the nominal exchange 
rate requires that domestic inflation be equalized to foreign 
inflation (equation 2'). Any departure from the linkage with the 
world economy in the form of a higher inflation as a result for 
example of larger domestic credit in face of a fixed demand for 
money will translate into a trade deficit. A depletion of the 
foreign assets (which are the other counterpart of the money 
stock beside the domestic credit) will follow until it completely 
offsets the initial increase operated via the credit channel. 
Following a monetary shock, the money stock is adjusted to offset 
the disturbance in order to keep the interest rate equal to the 
international level. Also this maintains the money market 
equilibrium and makes the price level insensitive to the monetary 
shocks. 
Equation (3') represents the most common specification for a 
peg. But there may be the case where although the current 
exchange rate is fixed, its expected variation differs from zero. 
Prospects of realignments for a weak currency in a mul tiple-
currency peg sys tern or anon-credible peg 0 f a overvalued 
currency to a key currency provide illustrations of such a 
possibility. 
For the time being though, the simplified model specifies the 
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arbitrage condition as a pure equality between the domestic and 
foreign interest rates in the peg regime. 
Another implicit simplification relates to the description of 
the manner in which the money stock behaves. The latter is 
supposed to verify: 
dm = adz (56) 
This is not particular to the fixed exchange rate: it applies 
to the flexible rate regime as well. 
A more general formula would include the core inflation term 
(n), that is the rate of the expected money growth: 
dm = 1td t + adz ( 56 ' ) 
The inclusion of the core inflation might matter, particularly 
when the analysis involves a comparison between countries in 
which the expectations about future inflation differ 
significantly for a reason or another. Introducing the core 
inflation n would augment the domestic price variance in 
equations (50) and (51) by the additional term n 2dt. This may 
explain why the FZ countries in matters of inflation generally 
have performed better than the neighbouring countries where the 
former group have relatively low inflationary expectations 
because of the peg to the large currency. But these aspects are 
not considered since the focus is on the effect of shocks and 
their implications for the exchange rate policy, everything else 
being equal. 
Let us rewrite the solution for the price level with a 
normalization to zero of the fixed nominal exchange rate, as 
follows: 
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The domestic price will then follow a Poisson process and verify 
the differential form below, where the notations are the same as 
in the previous sections: 
dp I L = P (PH * -PL *) dGlL * ( 57) 
dp IH = P (PL* -PH*) dGlH* (58) 
It follows that the variance will equal: 
VPIL = p21tLH(PH*-PL*) 2 (59) 
Vp I H = P 21tHL (PH * - PL * ) 2 ( 6 0 ) 
As expected, in the fixed exchange rate regime the variance of 
the domestic price is identical to the variance of the foreign 
price level. It does not include the variance of the money 
shocks: this is due as already indicated, to the fact that the 
money supply has become endogenous. 
The variance depends exclusively on the distance between the low 
and high levels of the commodity price and other characteristics 
of its probability distribution. In the context of rational 
expectations whereby the economic agents have a knowledge of the 
economic model, including the process according to which the 
foreign price behaves, these characteristics are among the 
factors which guide the expectations. 
b. Comparison between the two regimes. 
The question to answer now comes to the choice between two 
alternative exchange rate regimes. The authorities seek to 
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minimize the loss function defined as the price instability or 
variance. The exercise will amount to comparing the variance of 
the price level which may be obtained in the two regimes. To 
facilitate the comparison, we consider only the case where the 
system rests at position L. Also the correlation coefficient is 
assumed to equal zero. Then the flexible regime would be 
preferred to the fixed rate regime if the following inequality 
holds: 
This is equivalent to: 
The two terms on the left hand side of expression (62) can be 
characterized with reference to the standard analysis. The first 
term represents the ratio of the money shock variance with 
respect to the variance of the commodity price shocks. Very often 
the literature, when comparing the two alternative exchange rate 
regimes comes to the conclusion in favour of a flexible rate if 
the economy faces external shocks. Conversely in case of internal 
shocks, the recommendation points to the fixed exchange rate 
regime. More precisely though, as a generalization, the source 
as well the relative importance of the two types of shocks should 
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be considered. That is the sense of the ratio corresponding to 
the first term of (62). 
The second term relates to the anticipations of reversals. 
Without these anticipations, that is in the case where any jump 
in the commodity price is permanent, we recall that the exchange 
rate would respond by completely offsetting any change in the 
foreign price level and therefore insulate the domestic price 
from these shocks. Under such conditions, the variability of the 
price would be equated to the variance of the monetary shocks. 
The presence of anticipations of reversal has the effect of 
lessening the change in the exchange rate which no longer 
responds on a one-for-one basis. The domestic price level shows 
some variability as a result. This is represented by the second 
term of (62). Everything else being equal, the role played by the 
anticipations tends to diminish the case for a free float. The 
second term represents this effect as a positive and increasing 
function of the interest rate semi-elasticity or the transition 
probabilities. 
Lifting the assumption of a zero correlation between the two 
shocks would add a third term in the expression (62) of the form: 
with p as the coefficient of correlation. This third term 
increases with p. When the latter reaches its maximum value 
(p=l), the expression (62) including the third term would become: 
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Expressions (62) and (62') represent two extreme cases as far 
as the coefficient of correlation is concerned. The existence of 
a positive correlation between the two shocks constitutes an 
unfavourable factor for the selection of a free float. The 
conditions of existence of such a correlation as well as the 
policy implications are discussed in Edwards (1986). 
3.4 Managed float: an intermediate case 
We have seen that due to the anticipations of the economic 
agents, the nominal exchange rate does not respond as much as it 
would otherwise do, to the commodity price fluctuations. This 
raises the case for an active exchange rate policy which would 
aim at eliminating the smoothing e ffect mentioned earlier, making 
the exchange rate more variable to offset the external 
disturbances and to protect the domestic price level. The whole 
effect of the commodity price shocks will b e ar on the exchange 
rate exclusively. 
In figure 3.3, the lines S~ and S: r epresent the leve ls of the 
exchange rate in the absence of anticipations corresponding to 
constitute the solutions in the presence of anticipations. 
In terms of figure 3.3, the managed float consists of pushing 
back the lines SL to SLO and SH to SHO. 
When such a policy 1S feasible, the variance of the domestic 
price is reduced to the variance of the money stock. In such 
circumstances, the managed float compares favourably with the 
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free float as far as price stability remains the maln concern of 
the authorities. Indeed, ln the managed float regime, the 
variance of the price level equals: 14 
Comparing equation (64) with (55) or (56), it is clear that the 
managed float indicated here will deliver a lower price 
variability than the pure float. 
With respect to the fixed exchange rate regime compared with the 
managed float, the choice will depend on the ratio of the two 
variances: 
which simply denotes the ratio of the money stock variance to 
the variance of the commodity price. 
For an economy facing stochastic s hocks , a managed float may be 
more appropriate rather than a free float or a fixed exchange 
rate if the external shocks prove more important than the 
internal shocks. 
In sum, the calculations done above under different assumptions 
have shown that in contrast to the results using a standard 
14 This can also be seen by noting from the arbitrage 
equation that: dp=dS+Pdp * 
= (as\am) crdz+ (SH-SL)dP*+P (PH*-PL*)dP. The managed 
float ensures that SH-SL = -P (PH* -PL*) 
~ dp =(as\am)crdz = crdz ~ Vp = cr2 
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Brownian motion process, the Poisson process model enables us to 
identify an effect of terms of trade fluctuations on the domestic 
price level. That means that the flexible rate regime does not 
completely insulate the economy from external disturbance. As a 
result of this model the domestic price level will have a Poisson 
process component. In these conditions, the monetary authorities 
may adopt a managed float to achieve price stability. They would 
have to reinforce the appreciation of the exchange rate which 
occurs in response to a rise in terms of trade for example. Such 
a managed float is usually described as a policy of "leaning with 
the wind". It would seek to insulate completely the economy from 
external shocks. Williamson (1991b) points to this type of policy 
in the presence of expectations. In contrast, the domestic price 
will tend to be as volatile as the terms of trade if the exchange 
rate is fixed. 
To some extent, the managed float which is suggested here would 
take the form of a commodity standard whereby an increase in the 
commodity price is offset by a deliberate action of the monetary 
authorities to complement the automatic appreciation on impact. 
In practice, this takes the form of contractionary monetary 
policies when there is a boom in the commodity market and of an 
expansionary impulse when the commodity price falls. This would 
mean that fiscal surplus or deficits would be temporally allowed 
on the basis of expectations that the increase or decrease in the 
commodity price will be reversed, Blundell-Wignall & Gregory 
(1990) . 
We may represent the active monetary policy implied by the 
managed float by means of a reaction function for the monetary 
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authorities as follows: 
where m is the money supply with an average value of IDa. 
The parameter v measures the intensity of the management policy 
to achieve the inflation target corresponding to IDa. This 
specification implies that the managed float will take the form 
of a non-sterilized intervention. The rule is based on the 
movements of the commodity price. In a sense lit is easy to 
follow since the commodity price data are directly observable 
without great delay. 
The standard model will be used for the determination of v. To 
do that we rewrite the reduced form of the monetary model 
(equation 17) in which m is replaced by its value above: 
(17 ') 
The corresponding solutions for the exchange rate denoted by SLm 
and S~ prove to be: 
(65 ) 
and 
(66 ) 
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The exchange rate will be managed so that its variations offset 
the change ln the commodity prlce, taking account of the 
expectations. This means for example taking SL back to SL = mO -~PL" 
as if there were no expectation effect. The corresponding value 
VL of v, the degree of management appears equal to: 
where: 
(j) -L (44) , 
Similarly, the managed float would return SH to the value s/ of 
the exchange rate corresponding to the high level of the 
commodity price (without expectation effect) by setting: 
with 
(l - (t)H) (P~- P~) 
(l - (t)H) p~+(t)~~ 
(45) , 
(68 ) 
This managed float together wi th the PPP relationship guarantees 
the constance of the domestic price PH=PL=mO• 
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One may note that the degree of management v reflects directly 
the degree of anticipations as represented by the transition 
probabilities nlli and n~ and the semi-elasticity coefficient ~ 
(the similarity of the latter with the transition probabilities 
has already been mentioned). It also reflects the relative 
position of PH* and PL* . Referring to diagram 3.3, we see that, 
assuming a symmetric representation, the position before 
intervention corresponds to the point I if the commodity price 
is at its low level and J if the commodity price is at its high 
level. The intervention will move the equilibrium to I' when 
starting from I, and to J' when starting from J. We have 
at point I': 
at point J': 
(l - coH ) (P~- P~) 
( I - ffiH) P~ + O)HP~ 
(69 ) 
(71 ) 
(72) 
where mL and mH denote the levels of money stock resulting from 
the intervention at positions Land H respectively. 
The negative sign of vL and the positive sign of vH in equations 
(67) and (68) also confirm the nature of the managed float, 
namely an exchange rate policy of leaning with the wind. 
With the managed float, and the equality of PH and PL as a 
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result it is possible to confirm that the variance of the price 
level will be reduced to variance of the money shocks. Indeed the 
differential equation of the domestic price gives: 
which leads to : 
(74) 
We note that the interventions to appreciate or depreciate the 
exchange rate are non-sterilized. 
Furthermore it is possible to get a sense of the exchange rate 
policy introduced here by recourse to the simplified model in 
its form of equations (1), (2) and (3). When the price level is 
targeted, then the value of the currency will change on a one-
for-one basis with the commodity price according to the 
relationship (2). Let us assume the system starts from position 
and jumps to The agents will change their 
expectations. At the new position, they will be expecting a 
decrease in the commodity price level in period t+l, which 
implies , combining equations (1) and (2), that the real balances 
will tend to fall. This decrease in the real balances is brought 
about by the move of the nominal interest rate above the world 
rate for a while and correspondingly by the increase in the 
domestic price. To counter this rise in the domestic price, the 
monetary authorities will need to reduce the money supply, 
augmenting the initial appreciation of the exchange rate. The 
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interpretation of the policy action in the case of a fall in the 
commodity price Pc· would follow similarly, implying an increase 
in the money stock. 
3.5 Target zone 
The literature on the choice for an exchange rate regime has for 
long concentrated on the comparison between the free float and 
the fixed exchange rate regimes. The target zone literature has 
opened up a third possibility usually viewed as an intermediary 
case. 
The target zone scheme proposed here is deemed to suit very well 
the case of a small open economy facing two types of shocks: 
money disturbances and commodity price shocks. It will consist 
of setting a band for the exchange rate and to defend it as far 
as the money shocks are concerned but it will be adjusted upwards 
or downwards when the commodity price changes. 
Setting a band and making it function as outlined seems to have 
an advantage. For a small economy with an undeveloped financial 
market, a fully free float may not be a real option. The presence 
of only a few participants and the little integration to the 
international market make the economy very vulnerable to 
speculations. 
On the other hand, the experience about the exchange rate 
policies has clearly shown that the developing countries have had 
much difficulty in handling the system of fixed exchange rates 
with not frequent but very large devaluations. This has proven 
to be most destabilizing because these devaluations were preceded 
by severe balance of payments constraints and often forced by 
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speculative tensions on the financial market. 
On both accounts, instituting a target zone would give more 
margin and prevent the building of speculative attack if the 
necessary shifts in the band are undertaken every time a 
commodity price occurs. 
In addition, operating the target zone for the aim of price 
stability will clearly combine to a large extent the advantages 
of having a fixed rate to counter the money shocks and the 
advantages of the flexible rate to insulate the domestic price 
from the external disturbances. 
In the following, the comparison will be carried out essentially 
between a target zone and a free float. 
a. The model 
The reduced form equation of the monetary model constitutes the 
starting point, rewritten as: 
(17' ) 
Application of Ito's lemma in its generalized form when both a 
Brownian motion process and a Poisson process are involved brings 
about, at position L and with the notations of the previous 
sections: 
dSIL = (dS/dm) ILcrdz+(d2S/dm2) IL(cr2 /2)dt+(SH-SL)d~* (75) 
Taking the expected value of (71) gives: 
E(dS/dt) IL = (d 2S/dm2) IL(cr2/2)+1tLH(SH-SL) (76) 
substituting (72) into (17', it follows: 
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where S" denotes a second order differential. 
Adopting and defending a currency band may involve a non-
lineari ty graphically represented by a curve form to describe the 
exchange rate in function of the fundamentals, namely the money 
shocks. The non-linearity explains the presence of the second 
derivative term of S in the above expansion. 
From equation (77), it follows that: 
Similarly at position H, we have: 
To find the solutions of (78) and (79), we will look for, as in 
Perraudin (1990), a type of function with both a linear component 
and an exponential (non-linear) component: 
S IL = Aom+AI+A2exp<X.lm+A3exp<X.3m (80) 
S IH = Aom+Bl+B2exp~lm+B3exp~3m (81) 
where the coefficients Ai (i=O,l,2,3) and Bj (j=1,2,3) as well 
as the parameters aI' a 2 and ~l' ~2 are to be determined. As far 
as the linear component is concerned, the same coefficient Ao of 
the variable m can be in both SL and SH' with regards the other 
parameters, the S-curve (as known from the standard solution of 
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the target zone model) suggests to set the conditions: 
Also u l = -u2 since the money shocks have no drift. By 
substituting equations (80) and (81) into (78) and (79) one finds 
the conditions or equations determining the coefficients and 
parameters Ao I All Bl and Ul . 
(l+A1tLH ) Al = -~PL" +A1tLHB l 
(l+A1tHL ) BI = -~PH *+A1tHLAI 
( 82 ) 
(83 ) 
(84) 
(85 ) 
Equations (83) and (84) determine Al and BI while equations (85) 
will give the parameter u I : 
(86 ) 
(87) 
(88) 
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The coefficients A2 and A) are obtained via the "smooth-pasting" 
or tangency conditions. 
b. The solutions 
Before coming back to the tangency conditions, let us indicate 
the form of the solutions: 
Not very surprisingly, the linear term of the solutions SL or SH 
equals the solution in the free float case. 
The determination of the coefficients A2 and A3 requires that 
the boundary conditions be specified. These involve the upper 
(and lower) edges of the band and the values of the fundamentals 
where the curve representing the exchange rate will be tangential 
to the boundaries of the band (cf fig 3.4). 
A number of notations have been adopted to illustrate the 
diagram 3.4. The band L represents the configuration of the 
currency band when the commodity price is at its low value 
while the band H corresponds to the high level of the commodity 
price PH'" The values SLu and SL1 are the upper and the lower edges 
of the band L: the corresponding points of tangency are located 
at m=mL
h 
and m=mL 1 respectively, that is when the system rests on 
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Fig 3.4: Targcl zone wilh rcSpeCllO Ihe nlOnClary shocks 
and band shifts in response 10 cOnlmodily price shocks 
s 
a 
~ 
B S HI 
a 
~ 
H 
Fig 3.5: Combinalion of a largel zone wilh rcspecllo Ihe monclary shocks 
and managed Ooal wilh respcci 10 commodi ly price shocks. 
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the line SL. A similar description applies for the band H. 
When the Government announces the bands Land H which will 
characterize the exchange rate regime under the conditions of a 
commodity price boom or decline then it is possible to determine 
mLI, mLh, rn/ and mHh. Using the expression (89) for SL' we have: 
Equations (91) and (92) give mLI and mLh respectively in function 
of SLI and SHh which are determined by the monetary authorities. 
Similar equations apply for the determination of Ir\i l and mHh using 
the expression (90) of SH. 
Coming back to the smooth-pas ting conditions, they may be 
written for SL: 
(93 ) 
(94) 
It follows that the coefficients A2 and A3 can be obtained uSlng 
the expressions: 
h 1 1 exp -~mL - exp- ~mL (95) 
A 2--~ expa1 (m~ -mi) - exp~ (mt - mt) 
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As expected, it appears that the coefficient A z is negative 
while A3 1.S positive. This explains the S-shaped form of the 
curve SL and SH in figure 3.4. 
c. Anticipations and interventions. 
(i) Interventions inside the band 
This case corresponds to the solutions obtained where the 
interventions are limited to keep the exchange rate inside the 
band in response only to monetary shocks. Let us look at figure 
3.4 again to comment on some particular features. The exchange 
rate is driven by a continuous stochastic process via the money 
shocks and from time to time by discontinuous changes due to the 
commodity price fluctuations. The exchange rate policy consists 
of letting the exchange rate move freely between the points A and 
A' when the commodity price is at its high l eve l or between the 
points Band B' when the commodity price is at its low level. Any 
change 1.n Pc* will automatically provoke a s hift from the curve 
SL to the curve SH and a corresponding shift in the band from 
band L to band H, or vice-versa. McKinnon (1971) has suggested 
the need for an adjustable band in an unstable context. This 
intervention policy which deals differently with the external 
shocks and the monetary shocks supposes that one can distinguish 
the two categories of shocks. Aizenman & Frenkel (1982) raise the 
issue of signal extraction which may arise in practice. 
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But let us assume that the exchange rate moves along, for 
example SH ' then it will be restrained to remain inside the band 
H. At point A (or A'), the monetary authorities will stand to 
defend it not to depreciate (or not to appreciate) any more. When 
the commodity price drops from PH* to PL* ' then the exchange rate 
will move vertically into the band L. The size of this jump 1n 
the exchange rate is independent of m in this specific form of 
intervention and equals the distance d = SL-SH' 
(ii) Combining managed float and target zone. 
The monetary authorities a1m to protect the domestic price. 
Consequently they will seek to offset the dampening effect on the 
exchange rate of anticipations about the commodity pr1ce 1n 
foreign currency. This managed float can be combined with the 
target zone, leading to the situation described in fig 3.5. There 
is similarity with fig 3.4 but here the variable m changes as a 
result of the offsetting operation. The corresponding solutions 
denoted s c L and S c H can be easily derived by analogy from 
equations (89) and (90) where we replace m by mL and ~ 
respectively (these correspond to the level of money taking into 
account the monetary rule and have been defined in equations (70) 
and (72 ) above): 
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d. Target zone versus free float. 
As before the relative merits of the two regimes will be 
assessed with reference to the criterion of price stability. We 
know from the standard model where no foreign price shocks are 
present, with only money shocks that the target zone leads to 
more stability of the exchange rate than the free float. Adding 
the commodity price shocks and letting the exchange rate respond 
freely to the foreign price fluctuations will constitute an 
additional source of variability in the exchange rate, in both 
regimes. A sense of that can be easily seen by looking at the 
difference between the exchange rates at positions Low and High, 
difference directly associated with the relative positions of PL* 
and PH* : 
(97 ) 
This represents the size of the jump in the exchange rate, 
associated with the jump in the commodity price, in the free 
float regime. The higher degree of variations in the exchange 
rate would result in less variation of the price level: 
Let us now determine the variance as a more appropriate 
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indicator of the price variability, considering first the target 
zone with interventions limited to defend the band. Later the 
combined case will be considered. 
The differential formula applies to the domestic prlce: 
(100) 
The variance is obtained as: 
(101) 
To introduce the comparison with the free float, let us note 
that the first term in (101) represents the variance of the 
exchange rate in the case of a target zone with only money shocks 
operating. Expressing the fact that the target zone provides more 
stability for the exchange rate than the free float ln the 
condi tions of only money shocks prevailing can b e done as 
follows, from equation (102): 
Or equivalently: 
(ap\am) 2ILcr2 < 0'2 
Then it follows that: 
(103) 
(104) 
(105) 
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But looking at equation (99) which gives the expression of 
(106) 
The right hand side of (106) represents in fact the variance of 
p in the free float regime having ignored the correlation 
term) This establishes that the target zone provides price 
stability better than the flexible rate regime. 
The calculations above .. .. concerned the case where Pc =PL . But the 
same results apply for the case where PC"=PH* . The target zone is 
referred to here in the sense of a currency band with defence in 
response to monetary shocks which may drive the exchange rate out 
of the band but realignments will be the normal response to 
commodity price shocks. The target zone gives more price 
stability than the free float for two reasons: 
-in face of monetary shocks, more stability of the exchange 
rate means more stability of the domestic price. 
-when jumps in the commodity pr~ce occur , then the exchange 
rate is let free to respond as in the free float. 
Consequently, the domestic price will display less variability. 
It will display even less variability when we combine the target 
zone with the managed float. More precisely this combination will 
ensure that the domestic price is completely insulated from the 
commodity disturbances. Under these circumstances, the only 
source of uncertainty affecting the domestic price will be the 
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money shocks, and the variance will be reduced to (cf equation 
101) : 
Indeed fig 3.5 indicates that the jump in the exchange rate will 
always equal: 
Th . s g' ft' ( 9 8 ) c c S c A .. (S c + Ap " ) l lves rom equa lon : PH -PL = H +tJPH - L tJ L 
3.6 Basket peg 
The basket peg has become much more adopted as an exchange rate 
regime by developing countries. Many of these shifted from a 
single currency peg to a basket peg in the aftermath of the large 
fluctuations between major currencies in the early 1970's. The 
basket peg consists of stabilizing the effective exchange rate 
for a given country. The SDR which constitutes a basket of the 
key currencies is usually taken to approximate the effective 
exchange rate. 
The adoption of a basket peg involves methodological and 
operational issues discussed by Williamson (1982) and Takagi 
(1987), especially about the criteria for an optimal peg and the 
weighting necessary to compute the effective exchange rate. 
In the following, the basket peg will be compared with the 
single currency peg. The latter is usually referred to as the 
fixed rate regime. In fact there exist different sorts of pegs: 
the fixed peg and the crawling peg constitute two main 
categories. The fixed peg includes the single currency fixed rate 
and the basket fixed peg. The two sub-categories also apply for 
the crawling peg. The crawling peg is the case where the nominal 
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exchange rate ~s continuously changed to offset the inflation 
differential vis-a-vis the trade partners. 
The fixed peg seems more appropriate than the crawling peg in 
the present context where price stability represents the basic 
criterion. 
a. A three-country model 
To introduce the basket peg let us consider a model with three 
economies: 
the domestic economy which is a small open conunodity-exporting 
economy 
- a large country A and a small country B with the following 
characteristics: 
i} the exchange rate of A is not affected by a change in the 
conunodity price. Country A would be the USA or the EC . 
ii} B is a conunodity-exporting economy. Its exchange rate 
responds to change in the conunodity price. We might 
think of the economy B as representing the group of 
trading partners among other developing countries. 
Let us adopt the following notations: 
m: money supply in the domestic economy 
Pew : the world conunodity price expressed in country A 
currency. 
POT*: the price of other tradables in country A currency. 
P : share of the corronodity sector ~n the domestic economy. 
P' share of the corronodity sector in the economy B 
x : share of country A in the external trade of the small 
economy 
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1-x: share of country B ln the external trade of the small 
economy 
SA: the bilateral exchange rate with respect to A 
Ss : the bilateral exchange rate with respect to B 
In the context of the monetary model the reduced form is known 
to be: 
(107) 
P~* will be set to zero so that to focus on the changes in the 
commodity price p/ . 
Then the above reduced form will give the following: 
(108) 
As regards Ss' the triangular arbitrage gives: 
(109) 
whe re S~ represents the exchange rate of country B currency 
with respect to the referenc e currency. 
Just as in equation (108), we h a v e : 
(110) 
where ms* denotes the money supply of country B. It will be 
considered as exogenous and normalized to zero as well15 • 
15 Setting mB*=O while variations of Pc* are considered 
implies that there is no correlation between the commodity price 
shocks and the money shocks in e conomy B. 
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Then we can write: 
(111) 
Equation (111) indicates that the response of the bilateral rate 
vis-a-vis country B will depend on the relative importance of the 
commodity sector in country B compared with the domestic economy. 
For example an increase in the world price of the commodity will 
entail an appreciation of the domestic currency with respect to 
the key currency A. But it will do the same for the currency B 
with respect to the same currency A. Then the bilateral rate of 
the domestic currency with respect to the currency B will 
appreciate or depreciate depending on the relative importance of 
the export sector in the two economies: it will appreciate if the 
domestic economy has a commodity sector more important than 
economy B (~>~') and conversely it will depreciate if the 
commodity sector is less important in the domestic economy 
(~< ~') . 
The index of the effective exchange rate is defined as: 
(112) 
This gives: 
(113) 
The same Comment as on equation (111) applies to equation (113), 
defining the effective exchange rate of the domestic economy 
except for taking into account the trade partnership with country 
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B. 
The corresponding index of the commodity prlce in the currency 
of country A should be consistent with the PPP rule in the 
context of the monetary model. The following index: 
(114) 
proves to satisfy that condition in the sense that if the 
commodity price Pe* rises, the nominal (effective) exchange rate 
will appreciate sufficiently so as to leave the domestic price 
unchanged. Likewise a one-to-one nominal depreciation will occur 
in response to a decrease in p/ . 
Consequently, the domestic price Vla the PPP rule takes the 
form: 
P = S + [P-(l-x)P']p/ (115) 
Then the monetary model for a three-country world will be 
described with the three equations: 
m-P = -Ai 
P = S + [P- (l-x) p' ] Pc * 
1 = E(dS/dt) 
(1" ) 
(2" ) 
( 3 " ) 
where: i represents the nominal interest rate and A denotes the 
interest rate semi-elasticity of the demand for money. The main 
point derived so far relates to the form of equation (2") which 
defines the PPP rule in the context of a three country model. 
The reduced form of this system of equations appears to be: 
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E(dS\dt) = A-1 (S-m+(t)P/) ( 17" ) 
in which relationship (J) is derived from P and P': (t) == P- (l-x) P' . 
Let us assume that (t) is positive since this does not seem to be 
a very restrictive assumption. Note that in a two-country model 
with a single key currency, ro would become p. This parallels the 
case where country B does not trade very much with the small 
economy in comparison with A, and consequently (I-x) will be low 
and ro will tend towards p. 
b. The results 
i) Solutions for the exchange rate and the domestic price. 
If Pc'" follows a Poisson process and takes on two values only PL'" 
(low) and PH'" (high) as previously assumed, the reduced form: 
leads to: 
1tLH (SH-SL) = A - 1 (SL -m+roPL "' ) 
1tHL (SL -SH) = A.- 1 (SH-m+o)PH "') 
(116) 
(117) 
In the context of the free float, solving this two-equation 
system gives SL and SH and combining with the PPP equation (115) 
entails: 
A.1t P -m- LH (p. p.) 
L 1 X X ro H - L + 1tLH+ 1tHL (118) 
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(119) 
It follows that: 
(120) 
These expressions correspond to the flexible rate regime and can 
be used for further calculations. 1 6They display much similarity 
with the solutions of the two-country model (equations 46 to 48), 
the parameter ro replacing the parameter p. After having 
established the three country framework, we can now proceed to 
compare the single currency peg and the basket peg 
ii) Price variability 
We distinguish the two types of fixed rate regimes: the 
basket peg and the single currency peg. 
For the basket peg, the effective exchange rate S is constant and 
is taken as zero. It results that: 
(121) 
1 6 To compare with the variances in equations (122) and 
(125) ,one may note that the variances of the domestic price in 
the free float and managed float (at position L) are 
respectively: 
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Since p c· follows a Poisson process, the variance of the 
domestic price P will be: 
E ( dP ) 2 / d tL = (122) 
For the single currency peg, it consists of a fixed rate peg to 
the currency of A, implying that SA = 0 and consequently: 
(123) 
and 
(124) 
The variance of P can then be derived as: 
(125) 
These two variances involve only the variance of the commodity 
price and can be easily compared. The conclusion will be that the 
fixed rate basket peg gives a lower variance than the fixed rate 
single currency peg (to country A currency) since ro = ~-(l-x)~' 
is less than ~. In the single currency peg, a commodity price 
fluctuation will fully translate into changes in the domestic 
price taking account of the share of the commodity sector in the 
domestic economy. Extending the peg to currency B in a basket peg 
regime means that the bilateral rate with respect to country B 
will change somewhat following a commodity price jump because the 
currency B will respond to that jump: the latter will appreciate 
and lead to a depreciation of the bilateral rate SB. Consequently 
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it will tend to depreciate the effective exchange rate from its 
initial level in the proportion P' (I-x). To keep the effective 
rate fixed, one will have to appreciate the bilateral rate SA for 
the same amount. The domestic price is insulated from the 
external disturbance to the extent of this appreciation in 
comparison with the single peg. 
(0 = P-(l-x)P'< P 
Therefore the variance of the domestic prlce is lower in the 
basket peg regime than in the single currency peg regime. This 
preference for the basket peg results in part from our focus on 
macro-stability instead of micro-stability. The latter criterion 
may give some advantage to the single currency peg as described 
in Black (1976), in the sense that it presents the traders with 
virtually no risks with regards the link with the intervention 
currency but it raises macroeconomic risks in the sense that 
fluctuations between the key currenCles will represent an 
external shock for the small economy. Conversely the flexible 
rate or the basket peg will eliminate this category of 
macroeconomic risk while it may introduce some uncertainty for 
the traders about the exchange rate to use for their 
transactions. 
c. Extension: taking account of the key currency variations 
The fluctuations between the key currencies during the 1970's 
and 1980' s and even more recently had been a feature of the 
international monetary system. For a small country which adopts 
a peg regime, the fluctuations may constitute a major foreign 
disturbance. To add in this particular aspect, the three-country 
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model of the preV10US subsection is extended and becomes a four-
country model. The fourth country is taken to be a large country. 
In sum, beside the domestic economy which continues to be 
characterized as a small open and commodity-exporting one, we 
have another small commodity-exporting economy and two large 
economies (e.g. us and EC or Japan). variations in the exchange 
rate between the two large countries are assumed to occur very 
significantly. 
Rewriting the model, we have as before: 
SA = m-~·pc* 
SB = SA-SBA=SA+~'PC*=m-(~-~')Pc* 
(126) 
(127) 
The bilateral rate with respect to the second large country C 
will be: 
(128) 
where SCA represents the bilateral rate between the two large 
countries and will be denoted by the variable f . Therefore, we 
have: 
Sc = m-~P/-f (129) 
If the trade shares are x A , x B and 1 - x A-xB , the effective exchange 
rate will equal: 
(130) 
or equivalently: 
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(131) 
Now the expression of the effective exchange rate has an 
additional term resulting from the introduction of the variable 
f (key currency fluctuations). The latter will affect the 
domestic currency as an external disturbance in a similar way as 
the world price of the commodity. 
On the other hand, for the PPP rule to hold, the domestic price 
should take the form: 
(132) 
i) The single currency peg 
If the domestic economy pegs its currency to the currency of 
country C then Sc=O and SA=S~ 
Under these conditions, the effective exchange rate reduces to 
its first two terms in (130) so that: 
or 
S = XASA+XSSS = XASCA+XS (SCA+ ~'PC" ) 
S = (xA+xs )f+xs~'Pc" 
(133) 
(134) 
It will follow that the domestic price in the case of a single 
currency peg will be: 
(135) 
The domestic price will vary in function of the changes in not 
only the commodity price but also the bilateral rate between the 
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key currencies as well. We will assume that the variable f 
follows a random walk process. Under these conditions and 
assumlng that the commodity price shocks and the key currency 
shocks are independent, the variance of the domestic price 
equals: 
(136 ) 
where cr/ denotes the variance of the shocks corresponding to 
the currency fluctuations. 
ii) The basket peg 
We set S = 0 to represent the basket peg which leads to: 
(137) 
Consequently, the variance of the domestic price equals: 
VP = 1'.,2 ( .. .. ) 2 I L UJ 7tLH PH -PL (138) 
The comparison between the two types of peg amounts to comparing 
the variances in (136) and (138). The simple currency peg is less 
satisfactory than the basket peg, even more clearly in this case 
where the key currency variations are introduced and prove to be 
external disturbances affecting the small open economy. The 
reason is because it fails to protect the domestic price from 
both external shocks while the basket peg insulates completely 
from the f shocks and partially from the commodity price shocks. 
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Conclusion 
The role that expectations can play among the determinants of 
the exchange rate is one of the features underlined by the modern 
strand of the literature on exchange rate economics. We have 
wanted to illustrate this by introducing a Poisson process to 
describe the behaviour of the export conunodi ty price or more 
generally the terms of trade that the small economy faces. When 
the monetary authorities aim to stabilize the domestic price 
level, then the results of the model suggest a policy of "leaning 
with the wind" for the exchange rate, corresponding to a 
contractionary (expansionary) monetary policy to be undertaken 
in a period of conunodity price boom (bust). The specification of 
the Poisson process has been simplified as much as possible where 
the conunodity price takes on two values only (High and Low). But 
the policy implications would be the same in a more complex 
specification of the Poisson process. 
We have also addressed the question of choice for an exchange 
rate regime. It appears that the managed float as well as a 
currency band present some advantages compared with the free 
float in this small open economy subject to monetary and external 
shocks. On the other hand, it is shown that the basket peg should 
dominate the single currency peg. Then the question arises 
whether it is feasible to combine the features of basket peg, 
managed float and target zone as a way to obtain the most optimal 
exchange rate regime. In principle, there is no conceptual 
difficulty in doing so. The way to combine the managed float and 
the target zone has been investigated above. Furthermore, 
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considering the target zone, one needs only to set it using a 
basket instead of a single currency as the unit. Typically the 
edges of the band would relate to the effective exchange rate and 
not the bilateral rate. Secondly the band will be managed. This 
means that with respect to the monetary shocks, the band will be 
defended as usual (if necessary the band width will be zero). But 
when commodity price shocks occur, the monetary authorities will 
proceed to a realignment, shifting the band consequently (cf 
section 3.5). This managed float will protect the domestic price 
from the external disturbances: it does not limit itself to 
shifting the band, it takes into account the effects of 
anticipations in the exchange rate and the domestic price. 
One can note the highly stylised nature of the model, leading 
to the proposal that the currency band be shi f ted to two 
positions High and Low respectively, in response to an increase 
or decrease in the commodity price. In the general case where the 
commodity price takes on many more values, the policy implication 
reminds of the crawling peg policy. Here the crawling peg will 
be with respect to the commodity price or equivalently the terms 
of trade. The conventional crawling peg refers to the 
differential between domestic and foreign inflation. We can note 
that the two concepts would coincide if the terms of trade were 
defined to mean the foreign price relative to the domestic price. 
A crawling peg which has the form of a commodity standard will 
ensure that the real exchange rate adjusts to external shocks and 
at the same time promote price stability as far as these external 
shocks are concerned. 
We have assumed that a problem of signal extraction does not 
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arise in this model so that the monetary authorities can decide 
about the action the most appropriate to external shocks as 
distinct from monetary shocks. 
CHAPTER 4. THE BG/SD MODEL 
Introduction 
The study of exchange rate reglmes offers two ways of 
approaching the problem of choosing the optimal regime. One way 
which is most used in the literature consists of specifying a 
monetary rule whose parameters determine how the exogenous shocks 
hitting the economy affect the ultimate objectives. Blundell-
Wignall and Gregory (1990) referred henceforth as BG have used 
this method . They offer a model to analyze the choice of an 
exchange rate regime. The analysis bears on the case of Australia 
and New-Zealand. But the model may be viewed as representative 
of any country which can be characterized as essentially a 
commodity-exporting economy. The authors have established a 
clear-cut result which gives the relationship between the real 
exchange rate and the terms of trade. Then they proceed to the 
question of an optimal exchange rate regime. For this purpose, 
price stability is chosen as the optimality criterion. Using a 
reaction function to describe the monetary rule, the analysis 
comes to the conclusion that where external disturbances are more 
important compared with internal disturbances, a flexible 
exchange rate should be preferred to a fixed rate and vice-versa 
(i.e. a fixed rate regime should be adopted in the case where 
internal shocks are relatively more important). 
An alternative and more direct way to deal with the problem of 
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the choice of an optimal exchange regime would involve 
calculating the variances for the target variable under only two 
regimes, a fixed rate on the one hand and under a flexible rate 
on the other. One can then compare these variances and select the 
optimal regime, on the basis of the price stability criterion for 
example. 
By means of stochastic calculations, we use the second approach 
which, when applied to the BG model leads to more precise 
results. Furthermore, it is shown how the Poisson process 
specification may be introduced. In the present chapter as in the 
previous chapter and, we retain price stability as the objective 
function of the monetary authorities. 
The first section will present the extended model. Section 4.2 
will determine the solutions and the dynamics. In section 4.3, 
we consider the economy under s hocks. Under the stochastic 
setting, the alternative regimes of float and fixed rate are 
compared. A numerical illustration follows in section 4.4. The 
last section introduces the Poisson process. 
4.1 The BG specification 
Here we present a version of the BG model in which a few 
modifications have been introduced : the reaction function 
defining the monetary rule does not enter any longer. Also the 
equation which describes in an ad-hoc way the dynamics of the 
real exchange rate is deleted since such dynamics can be derived 
from the rest of the model, using the saddlepoint technique. 
Furthermore we translate the discrete time form of the model into 
a continuous-time setting in order to apply the stochastic 
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analysis. 
The main characteristic of the model considered here relates to 
the emphasis it gives to the role played by the primary good or 
commodity. In that sense, it presents a great similarity with the 
simplified model of the previous chapter. The main novelty in the 
present representation is the introduction of a non-traded good, 
whereby the structural parameters can be displayed. 
As it stands, the model in continuous time is basically a 
modified Dornbusch model in which the goods sector has been 
extended. The PPP rule is assumed to hold for traded goods, both 
manufactured and primary commodities. The non-traded good price 
however is determined by the situation of demand and supply on 
the domestic market. 
The model consists of the following set of equations: 
m-Pd = Y(P+Yo-Pd) -£i (1 ) 
. " E (dS/dt) (2) 1 = 1 + 
Yx = 11 (S+Px* -Pn) +y (3 ) 
Yo = Yx + Yn (4 ) 
d = P-Pd+YO (5 ) 
~ = ex (S+Prn* -Pn) +d (6 ) 
Dm = D-Dn (7 ) 
p = APn+ (I-A) (S+Px* ) (8 ) 
Pd =APn+ (I-A) (s+Pm") (9 ) 
dPn = <I> ( d n -Y n) d t (10) 
The notations are as follows: all variables are in natural 
logarithms except the variables in capital letters and the 
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interest rate. So Yo=logYo and p=logP for example. Variables such 
as Yo and Px* are assumed to be exogenous. The other ten variables 
constitute the endogenous variables which can be derived from the 
set of equations. The other notations consist of the following: 
Yx' Yn and Yo: supply of exports in the proportion (I-A.), of the 
non-traded good in the proportion A. and of total (and full 
employment level) output (evaluated at their price in the 
previous period, which is assumed to be equal to uni ty) 1 • 
~, ~ and d: non-traded goods demand, import demand and total 
demand. 
p, Pd' Pn and Px" : GDP deflator, demand deflator I price index of 
the non-traded good and export price (Px" is in foreign 
currency) . 
Pm" : import price index in foreign currency, normalized to zero 
in the subsequent analysis. 
Sand E(dS/dt): the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency 
per unit of foreign currency) and its expected depreciation. 
m: money stock 
i and i *: domestic and foreign inte rest rates. 
All parameters are deemed to b e positive . To clarify the sense 
of equation (3) and equation (6), one may nee d to add a negative 
constant on the right hand side . Indeed these two equations aim 
at giving the determinants of the production share (%) of the 
commodity sector and the demand s hare (%) of the non- traded good 
respectively. Such a constant i s omitted here. 
1 p Oy _ pO Y 0 0 0 .• d o - x x + P nYn where P x and P n are the prev1.ous per1.o 
prices normalized to unity. 
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The analysis of the terms of trade shocks generally requlres the 
set-up of a three goods framework as a minimum. The model 
specified above includes three goods, but there are restrictions 
in what is produced and consumed domestically.Only two of the 
three goods are produced domestically, the primary commodity 
which is exported and the non-traded good. Basically, it pictures 
the case of a dependent economy a la Salter (1959). As Salter 
(1959) explains in building his model for a dependent economy, 
importables might be viewed as a category of exports, the 
receipts of which will be used to buy imports for an amount 
equivalent to the would-be domestic production of importables2 • 
Table 4.1 
a) Composition of production and consumption 
(showing the price of production and consumption) 
Production Consumption 
Commodity Non-traded good Imports Non-traded good 
Yx (Px*+S) . Yn (Pn) ~ (Prn= S+Prn* )· ~ (Pn) 
(with Pm*= O) 
.................................... .. ........................ .. ............................................................ 
b) Deflators of production and consumption 
Production (GDP) Consumption (CPI) 
2 We note that the construction of the tradable good as a 
composite good holds as long as the relative prices of exports 
and imports do not change . 
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c) Terms of trade 
d) Real exchange rate 
The tradable sector is thus divided into the exports which are 
domestically produced and imports which are not. It is assumed 
that domestic demand has only two components: demand for the non-
traded good and demand for imports. The tradable sector produces 
for the foreign good market only and the needs for tradables are 
met by imports. 
These assumptions on production and consumption can be relaxed 
by interpreting the equations in terms of excess demand and 
supply terms. The level of imports can be given the 
interpretation of excess demand for the importable over the 
domestic production of the same good. Similarly, the level of 
exports could represent the excess supply of the commodity good 
with respect to the domestic demand for the same good. It can be 
easily seen that the way the excess demand for, and the excess 
domestic production of, these goods will respond to a boom is 
consistent with the specification of equations (3) and (6). But 
note that the exclusion restrictions are now much harder to 
justify. 
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Equations (1) and (2) represent the asset market equilibrium and 
the arbitrage equation equalizing the expected returns on the 
domestic and foreign assets. The parameter E (notice the change 
in the notations from the previous chapter) represents the semi-
elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the interest 
rate. These two equations determine the domestic price Pd and the 
interest rate i respectively. 
Equations (3) to (7) describe the goods sector supplies and 
demands. Under the assumptions of a small open economy, the 
domestic demand for imports and supply of exports have no effect 
on the world price of these goods, that is to say that the world 
supply of the good which is demanded for by the small economy, 
as well as the world demand for the good supplied by the small 
economy are infinitely elastic. The assumption therefore enables 
us to treat Px* and Pm* as exogenously determined. 
Equations (3) to (6) involve what will be referred to as the 
substitution and income effects. We give below a brief 
presentation of these categories of effects before proceeding 
with the description of the othe r equations of the model. 
a. The substitution effect in production. 
The supply of the commodity good (all of which is exported) as 
a proportion of the overall output will increase with the price 
of the commodity relative to the non-traded good. This represents 
the substitution effect between the two sectors in response to 
changes in the relative prices. The supply elasticity ~ measures 
the degree of substitutability. Fig 4.1 below gives a graphic 
representation of the substitution process. The curve AB 
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Fig 4.1: substitution effect 
d 
U" 
U L' 
d 
n 
Fig 4.2: income effect 
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indicates the possibility frontier of the production function . 
The total of resources used in the production is assumed to be 
fixed and the economy reaches its full employment level along the 
frontier. The lines TT and T'T' denote two levels of the relative 
price of the non-traded good with respect to the commodity good. 
The relative price at the equilibrium point E' is more favourable 
to the commodity sector that at point E, which consequently 
attracts more resources and a higher production level of the 
commodity good at the expense of the non-traded good: y} > y/ 
and Yn2 < Yn1 
These substitution effects correspond to the "resource movement" 
effect in the "Dutch disease" literature3 • 
We note that when the exchange rate is flexible, the change in 
the price (in domestic currency) of the commodity good will be 
the net result of the change in the world price of the commodity 
and the change in the exchange rate, whether the former induces 
the latter or not. 
b. The income effect 
The aggregate demand and the demands directed to the non- traded 
good and to the imports are described in equations (5) to (7). 
Equation (5) states that the aggregate demand is simply nominal 
income deflated by the demand deflator, defined in equation (8). 
While this specification is undoubtedly very simplified , it does 
however take into account the income effect of the terms of 
trade. An improvement in the terms of trade will translate into 
3 The Dutch problem, that is the shrinkage of the importable 
sector following a boom in the commodity sector is dealt with 
more specifically in the next chapter. 
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more real income and consequently more demand. Note that what is 
identified here as the income effect 1S also known as the 
"spending effect" 
models. 
1n "Dutch disease" and dependent economy 
We note that it is the aggregate demand defined this way which 
enters the demand for money in equation (1). Also, · one may see 
that specifying the GDP deflator (equation 8 ) and domestic demand 
deflator (equation 9) separately has made it possible to derive 
the income effect, which justifies the set of three goods prices 
in the model. 
We note that equation (6) involves the real exchange rate 
defined as the relative price of the import good with respect to 
the non-traded good. With the chosen normalization (PmW = 0), the 
real exchange rate amounts to the difference between the nominal 
exchange rate and the price of the non-traded good. Equation (6) 
indicates that the non-traded good component of demand depends 
positively on the real exchange rate. 
In view of the possible application of the model to the Franc 
Zone (FZ) countries, the asymmetry between the small and the 
large country will be essentially represented by the underlying 
assumption that any change in the conunodity price will affect the 
domestic economy but conversely the latter cannot influence the 
world prices or other variables of the large economy. 
Let us further consider the adjustment process implied in the 
income effect with the curve of fig 4.2. This incorporates the 
production possibilities curve from fig 4.1, but also includes 
an indifference curve UU between d,. and ~, where the vertical 
axis measures both Yx amd the value of imports which can be 
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purchased at g1ven terms of trade. The supply of the commodity 
sector and demand for imports are measured on the vertical axis, 
the supply of, and demand for the non-traded good, on the 
horizontal axis. The effect of a commodity price change acts as 
an income effect which shifts the curve of available goods from 
MN to M'N and the indifference curve to a new position U'U'. The 
situation before any change in the nominal exchange rate S or the 
non-traded good price Pn can be pictured as at B. The point B 
represents the volume of goods available at the new terms of 
trade, point C represents the desird demand for goods, following 
the 1ncrease 1n the terms of trade.At C, the relative price LL 
(of imports with respect to the non-traded good) remains the same 
as at the beginning, and desired demand for goods has increased. 
Comparing with the volume of goods available at B, it appears 
that the volume of imports which can be bought at the new terms 
of trade exceeds the demand for imports while there is excess 
demand for the non-traded good. For equilibrium to be restored 
(at point D), there will be a change in the relative prices1 2 • 
The pr1ce of imports will decrease, and the price of the non-
traded good will increase, which means an appreciation of the 
exchange rate,as a result of the terms of trade rise. This will 
lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
A similar illustration of the adjustment process which involves 
the money market could be conducted but it is postponed. 
The other equations of the model (8) to (10) describe the 
determination of the GDP deflator p (demand deflator Pd) as a 
1 2 The lines LL an L'L' represent the relative price of the 
non-traded good the import price at the initial equilibrium A and 
new equilibrium D respectively. 
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weighted average of the pr1ce index of exports (imports) and the 
price Pn of the non-traded good. The behaviour of Pn itself in 
equation (10) reflects the excess demand on the non-traded good 
market. The parameter $ represents the speed at which the non-
traded good price will adjust in response to the discrepancy 
between demand and supply. 
The model adopts the case of an open economy and the way 
equations (8) and (9) are written with the same coefficient for 
the export price and import price implies that the economy 
presents a balanced external trade at equilibrium. We note also 
that the exchange rate will serve as the sole channel of 
transmission of the monetary policy since for simplicity, the 
interest rate is omitted in the function of demand for goods 
(equation 5) . 
4.2 The solution 
The model in continuous time constituted of equations (1) to 
(10) will bring about the steady state solutions of the non-
traded good price and the exchange rate. The analysis will also 
bear on the dynamics involved. Adding the stochastic elements 
will come afterwards. 
The model can be transformed into a two-equation "reduced form" 
by substitution of: 
- equations (3) to (7) into equation (10) with the use of 
equations (8) and (9) which define the GDP and demand deflators. 
-equation (2) (in which the foreign interest rate i * is set to 
zero to simplify) into equation (1). 
This gives the following reduced form l3 : 
( 
dPn ) [- -t . (a. A + (1- A) Tt) 
E(ds) - A 
€ 
4-. (a. A+ (l-A) Tt)J 
(Pn
dt) 
(l-A) sdt 
€ 
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The price of the non-traded good is chosen as the distinguishing 
characteristic of the inflation conditions in the domestic 
economy. But the use of any of the two other price indexes could 
be considered and should not significantly affect the results. 
In a compact form, equations (11) will be rewritten: 
(11' ) 
where: 
A -
E ... 
- ~. (a.A+ (1 - 1..)11) 
A 
E 
(
{. (I - A) (A+l1)J 
y(l - A) 
E 
~. (a.A+ (1 - 1..)11) 
(1 - 1..) 
E 
(12) 
(13) 
13 In the substitutions, we have used the relationship: 
Yo = AYn +(l-A)yx (cf. Blundell-Wignal & Gregory, 1990) 
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The technique used for the stochastic Dornbusch model as in 
Miller and Weller (1989) is followed here to deal with the 
reduced form (11) of the model. 
First, the steady state solution 1S determined by setting dpn=O 
and E(dS)=O, which gives: 
p"-(l - )..) [ (I-A) (.l.+T]) -yJ .p;+m (14) 
n a.At(l - )..)~ 
s·.- [). (I-A) ()..t!)) + (I-A)y] .p·tm (15) 
a.A+(l -).)~ x 
Let us denote: 
then the solutions (14) and (15) may be rewritten 1n the form: 
(18) 
(19) 
The equilibrium values of the non-traded good price and the 
nominal exchange rate depend on the levels of the commodity price 
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on the world market and the money stock. 14 
a. Influence of the money supply 
From equations (18) and (19), the steady state price of both the 
non-traded good and the exchange rate are in a one-for-one 
relationship with the money stock, meaning an increase In the 
money stock will translate into an equivalent rise In the 
domestic price and the exchange rate. The price of the commodity 
in domestic currency will increase by the same amount. This 
ensures homogeneity of degree one in m: money is neutral. Indeed 
such an increase will cause an excess supply on the money market 
and an excess demand on the goods market. On the latter market 
the price of the non-traded good will rise consequently to 
restore equilibrium. Similarly on the money market, the price of 
the domestic currency will need to fall (depreciation) to restore 
the initial equilibrium . 
Here we can identify the "overshooting" of the exchange rate due 
to the stickiness of the domestic price. When the money stock 
increases, the real balances increase immediately and cause a 
disequilibrium. An instantaneous rise in the demand deflator Pd 
in equation (1) is required to restore the equilibrium on the 
asset market. But Pd is defined as a weighted average of the non-
traded good price and the nominal e x change rate (after having 
normalized Pm* = 0). If the former is slow to adjust as assumed 
in equation (10), then the exchange rate will bear all the burden 
of the adjustment in the first place with a "spillover" between 
14 One can also determine the production level of the non-
traded good at equilibrium: 
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the goods market and the money market. When later on, the price 
of the non-traded good starts to rise to counter the excess 
demand and bring back the equilibrium on the goods market, the 
first increase in the exchange rate will have to be reduced to 
its long run value: in that sense the exchange rate has overshot 
its steady state value. This appears in figure 4.3. 
An increase in the money stock shifts the MM curve of the money 
market equilibrium to M'M'. In face of price stickiness, the 
system goes from A to B by change only in the exchange rate to 
reach the new equilibrium line of the money market. Then it moves 
to point C which constitutes the equilibrium point for the 
economy as a whole. At that point, the exchange rate has risen 
with respect to point A but it has decreased with respect to B, 
which means that the exchange rate at point B has overshot its 
long run equilibrium position corresponding to point C. The 
overshooting effect will be measured more precisely later on. 
b. Influence of the world commodity price. 
The world price will display its effects through mUltiple 
channels. The coefficients of P x* in equations (18) and (19) 
indicate the extent to which the world price of the commodity 
good will affect the steady state values of the non-traded good 
price and the exchange rate. 
To start with, the influence on the domestic price involves two 
types of effects: direct and indirect effects through the 
adjustment of the goods market equilibrium. A one unit increase 
in the world price of the commodity will entail directly an 
increase in the real income equal to 1-A. This causes a rise ~n 
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Fig 4.3: 'Oversbooling' of Ihe exchange rale 
s 
Fig 4.4: Dynamics wilh overshooling 
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the demand for the non-traded good equivalent to A(l-A) since the 
latter represents a share A in the aggregate demand. There exists 
a second direct effect equal to (l-A)~ where (l-A) represents the 
share of the export sector in the aggregate output and ~ the 
price elasticity of supply. Indeed the one unit rise in the price 
Px* will cause an increase equal to (l-A)~ in the supply of the 
export good and consequently a corresponding decline in the 
supply of the non-traded good since the available resources are 
allocated competitively between the two sectors. The increase in 
the demand on the one hand and the fall in the supply on the 
other hand will create a discrepancy requiring the price of the 
non-traded good to rise. 
The indirect effect will come out v~a the change in the exchange 
rate as implied by the external trade surplus which accompanies 
in the first place the boom on the commodity market. The trade 
surplus causes an appreciation (decrease in S) which in turn 
makes imports less expensive, and as a consequence the demand for 
the non-traded good will tend to decrease in the proportion AU. 
Likewise, the decrease in S will tend to reduce the price ~n 
domestic currency of the commodity. This gives some incentive to 
produce more of the non-traded good in the proportion (l-A)~. 
These effects via the exchange rate will occur at the second 
stage and will reduce the excess demand created at the first 
stage. 
The direct effects are measured by Kl as a numerator in the 
coefficient of Px" (in the express~on 18), and the indirect 
effects which act in the opposite direction to dampen the direct 
effects are represented by K2 as a denominator. 
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The above description concerns mainly the adjustment process on 
the goods market. What happens on the other market should be 
considered as well. The effect of the boom on the money market 
will tend to create an excess demand for money and to reduce 
inflation. This is captured by the parameter "I in the coefficient 
of Px* . Also the overall impact on the domestic price will depend 
on the importance of the export sector I which explains the 
multiplicative term (l-A): in fact the impact on the domestic 
economy of the boom in the world price can be expressed in terms 
of (l-A)px* to signify that the commodity price variations on the 
world market affect the domestic economy through the external 
sector. 
We recall the rather special case mentioned earlier on where the 
commodity boom provokes a decrease in the domestic price. This 
corresponds to the situation in which the direct impact as 
lowered by the indirect effects will prove to be less than the 
income elasticity of the demand for money: 
K1 /K2 < "I (20) 
A high income elasticity combined with a low share (l-A) of the 
external sector and a high price elasticity of the demand for 
goods are the conditions likely to establish the special 
conditions (20). 
with regards the determination of S* in equation (19) I the 
coefficient of Px* appears as a weighted average of Kl /K2 and "I, 
the respective weights being A and (l -A) 
The description about Pn* applies similarly to trace the 
different parameters which appe ar ln the ratio K1 /K2 • The 
weighted average identifies the two sources for the appreciation 
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of the exchange rate following an increase in the commodity price 
in foreign currency: on the one hand, the combination of direct 
and indirect effects via the goods demand and supply and on the 
other hand, the income effect of the demand for money. The weight 
A refers to the adjustment on the non-traded good market while 
the weight (l-A) indicates that the importance of the income 
effect on the money market will be commensurate to the size of 
the external sector. 
The excess demand for the non-traded good as already presented 
will cause a rise in Pn and a reduction in the money stock in 
real terms. Also, the increase in the commodity price results in 
an soaring of the demand for money. These pressures add to each 
other to appreciate the currency, hence the coefficient of Px* 
where the relative weights of the two sectors are taken into 
account. According to equation (19) therefore, an increase in the 
commodity price leads necessarily to an appreciation of the 
currency. 
c. The real exchange rate (S -p~ 
We show in this section that the d e termination of the real 
e xchange rate at the steady state does not involve monetary 
variables . So the equilibrium real e xchange rate will not depend 
on the type of exchange regime. since the present chapter will 
focus on the comparison between the flexible and fixed exchange 
rate regimes, the scope of this s e ction will be limited15 • 
In the standard model, the PPP relationship by construction rules 
15 More of the analysis on the real exchange rate is given 
in chapter 6. 
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out the variations l.n the real exchange rate. The extended 
version of this chapter distinguishes a non-tradable and a 
tradable sectors. The price of the tradable obeys the parity 
condition while the price of the non-traded good is determined 
by the condition on the domestic market. The real exchange rate 
represents the relative price of the two types of goods. Its 
variations imply a reallocation between the two sectors of the 
resources available in the economy as mentioned in the earlier 
discussion on the choice for a criterion. 
From the solutions of the domestic price and the exchange rate, 
we can derive the real exchange rate at the steady state (ERER): 
(21 ) 
This result has been found and tested by BG(1990). It states 
that in the long run the real exchange rate can be described as 
depending only on the terms of trade Px* : there is no trace of a 
nominal variable. This corresponds to some extent to the result 
derived by Edwards (1988a) in which the nominal variables enter 
only in the short run although othe r real variables are added 
besides, such as the Government expenditures or the net capital 
inflows. Equation (21) simply states that a rise in the commodity 
price l.n foreign currency will result in a real appreciation16 • 
Table 4.2: Values of Kl/ K2 l.n %. 
1 6 In the presentation by Lal (1989) where the model 
includes explicitly an importable goods sector, to obtain the 
result that a reduction in the tariff causes a real appreciation 
would require the additional assumption that the non-traded 
sector is the most labour-intensive and the importable sector the 
most capital-intensive one. 
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ex. (= 11 ) 
0.5 1 1.5 
10.2 1112.5%1 93.8% 87.5 % 
10.5 100% 75% 66.7 % 
10.75162.5% 44% 37.5 % 
Table 4.2 gives an illustration of possible values of the 
coefficient K1/K2 in equation (21). For given elasticities, it 
decreases with the share A of the non-traded sector, and for 
given A, it is higher for economies of low elasticities of demand 
and supply, and vice-versa17 • 
One point we can make here is that in fact one needs not find 
the solutions S* and Pn* at the steady state to derive the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. The long run real exchange rate 
may be defined simply and more conventionally as the level which 
ensures the trade balance. 
Let us determine the trade balance (TB) as follows: 
17 Let us note that to examine the possible values of K1 /K2 , 
we have simplified by assuming ex. = 11. The more general case is 
considered later. 
where the notations are those of the model. Also we have: 
d = A.d,,+(l-A.)~ = A.a(S-PI1)+(1-A.)~+A.d 
~ d = [A.al (1-A.) ] (S-Pn) +~ 
o r ~ = d - [A. a I ( 1-A) ] (S - Pn ) 
(23) 
(25) 
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(24 ) 
Combining with the expression which determines the supply of 
the export good will provide: 
But from equation (5), we have y-d = -(l-A.)px*. Therefore: 
The condition of the trade balance TB = 0 implies: 
(1 - A.) (A.+n) • 
(S- P n )' - - Xa+ (I - X) n Px (28) 
that is ERER = -(K1 /K2 )px* . The relationship between the 
equilibrium real exchange rate and the terms of trade can 
therefore be obtained under the condition of trade equilibrium. 
It can be shown also that the condition of equilibrium on the 
non-traded market would lead to the same relationship, due to the 
fact that the simultaneous equilibrium on both markets is built 
in the model. A case where this simultaneity does not hold will 
be seen in chapter 6. In advance, let us say that in general ERER 
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will correspond to the long run equilibrium, that is, the steady 
state with at least a trade balance and an equilibrium on the 
market of the non-traded good. 
d. Dynamics 
To study the dynamics of the model, we refer to the techniques 
of the saddlepoint analysis. The matrix A of the reduced form has 
a negative determinant: 
[-~ A' A- (a.A+( l-A)11 A 
€ 
t. (a. A+ (l-A) 11] 
(l-A) 
e 
(29 ) 
The reduced form concerns a predetermined variable, namely Pn 
and a "jump" variable S. This with the result (30) ensures the 
existence of a saddle-point whose stable manifold corresponds 
to the negative eigenvalue of A: the system provides a " unique, 
non-explosive solution for the expected values" of the price 
level and the exchange rate. 
Denoting the negative eigenvalue by r 1 and the corresponding 
eigenvector by (I, 81 ), we have by definition: 
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The calculations for r 1 and 81 are presented in appendix la 
where 81 appears to be negative, implying the "overshooting" of 
the exchange rate in the short run, as in the classic Dornbusch 
model and as already mentioned. 
Along the stable path, the relationship between the nominal 
exchange rate and the non-traded good price l.S as follows, 
omitting the subscript on 8 : 
S-S"=8(Pn-Pn*) (32) 
where S* and Pn* denote the equilibrium values of the exchange 
rate and the non-traded good prl.ce. 
Figure 4.4 gives a phase diagram of the dynamics which are 
involved. The line dPn=O and Eds=O describe the paths along which 
the variable Pn or S takes a constant value. They interse ct at 
the steady state equilibrium, chosen to coincide wi th the origin. 
The stable path and the unstable p a th are indicated as the line s 
SS and UU. The direction indicated by the arrows for the stable 
manifold supports the r e sult of the calcula tion giving a n e gative 
value to the parameter 8 or degree of overshooting. If the system 
departs from a point outside the stable manifold, it would not 
converge to equilibrium. But the assumption of rational 
e xpectations requires at any point in time that the s ystem be 
located on the stable manifold. 
The adjustment with overshooting can receive a further 
illustration. This can be seen when the equilibrium is disturbed 
from an initial point like A. with the price stickiness, the 
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shift goes from A to B to reach the new position of the stable 
manifold. From B, the system moves along SS to get at point o. 
with regards the real exchange rate, the dynamics can be derived 
from the results already obtained. The overshooting of the real 
exchange rate will result from the overshooting of the nominal 
exchange rate wi th the same reason as before I that is the 
stickiness of the non-traded good price: 
using the relationship along the stable manifold, it follows 
that: 
RER - (1 - ~) (S - S" ) + S" - p~ ( 34 ) 
or equivalently: 
RER - RER"+ (1 - 1) (S- S") (35) 11 
where RER* denotes the equilibrium real exchange rate. Since 
the coefficient of the second term on the right hand side of (34) 
is positive, an overshooting of the nominal exchange rate will 
cause the same type of overshooting of the real exchange rate. 
This may constitute a supplementary point of concern about the 
loss of competitiveness which accompanies a boom in the commodity 
sector and which is known to take the form of a real exchange 
rate appreciation . 
The movement of the nominal exchange rate along the stable 
manifold has its counterpart for the real exchange rate. Again 
from the dynamics of Sand Pn rewritten as follows: 
E (dS/dt) = [AI (E8) + (I-A) IE] (S-S*) 
dPn/dt = -K2 (1-8) (Pn-Pn*) 
(36) 
(37) 
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and taking account of the definition of the 8 which ensures the 
equality of the coefficients of (S-S*) and (Pn-P/ ) in (36) and 
(37) respectively, it will follow that: 
E(dRER/dt) = K2 (1-8) (RER*-RER) (38) 
This result constitutes a formal derivation of the formula 
indicated by BG(1990) to describe the dynamics of the real 
exchange rate. Equation (38 ) gives in particular an explici t form 
of the speed of adjustment as a function of the different 
parameters of the model. For example and very understandably, the 
system will, after a disturbance, undergo a faster adjustment 
process to its equilibrium when the adjustment on the market of 
the non-traded good is faster (~ is higher) or when the supply 
and demand elasticities are higher (cf appe ndix 1) . 
4.3 The economy under shocks: the BG/SD specification. 
The analysis above has concerned only the treatment of the 
economy in which no uncertainty is involved. Now, the velocity-
adjusted money stock and the world price of the commodity will 
be assumed to follow a stochastic process. This constitutes the 
stochastic Dornbusch model (SD) aspect of the proposed 
specification. As in the simplified model of chapter 3, 
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disturbances will face the economy, namely the money shocks and 
the commodity price shocks. In practice, the different shocks 
wi tnessed by a small open economy, ~n the FZ in particular 
constitute a larger set. But the two cases considered here will 
represent most of them. In this respect the terms of trade 
disturbances may be taken to represent as well the other types 
of external shocks such as the variations in interest rates or 
net capital inflows. The effect of real shocks such as crop 
fluctuations might receive a description along similar lines. S. 
Black (1976) gives an analysis on this category of domestic 
production fluctuations although his model differs from the BG 
model on the determination of the exchange rate. 
To start with, we consider the case where the two shocks will 
behave as random walks18 : 
(39 ) 
(40) 
where Zl and Z2 will represent the corresponding Wiener 
processes and variances 0'12 and 0'/ the variances. Equations (39) 
and (40) which describe the behaviour of the stochastic elements 
add to the set of equations (1)-(10). As this represents the 
stochastic Dornbusch form of the BG model, we will refer to it 
as the BG/SD model. 
a. Price variability ~n the free float 
18 The concepts of random walk, diffusion process or 
Brownian process will be used to mean the same thing to simplify 
the terminology. 
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The steady state solutions of the non-traded good price and the 
exchange rate have been shown to depend on the money stock and 
the commodity price in foreign currency (equations 18 and 19) . 
In consequence, the steady state equilibrium will move in 
response to the disturbances facing the economy. 
The reduced form equation (11) indicates that we have: 
Since S-S* = e (Pn-Pn*) along the stable manifold, equation (41) 
may be rewritten as: 
The difference Pn-Pn* represents the departure from equilibrium 
of the domestic (non-traded good) price. We denote 
Then differentiating Pn-Pn* gives: 
(44) 
Equation (44) describes a Ornstein-Uhlenbeck19 process whose 
condi tional and uncondi tional variance are respectively (assuming 
zero correlation between the two shocks) : 
19 This equationn may take the form: 
dPn = -K2 (1-e)Pndt+crdz with Pn denoting the departure 
from equlibrium. 
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(46) 
We recall that: K2 = (~/A) [aA+(l-A)~]. 
Consequently the inverse of 2K2 (1-8) will decrease while Kl/K2 
proves to be independent of ~. A relatively high value of ~ means 
that the goods market adjusts relatively quickly in response to 
shocks, which should lead to a lower asymptotic variance of the 
domestic price. 
For the other parameters, a clear-cut interpretation does not 
seem to be available except for the price elas tici ty (a) of 
demand for goods. High values of a will lower both the 
conditional and the unconditional variances. This is due to the 
fact that for a given excess demand, a higher price elasticity 
implies that less change in the domestic price level will be 
needed to close the gap between demand and supply, every thing 
else being constant. 
b. Flexible versus fixed rate regime. 
The calculations above have provided the price variability in 
the context of the free float. The same type of calculations 
would need to be done for the fixed rate regime in view of the 
comparison between the two regimes. But before considering the 
latter case, let us derive the case of the managed float, of the 
type examined in the previous chapter, that is a form of 
commodity standard. From equation (19), it appears that in the 
free float the exchange rate will appreciate in response to the 
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commodity price shocks but not enough to insulate the domestic 
price (i. e. non-traded good price). The managed float will 
consist of reinforcing the appreciation so as to eliminate the 
effect of the shock on the domestic price. 
We note that the type of regime either a float or a peg would 
not affect the real exchange rate in the long run although some 
concern might arise in the short run. What the managed float does 
however is to bring about a modification of the wayan 
appreciation for example of the real exchange rate is split 
between the appreciation of the nominal rate and the increase in 
the domestic pr1ce. The need to get the domestic price 
independent of Px* would imply new expressions to hold for the 
price level and the exchange rate: 
Pn*' = m (47) 
and since the equilibrium real exchange rate should not be 
modified: 
(48) 
where S* , and Pn* ' denote the steady state values of the exchange 
rate and the domestic price corresponding to the managed float 
regime designed to insulate it from the external shocks. It will 
follow that: 
with respect to the free float solution, the managed float will 
bring about a reinforcement of the appreciation equal to: 
~ 5 *-5*' = (I-A.) [(K1 /K2 ) -Y]Px* 
The term on the right hand side of (51) 
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(51) 
equals exactly the 
components of Pn" related to the terms of trade. This means the 
transfer from the domestic price to the exchange rate of that 
part of the adjustment which would mark the domestic price under 
the free float and which the managed float has shifted on to the 
exchange rate. 
It is assumed that at any time, the managed float succeeds in 
insulating the domestic price from the external imbalances, which 
implies that the differential of the domestic price of equation 
(44) reduces to: 
dPn = 0'1dz1 
The corresponding variance is: 
VPn = E (dPn/dt ) 2 
cVPn = cr/ 
(52) 
(53 ) 
(54) 
Whenever it is feasible, this managed float of leaning with the 
wind will provide more price stability and would be preferable 
to the free float regime, comparing the variances in (45) and 
(54) since it insulates the domestic price from the external 
shocks. In practice, the degree of management which is required 
of the float may be less than implied by the model. Indeed, the 
latter does not include for the sake of simplification the 
interest rate among the determinants of the demand for goods. In 
case the interest rate was introduced as an additional channel 
of transmission for the fluctuations in the terms of trade, then 
the managed float designed to deal with the boom effect on the 
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domestic price would decrease the money supply and raise the 
interest rate. A decrease in demand for the non-traded good would 
follow, dampening the inflationary pressure. 
One may note that the policy of reinforcing the change in the 
nominal exchange following a boom would not lead to a worsening 
of the loss in competitiveness when compared with the free float. 
The real exchange rate proves to be identical under the two types 
of exchange rate policy. However the decomposition of the real 
exchange rate into a nominal appreciation and an increase in the 
domestic price will be modified. The managed float will aim to 
transfer all of the adjustment on to the exchange rate, to 
protect the domestic price stability. 
Let us now consider the fixed rate regime. The exchange rate 
is constant and may be normalized to zero. The money supply 
becomes an endogenous variable. Considering the limits of 
sterilization, the monetary authori ties would not be able to 
control the money supply because of their intervention on the 
exchange market to maintain the exchange rate fixed at the same 
level. Substitutions l.n the equations of the mode l in its 
deterministic form will give: 
(55 ) 
Considering the departure from equilibrium and differentiating 
it will lead us to the new expression of (56): 
(56) 
In equation (56), p/* represents the equilibrium value of the 
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domestic pr1ce under the fixed regime. It can be shown that the 
steady state relationship between the domestic price and the 
terms of trade holds as: 
f* = Pn (57 ) 
Using the procedure as in equation (44), the differential 
equation gives: 
(58 ) 
Equation (58) shows that under the fixed exchange rate regime, 
the change 1n Pn (and equivalently the change 1n the real 
exchange rate) does not involve the monetary shocks since these 
should be accommodated so as to keep the domestic interest rate 
equal to the foreign interest rate. 
This provides the conditional and unconditional variances under 
the fixed rate regime: 
( 59) 
(60 ) 
The comparison between the fixed rate and the flexible or 
managed float will amount to comparing the corresponding 
variances of the domestic price. Let us limit the comparison to 
the case of the fixed rate versus the managed float since the 
latter is known to deliver more price stability than the free 
float. 
The managed float should be preferred to the fixed rate if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
- on the basis of the conditional variances: 
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(61) 
- on the basis of the unconditional variances: 
(62 ) 
These inequalities are equivalent to: 
~12/~22 < (K /K ) 2 v v 1 2 (63 ) 
(64) 
By means of these relationships, we see that the case for or 
against a float regime (a managed float ~n particular) in 
comparison with a fixed rate regime will depend on the relative 
importance of the two (internal and external) shocks. This result 
is now a familiar one. The ques tion remains to provide a scale 
upon which to assess the relative size of the two shocks. Here 
comes the need to look at the terms on the right hand side of the 
above conditions. It appears that give n the relative importance 
of the two disturbances, the d e mand and supply elasticities will 
matter as well as the share of the export sector in the domestic 
e conomy. A formal analysis will u se the conditional variances. 
With regards the unconditional v a ri ances, the analysis is more 
complex. Numerical simulations comparing the float and the fixed 
rate regimes will be undertaken in the next s e ction to provide 
an illustration of the way the parameters are involved on the 
basis of the unconditional variance s. The parameter ~ does not 
enter expression (63). But on the basis of the unconditional 
variances, we note that a higher value of ~ will diminish the 
chances that the managed float will be preferred. Williamson 
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(1991) indicates that prlce flexibility reduces the case for a 
flexible rate. 
c. Context of the FZ countries. 
In this subsection, we start the discussion of how the values 
of the parameters may affect the desirability of adopting the 
float regime or the fixed rate. The characteristics of the FZ 
will be taken into account. 
To simplify, the conditional variances of the managed float and 
the fixed rate will be used as a basis of the comparison. The 
simplification is two-fold. First, we consider the managed float 
instead of the free float. But further investigations not 
reported here seem to indicate that the conclusions derived from 
the analysis of the parameters do not differ when using the 
conditional variance of the free float or that of the managed 
float. Secondly, the conditional variance is used instead of the 
unconditional variance. However the numerical simulation to be 
undertaken ln the next section will involve the unconditional 
variance. 
We rewrite the condition (63 ) 
Let us denote: 
(I - A.) (A. +1l) 
ACU(l - A)ll (67 ) 
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Given the relative size of the money and commodity price shocks, 
the larger the ratio R the more likely the preference of the 
float regime will be. The discussion on the significance of the 
parameters related to the choice of an exchange rate regime will 
bear therefore on R. It will concern the demand and supply 
elasticities and the degree of openness. 
i) Demand elasticity 
The ratio R appears as a decreasing function of the price 
elasticity of demand for goods (a). Therefore, considering two 
economies A and B which differ only by their demand elasticity, 
it will be less costly for A than for B to adopt a fixed rate if 
A has a higher elasticity. We recall that the parameter a in the 
ratio represents the effect brought about by the appreciation of 
the exchange rate following an increase in the commodity price 
on the world market. This indirect effect is equivalent to a 
decrease in the demand for the non-traded good and tend to lessen 
the direct (income) effect which corresponds as we have seen to 
an increase in the demand. In the case where a takes on a high 
value, little change in the exchange rate will suffice for the 
indirect effect to offset the direct effect and prevent an 
increase in the price level via an excess demand. This would 
correspond to the characteristics of a developed economy while 
the FZ economies have a relatively low demand elasticity. The 
demand for basic food may represent an important component in 
these countries. The imports also include a significant share of 
food and capital goods which are not produced locally, making the 
demand for these goods relatively inelastic. 
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ii) Supply elasticity 
Wether the ratio R is an increasing or decreasing function of 
the supply elasticity ~ will depend on the relative value of (1-
A) and u. These two parameters represent the direct and indirect 
effects respectively on the demand side of a change in the 
commodity price. On the other hand, the parameter ~ represents 
the direct effect (in the numerator of R) as well as the indirect 
effect ( in the denominator of R) on the supply side attached in 
each case with the same weight equal to the share of the export 
sector. When a is greater than (l-A), the indirect effects (both 
demand and supply sides) tend to be more important than the 
direct effects (both demand and supply sides ) but this is less 
and less the case as ~ increases. Conversely, when a is lower 
than (l-A) the direct effects tend to be predominant (via the 
demand channel), and this will be less the case as ~ increases 
and tends to re-equilibrate the two types of effects (via the 
supply channel). In consequence, the ratio R increases as a 
function of the supply elasticity ~ when a > 1-A and decreases 
instead when a < 1-A. 
The FZ economies are deemed to have relatively low elasticities 
compared with a large developed country for example. At the same 
time they are very open economies. The presumption will therefore 
place emphasis on the second situation of relatively low values 
of a and high values of 1-A, to characterize the context of these 
economies. A higher supply elasticity will diminish the argument 
for a flexible rate while lower ~ will increase the favourable 
argument. The FZ countries may have a low elasticity of export 
supply, at least for crops like cacao and coffee which are tree-
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crops. Some estimates give ~ between 0.3 and 0.5 in the first 
year after the price change has been implemented. This value may 
increase to between 0.5 and 1.5 after three to five years. More 
specifically, Devarajan & de Melo (1987b) give the following 
values: 0.2 < ~ < 0.85 in the manufacturing sector and 
0.4 < ~ < 1.7 in the agriculture sector. The elasticity in the 
agriculture sector is reported to equal 0.8 for Cameroon, 0.4 for 
Cote d' Ivoire and 0.4 for Senegal. These characteristics of 
relatively low elasticities call for a float regime. The exchange 
rate would provide the necessary extra flexibility these 
economies need and that they may lack in the production and 
demand sides. 
iii) The degree of openness 
As regards the parameter A which represents the share of the 
non-traded good with (l-A) representing the share of the export 
sector or the degree of openness, its link with the ratio is more 
complex . The investigation of wheth er high or low values of A 
would call in favour of a particular exchange rate regime will 
l ead us to raise a discussion on two criteria widely referred to 
in the literature on optimal exchange regime, namely the Kenen's 
criterion that a fixed exchange rate would suit diversified 
economies while a flexible rate would be called for undiversified 
economies, and the Mc Kinnon's criterion that open economies 
should adopt a fixed rate, and closed economies a flexible rate 
regime. In the present context, an undiversified economy means 
that a2 is relatively great in contrast to diversified economies 
for which external disturbances tend to "average out" according 
to Kenen's argument. At the same time 
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more diversification 
corresponds to less openness of the economy. It appears that at 
this point, Kenen's and McKinnon's criteria seem to conflict with 
each other as noticed in the literature (Presley & Dennis, 1976). 
Indeed, according to the latter criterion very open economies are 
less subject to exchange "illusion" and require a fixed exchange 
rate reg~me. In the framework used here, great values of 1-~ or 
low values of ~ represent a high degree of openness. But the 
extent to which openness calls for a flexible exchange rate or 
not will depend on the values of the supply and demand 
elasticities in the foreign sector as already indicated. More 
explicit calculations will aim at determining in which cases 
Kenen's criterion or alternatively McKinnon's criterion will 
apply. 
For this purpose, we note that the differential of R with 
respect to ~ has the same sign as: 
D = (~-a)~2-2~~+{1-a)~ (68) 
The analysis of D in function of A leads us to consider two 
alternative situations. The first one arises when l+~-a < O. This 
corresponds to the case when the price elasticity of demand is 
very high. For l+~-a < 0, the analysis shows that D is definitely 
negative, whatever the values of A and the same sign applies for 
the differential of R. In consequence, the ratio R or 
equivalently the case for float regime will increase when A 
decreases that ~s when (i-A) ~.e the degree of openness 
increases . In the conditions of high demand elasticity therefore, 
the Kenen's criterion applies: when openness increases or for 
that matter, where diversification diminishes, this favours the 
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float regime. We note that the condition stated above implies 
that the price elasticity of demand be larger than both unity and 
the price elasticity of supply. 
The second situation arises where l+~-a has a positive sign: 
l+~-a > 0 (69 ) 
Under the condition (69), a priori four possibilities exist: 
case 1: 
l+~-a > 0 with ~-a < 0 
and 1-a < 0 (70) 
This case corresponds to an elastic demand for goods, and the 
demand elasticity is higher than the supply elasticity. It gives 
the same result and conclusion as the first situation analyzed 
above, the Kenen's criterion prevailing. The conditions (70) mean 
that the price elasticity of demand is relatively high with 
respect to both unity and the supply elasticity although not as 
high as to be greater than the sum 1+~. 
case 2: 
l+~-a > 0 with ~-a < 0 
and I -a > 0 (71) 
Both supply and demand are relatively ine lastic. But the latter 
is less inelastic than the former. Then the results are that the 
ratio R will increase as a function of A for values of less than 
a critical value but it will decrease for A larger than that 
critical value. The calculations in appendix 1b give the critical 
value Ac: 
1 - ).. -c 
[1)a (l+1)-a) ] \I\-a 
1) - (1 
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(73) 
This is a case which involves both Kenen' sand Mc Kinnon's 
criteria. For economies with a degree of openness less than l-~c ' 
the first criterion will apply. But the second criterion will 
hold for a higher degree of openness: the case for a flexible rate 
diminishes when openness increases from the critical value l-~c 
since R decreases. The result corresponds to the argument 
presented by some part of the literature (cf Ishayama 1975), 
specifying that in fact the McKinnon's criterion is meant to 
apply for very open economies. 
case 3: 
l+~-a > 0 with ~-a > 0 
and I-a < 0 (74) 
The demand for goods is elastic (a > 1) but not as much as the 
supply. This case leads to the same conclusion as case 1 or the 
first situation: the Kenen's crite rion applies for any value of 
the parameter ~ (0 ~ ~ ~ 1) . 
case 4: 
l+~-a > 0 with ~-a > 0 
and 1 - a > 0 (75) 
This is a case where the elasticity of demand happens to be low 
with respect to unity and with respect to the elasticity of 
supply. The results and conclusions prove to be identical to 
those of case 2. 
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The analysis of the influence that the parameter A or the degree 
of openness 1-A has on the optimal choice for an exchange rate 
reduces eventually to the results of cases 1 and 2 . 
The distinguishing features of the results about the involvement 
of Kenen' s criterion in the different cases seems to be the 
degree of demand elasticity for both locally produced and 
imported goods. If the demand is very elastic, in the usual sense 
that it is higher than one, the Kenen' s criterion applies, 
whatever the value of the other parameter ~. 
If demand is inelastic, then no matter whether it is more or 
less inelastic than the supply but provided l+~-a> O, we need to 
compare the actual degree of openness to the critical value as 
given by equation (73) to determine which of the two criteria 
(Kenen's or McKinnon's) will apply. 
Let us note that if there we r e not the direct and indirect 
e ffects related to demand but only the effects related to supply, 
the n the ratio R would reduce to unity whatever the values of A 
and ~. What happens on the demand side provides there for e the key 
to explain the link with the d egree of opennes s. The fact that 
the demand is very elastic (a>l) me ans that the indirect effects 
have an increasingly offsetting impact vis-a-vis the direct 
effects, when the exchange rate appreciates or d epreciates in 
response to a change in the commodity price. That r e sponse is 
more important, the larger is the export sector, that is the 
degree of openness. Having the exchange rate fre e to vary 
presents the opportunity of letting the offsetting effect play 
fully and prevents the upsurge in excess demand. 
But for the case of an inelastic demand, the offsetting process 
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disappears or will operate to a limited extent. In this case, the 
direct effects on demand reach a very significant level for a 
very open economy while the indirect effects which are brought 
by the exchange rate change have relatively little weight. This 
is the context corresponding to the Mc Kinnon's criterion: the 
gain obtained from letting the exchange rate appreciate or 
depreciate gets proportionately lower compared with the direct 
(income) effect as the importance of the external sector becomes 
paramount. However, in the case of economies which are not very 
open, for which the impact of the offsetting process is not yet 
made relatively too low (that is, not below a critical level) by 
the relative importance of the external sector and the associated 
direct effect, the net gain from having a flexible rate will tend 
to increase so that the Kenen's criterion will apply. This is the 
sense of the critical level 1-Ac defined in equation (73). The 
value 1-Ac provides a measure of openness and the dividing line 
to consider for deciding which of the above alternative criteria 
to apply when one is faced with the choice of an appropriate 
exchange rate regime for an economy characterized by an inelastic 
demand for goods. A typical application of this approach would 
relate to the comparison between two countries which have the 
same size of external and internal shocks and the same demand and 
supply elasticities but with different degrees of openness. The 
question of which exchange rate regime will be more suitable will 
amount to asking whether the actual degree of openness which 
characterizes each economy is higher or lower than the (common) 
critical level 1-Ac. 
We have already mentioned the simplifying approach very used in 
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the literature, that a flexible exchange rate is more appropriate 
when the economy faces external shocks and conversely a fixed 
rate regime is to be preferred in face of internal shocks. Then 
we noted that it is more precise to refer to the relative 
importance of the two disturbances since in general these are 
simultaneously present. In the context of the investigation 
undertaken here, the relative importance is given by the ratio 
of the two variances of the money disturbances and commodity 
price disturbances: 0'// 0'/' The argument developed ~n this 
section tends to point to an additional other element that needs 
to be taken into account as an important determinant of the most 
appropriate regime, and that is primarily the price elasticity 
of demand. 
This has led to an attempt of establishing the link with the 
other part of the literature which considers the degree of 
openness as a criterion in favour or against a flexible or fixed 
exchange rate regime. The degree of openness certainly matters 
as shown above. But the way it matters depends in turn on the 
elasticity of demand, and here is where lies the explanation of 
the so-called conflict between the Kenen's criterion and the Mc 
Kinnon's criterion. The circumstances under which these criteria 
hold are clearly identified and distinguished. For economies wi th 
elastic demand, the Kenen's criterion applies. Otherwise, that 
~s if demand ~s inelastic, it will apply only for those 
categories of economies with low degree openness up to a point 
(represented by the parameter l-Ac in the context of the present 
model) while the Mc Kinnon's criterion would apply beyond that 
point. We recall that openness helps to channel domestic 
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inflation to neighbouring countries or trading partners in the 
context of a fixed rate regime. Also, openness makes the exchange 
rate more effective an instrument to deal with external shocks. 
Still, there is a third aspect to take into consideration, and 
that is that openness makes a small economy more sensitive to 
external shocks. The combination of these three considerations 
seems to explain why the Kenen's rule tends to predominate and 
to give a sense of the critical level (l-Ac)determined above 
about the degree of openness. 
The FZ economies may be best characterized as undiversified 
economies. Their structure also corresponds to a high degree of 
openness. Furthermore, the characteristics of the FZ economies 
seem to suggest a low price elasticity of demand. Under these 
circumstances, the actual share of the export sector compared 
wi th the critical level will d e t e rmine whether to apply the 
Kenen's or alternatively the McKinnon's criterion . 
More importantly, knowing the nume rical values of the export 
s e ctor share, the demand and supply e lasticities for a given 
e conomy will be enough on the bas i s of the expression (63) to 
d e cide what criterion to apply for the choice of a fixed rate 
regime or a float exchange rate r e gime . The following section 
will give some simulations. 
4.4 Numerical illustration . 
The discussion in the previous s e ctions have shown that the 
choice between a flexible exchange rate and a fixed rate regime 
will depend on the source and size of the disturbances but also 
on the values of parameters such as the demand and supply 
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elasticities, the degree of openness and the speed of adjustment 
on the non-traded good market. Then the search for an optimal 
exchange rate regime was reduced to the comparison between the 
managed float and the fixed rate regime on the basis of the 
variances (conditional or unconditional variances) obtained for 
the price Pn of the non-traded 'good. The stochastic saddlepoint 
Program or Stochastic Sadpoint20 gives among its simulation 
results the eigen values and eigen vectors of the model and more 
importantly for our concern it provides the asymptotic or 
uncondi tional variances of the endogenous variables. Here we 
report the variance of Pn' the non-traded good price. 
a. The format 
Let us rewrite the differential equations of Pn related to the 
two alternative regimes. 
Float regimel1 : 
2 0 This package was developed at the University of Warwick, 
by Alan Sutherland as a stochastic version of the package 
II Sadpoint II created in 1982 by Austin and Buiter. 
21 One may note that the treatment of the free float with 
the two-element disturbance, using the Sadpoint Program would not 
raise any particular problem: 
dPn - - K2 (1 - 8)Pndt+Cf1dz1 + (1 - A.) (K1 _ y )Cf2dz2 K2 
Indeed, it would suffice to rewrite the equation under the form: 
dPn - - K2 (1 - 8) pndtHJdz 
where z represents the composite of Zl and Z 2 with: 
assuming zero correlation between the two shocks. But the 
numerical values of the parameters suggest to simplify by setting 
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(52) , 
The corresponding unconditional variance 1S: 
Fixed rate: 
( 58) I 
Under these conditions, the managed float would be preferred to 
the fixed rate if we have: 
(76 ) 
The inequality (76) 1n terms of the unconditional variances 
corresponds to (57) which is 1n terms of the conditional 
variances. The difference appears as being the multiplicative 
term (1-8) 1n (76). Because of the fact that the degree of 
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overshooting e is a complex combination of the other parameters, 
the comparison uSlng the unconditional variances is best 
undertaken by means of a numerical simulation as with the 
Stochastic Sadpoint Program. 
The simulation will consider ln turn different sets of values 
of the parameters, starting with a central case which is defined 
as corresponding to: 
A=O. 6; a=11=<j>=0' 1=0'2= 0. Sand £=2. 
Then A, a and so on will be let to vary in turn. 
We need to derive the formats which are appropriate for the 
Program. In this regard, the model can be rewritten by setting 
all the exogenous variables to zero and by substitution of the 
equations defining the GDP and demand deflators into the other 
equations. This reduces the number of equations to six (6) 
instead of ten (10), without affecting the nature of the model. 
The same can be done with the fixed rate regime. In addition, 
one normalizes the fixed exchange rate to zero. This deletes the 
currency arbitrage equation. But we recall that in this fixed 
rate regime, the money stock becomes an endogenous variable in 
the equation defining the money market equilibrium. 
In both cases, the disturbanc e i s added as a supply shock. 
The semi-reduced model becomes: 
Flexible rate: 
APn = £i (a1) 
E (dS) = idt (a2) 
Yx = 11 (S-Pn) (a3 ) 
AYn+ (l-A) Yx = 0 (a4) 
~ = a (S-Pn) (as) 
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Fixed rate: 
m = APn (bl) 
Yx = -~Pn (b2) 
AYn+ (l -A)Yx = 0 (b3) 
~ = -apn (b4) 
dPn = <j>(dn-Yn)dt+(Kl\K2)cr2dz2 (b5) 
The notations are identical to those of the previous sections. 
The representation of the input data for the case of the Program 
will have the following formats, under the flexible rate and 
fixed rate regimes respectively: 
Input data format (flexible rate regime) 
1/ Pn-S---y-dPn-dS-,y-i-y x-Y n--~ dz 1---, 
II II II II I 
dPn II 0 0 II 1 0 II 0 0 -<1> II -cr1 I 
II II II II 
IE (dS) II 0 0 II 0 1 II -1 0 0 0 II 0 
II II II II I 
Ii II -A- 0 II 0 0 II f- 0 0 0 II 0 I 
IYx II ~ -~ II 0 0 II 0 1 0 0 II 0 
IYn II 0 0 II 0 0 II 0 I-A A- 0 II 0 
I~ II a -a II 0 0 II 0 0 0 1 II 0 
II II II II 
Input data format (fixed rate regime) 
.----"'TTII-Pn---rrll-dpn---rrll-m--yx--yn--Ci" II dz 2-----, 
II 
dPn II 0 
II 
1m "-A 
I Yx "11 
IYn "0 
I~ II ex 
II 
II 
" 1 
" 
" 0 
" 0 
" 0 
II 0 
II 
" "0 0 
" 
"1 0 
"0 1 
"0 1-A 
II 0 0 
II 
o 
o 
A 
o 
" 
-$ "-K1 \K2 . <121 
" 0" 0 
o II 0 
0" 0 
1" 0 
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The formats of Stochastic Sadpoint I and the above formats in 
particular I are very similar to those of the deterministic 
version Sadpoint. The difference relates to the introduction of 
the stochastic elements: these are inserted in the formats at the 
place of the exogenous variables. 
b. The results 
The tables (TA to T,) below give the results of the simulations. 
In table TAl A. varies while the other parameters equal the 
central case values. The same procedure applies for T a l T~ and so 
on. Each parameter is given three different values when it 
varies. 
Note that the second column of table TA corresponds to the 
results of the central case AOI that is the case where A=0.6 and 
a=l1=$=<1 1 =<12 =0.5 and E=2. 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
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Asymptotic variance of Pn in the tables below: 
Table T" 
A=0 . 3 A=0.6 A=0.8 
0.12979 0.20204 0.2029 
0. 18816 0.23223 0.10816 
Table Ta 
U=0 . 2 u=0.8 I a=1.2 I 
I I 
0.28025 0.15952 0.12534 
0.88623 0.09234 0.03728 
Table TTl 
11=0.2 11=0.8 11=1.2 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
I Flexible 
rate 
0.2476 
0.27999 
Table Ta2 
<J'2=0 .2 I 
I 
0.20204 
0.03717 
Table T£ 
£=1 
0.16667 
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0.17142 0.14314 
0.19736 0.16383 
<J'2=1 I <J'2=1.5 I 
I I 
0.20204 0.20204 
0.92928 2.09088 
£=1.5 I £=3 I 
I I 
0.18750 0.22150 
I Fixed 
rate 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
0.23232 
Table Tq, 
<j>=0.2 
0.38824 
0.58080 
c. Observations 
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0.23232 0.23232 
<j>=0.8 <j>=1. 2 
0.14028 0.10067 
0.14520 0.09680 
A number of comments follow after an examination of the 
simulation results: 
(i) the choice between the two exchange rate regimes does not 
seem to be affected very much by some of the parameters, that is 
whether they are low or high. This is the case of the supply 
elasticity ~ and the semi-elasticity e of the demand for money 
with respect to the interest rate. Indeed in tables Tq and TE , 
the price variance is lower in the float regime than in the fixed 
rate regime under the different values considered of ~ and E. We 
may even indicate that the same result holds for table Tq, but 
only for relatively low values of <j> (<j> ~ 0.8). For higher values 
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of the speed of price adjustment ~, the choice might be reversed 
ln favour of the fixed rate, thus to indicate that price 
flexibility reduces the case for a flexible exchange rate regime. 
(ii) the relative merit of the exchange rate regime changes as 
the parameter increases in tables TA , Tcx and To 2 • Table Ta and the 
central case show that the managed float is to be preferred for 
the range of relatively low values of a (up to a=0.5) while the 
fixed rate performs better for a = 0.8 or greater values. This 
result is compatible with the points of the previous discussion 
about the simplified ratio R = K1 /K2 • 
In table TA, the float regime outperforms the fixed rate regime 
except for high values of A, that is a low degree of openness. 
This supports the Kenen's argument according to which less and 
less diversification (i.e more openness) calls in favour of a 
float regime. To compare with the discussion on the two Kenen's 
and Mc Kinnon's criteria, let us denote Ac the critical value of 
A when the other parameters take on their values as in table TA, 
(that is their levels in the central case). At the same time, we 
have l+~-a > 0 and 1-a > 0, which corresponds to the case 2 of 
the review and discussion earlier on about the degree of the 
openness. On the basis of the formula 22 (72), it equals: 
This value is less than the values of A in table TA, implying 
that the Kenen's criterion should apply. The result is again 
compatible with this criterion derived from the use of the ratio 
R. But the analysis of R cautions us about another possibility, 
22 When ~-a=O, the formula (64) can not be used but some 
calculations indicate that its equivalent is: Ac = (1-a)\2. 
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if Ac was higher than the value A=O. 3 or A=. 6 for example of 
table TA • More on this point will follow in (iv) below. 
Table Ta gives an illustration of the influence that the price 
elasticity of demand has on the choice for the optimal regime: 
the case for a fixed rate regime increases significantly when a 
rises. Starting with a value of a=0.2, one can see that the price 
variability is lower in the float than in the fixed rate regime 
in the very significant proportion of around 1 to 4 at that level 
of a. But the result of a preference for the float is hardly 
maintained when a rises to a=O.5 and gets reversed for a=0.8. 
With regards table Tcr2 , it simply relates to the relative size 
of the two shocks. When they have the same size or when the 
external shocks are more important than the money shocks, then 
the managed float should be preferred to the alternative regime 
of a fixed rate. The choice should be reversed however when the 
money disturbances are significantly more important than the 
commodity price disturbances: the ratio of the two variances of 
Pn under the two regimes changes as the ratio of the two shock 
variances, illustrating the direct influence that the size of 
these shocks have on the degree of price variability. 
(iii) we note that the variances in tables Ta and T~ decrease as 
a or ~ increases: higher demand and supply elasticities lead to 
lower price variability. This illustrates a point made earlier 
on comparing economies with high price elasticity and the others. 
By contrast, the variance of Pn obviously increases with cr2 in 
the fixed rate regime. The same pattern should apply for the 
float regime with cr1 increasing . More importantly, the price 
variability seems to be very sensitive to the size of the shocks 
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compared with the other parameters. An exception if any would be 
the parameter a (demand elasticity): table Tn shows that the 
variance of Pn decreases very quickly when a increases, 
particularly in the fixed rate regime. 
(iv) to investigate possibilities involving the Mc Kinnon's 
criterion, particular values of a and Tl have been chosen to 
compute the following values of Ac (represented below as Aci ' i=l 
to 3) as well as the corresponding tables TAd which can be 
compared with the central case TA. We may recall that the case of 
table TA corresponds to the Kenen's criterion A > Ac. 
The tables TAd (i=1 to 3) have been constructed so that to 
illustrate the case which involves the two criteria. The 
parameters have been chosen in such a way that the following 
situations are covered: 
- all the three values of A are lower than the critical 
value Ac (table TAcl ) 
- the second value of A coincides with the critical value 
Ac' the other values of A being lower and higher 
respectively than Ac (table TAc2 ) 
- all the three values of A are higher than the critical 
value Ac (table TAc3 ) . 
The values of the other parameters equal the values chosen for 
the central case ($=cr l =cr2=O.5; e=2). 
Table TAl typically represents the situation where the Mc 
Kinnon's criterion will apply. The variance of Pn in the flexible 
regime decrease relative to the variance of Pn in the fixed 
regime as A increases. That is to say that the fixed rate regime 
will tend to be preferred as the degree of openness (I-A) 
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increases. This is consistent with the previous discussion since 
A is lower than Ac. By contrast, the Kenen's criterion will apply 
in a situation corresponding to the characteristics contained in 
table TAc3 which uses a much higher value of the price elasticity 
of demand a than table TAc l • The ratio of the variances of Pn in 
the flexible and fixed regimes increases with A, which means that 
the flexible rate will tend to be preferred as the degree of 
openness increases. The values of A are higher than the critical 
value Ac = 0.101. 
The table TAc2 gives the intermediate case where the ratio 
between the two variances of Pn in the flexible rate regime and 
the fixed rate regime decreases for the values of A between A=0.3 
and A=0.5, and it increases for A between A=0.5 and A=0.8. This 
case corresponds to a value of a equal 0.2 and illustrates the 
possibility of reversing the optimal rule for the exchange rate 
policy as the degree of openness or equivalently the level of 
non-diversification compares with the value 1-Ac=0.5 . 
If the country in question starts with as a sufficiently open 
economy , then the case for the flexible rate will tend to 
diminish as openness augments whereas it will increase with 
openness if the starting point is marked by a relatively low 
degree of openness. This result of the numerical simulation again 
confirms the result obtained above that the Mc Kinnon criterion 
might be used only for very open economies. 
If we were to undertake an attempt at a generalization on the 
basis of the results just discussed, it would follow in simple 
terms. An economy with a price-elastic demand for goods should 
refer to the Kenen's criterion. It should favour a flexible rate 
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regime as its openness increases. The Kenen's criterion appears 
much as a general rule. The conditions under which the Mc 
Kinnon's criterion will apply are more restricted: a very low 
price elasticity of demand of goods combined with a high degree 
of openness. It appears therefore that the parameters A and a are 
the most determinant with regards the optimal exchange rate rule. 
The Kenen's criterion as a general rule might receive a possible 
interpretation. An economy with high price elasticity can cope 
with the external shocks for a given relative size of the shocks 
(<12 2 /<1/ ), without resorting to the exchange rate as an instrument 
provided the external sector has a limited size. But as the 
external sector becomes larger, the price elasticity does not 
suffice any longer and the need for the use of the exchange rate 
policy as an element of flexibility becomes more and more 
apparent. 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
Table TAc 1 
A=0.3 
0.09533 
0.17649 
a=0.02 11 =1 Ac1=0. 817 
A=0.5 A=0.8 
0.2337 0.40390 
0.87854 2.57200 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
I Flexible 
rate 
I Fixed 
rate 
A=0.3 A=0.5 
0.08915 0.15825 
0.14148 0.32552 
Table T)"c3 a=O. 8 11=1 Ac3 =O .101 
A=0.3 A=0.6 
0.07333 0.12994 
0.07477 0.09016 
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A=0.8 
0.28875 
0.55556 
A=0.8 
0.15810 
0.04373 
4.5 The commodity price as a Poisson process in the BG/SD model. 
The interest of the Poisson process specification as a 
description of the commodity price behaviour has been illustrated 
in the simplified model. It h e lps to highlight the role of 
anticipations on the determination of the exchange rate and 
consequently on a number of macroeconomic variables including the 
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domestic price variability. Taking account of the anticipations 
of the economic agents by means of the Poisson process goes some 
way in an effort to better capture their typical behaviour of 
rationality in a context of uncertainty. 
Now we attempt at a generalization by introducing the Poisson 
process in the more complex model of the present chapter. This 
will involve two steps. The first one relates to calculations for 
the determination of the steady state solutions . The second step 
will be about the comparison between exchange rate regimes. 
a . Presentation and derivation. 
In what follows, the form of the stochastic process remains 
unchanged for the money variable. But the export price will be 
assumed to behave as a point process. In fact, the export price 
is taken to be identical to the commodity price and to behave as 
a Poisson process. This assumption seems to suit the case of a 
commodity-exporting economy where the export sector is largely 
dominated by one or a few commodities. Actually, the commodity 
sector in the FZ economies had experienced a series of booms and 
busts on several commodity markets during the last two decades. 
Let us assume that the nominal exchange rate and the price in 
the non-traded sector are function of m and Px* which are the 
fundamentals and which will determine the equilibrium point. 
Pn = Pn (m, p/ ) 
S = S(m, Px* ) 
Applying the rule of stochastic differential to Pn for example 
leads to: 
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(77 ) 
where dpx * represents the Poisson distribution and 1tLH is the 
probabili ty that the size of the jump be PH* -PL* when the II event II 
occurs (i.e. change in the state variable Px* )' 
As in the previous sections when dealing with the Poisson 
process, the commodity price is assumed to take on two values 
only: the low level PL* and the high level PH*' The process 
consists of jumping from one level to the other. But the jumps 
are assumed not to occur very often, to fit the Poisson 
distribution characteristics. 
* * If the system rests at the position L corresponding to: Px =PL , 
the expected value of equation (77) i s : 
Again, the context of a free float will imply that a 2p/am2 =0. 
At this stage, we need to determine the solutions Pn(m ,PH* ) and 
Refe rring back to equation (11), the condition of steady state 
equilibrium for the domestic price in thi s case of a Poisson 
process appears at position L 23 as : 
23 The values Kl and K 2 use d in this section are those 
defined previously in equations (16) and (17). 
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where PnL* and SH*correspond to the equilibrium values in the 
Brownian case and PnL and PnH correspond to the values of Pn at 
positions Low (L) and High (H) of the commodity price 
respectively in the Poisson process context, and AL = Kl PL". 
We will consider first the solutions of the float regime first. 
Taking account of the relationships between the exchange rate and 
the domestic price on the stable manifold: 
one may rewrite equation (79) as follows: 
or equivalently: 
Similarly at position H, we have: 
7tHLPnL+ (-7tHL+K2 (1-8) )PnH = K2 (1 - 8)PnH* (83) 
Solving the system (82) and ( 83 ) brings about the solutions: 
p~ -
p;; -
(K2 (1 - 8) - 7t HL ) P~- 7tuJJ~H 
K2 (1 - 8) - 7t LH- 7t HL 
- 'It m,P~L + (K2 ( 1 - 8 ) - 'It HL) P~H 
K2 ( 1- 8 ) - 7t LH - 'It HL 
(84 ) 
( 85 ) 
The double star solution correspond to the solution of the 
Poisson process under the flexible regime and the one star 
notation to the solutions of the Brownian motion process under 
the same flexible regime. Since the parameter 8 takes on negative 
values and that the transition probabilities are generally small, 
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the denominator of the expressions should be positive. This leads 
to the configuration In fig 4.5. It corresponds to the normal 
result already found in the previous chapter: the introduction 
of expectations gives higher levels of the domestic price at 
position H (Pn/* > PnH*) and lower levels at position L 
(PnL** < PnL*) because of the smoothing effect that the 
expectations have on the exchange rate. The distance of the 
domestic price at positions Hand L respectively will appear as: 
p~~-p;;;' - K2 (1 - 8) (p~-p~) K (1 - 9) - 1t - 1t 2 LH HL 
> . • 
- PnH- P nL (86 ) 
The expectations will cause the domestic price to vary to a 
larger extent that it would otherwise do. This confirms the 
results of the simplified model which led to the idea of a 
managed float to offset this extra inflation effect due to the 
lesser variations of the exchange rate. 
b. Price variability and exchange rate regime 
As before the variance of the non-traded good price will serve 
as a measure for the price variability. Considering the flexible 
exchange rate regime to start with, let us assume that the system 
starts from the equilibrium where the fundamentals Px* and mare 
equal to zero. From that point, a change dpx* in the commodity 
price will cause a shift in the equilibrium value Pn** , which 
gives: 
p 
n 
** 
,PnH 
p* 
nH 
* 
PnL 
, ' P** 
nL 
Fig 4.5 The domestic price under the Poisson process disturbances. 
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where 0'/ denotes the variance of the monetary shocks and tJx the 
Poisson distribution. It follows that the conditional variance 
will equal: 
(87 ) 
under the additional assumption that the two disturbances are 
uncorrelated. A similar equation gives the variance at position 
H: 
(88) 
The unconditional variances (ucV) will then take the form: 
V cVPn uc - 2K2 (1 - O) 
The following values serve to compute the variances by 
substitution in the above equations: 
p~-p~~ -
and 
K2 (1 - 9) (p~-p~) 
K (1 - 0) - 1t - 1t 2 LH HL 
(86) I 
( 89) 
Now let us consider the alternative exchange rate, the fixed 
exchange rate. Under this regime, one may normalize to zero the 
nominal exchange rate and write the change in the domestic price 
as equal: 
(90) 
With the Poisson process specification, the expected value of 
(90) takes the form: 
Solving this set of equations brings about: 
f •• 
P llL -
Kl (K2 - 1t HL ) P~- 1t u¢J~ (93 ) 
K2 K2 - 1t LH - 1t HL 
The notations Pn/** and PnL f * * represent the 
(91) 
(92 ) 
solutions of 
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the 
Poisson process model under the fixed exchange rate regime to 
compare with f* PnL and f * PnH solutions of the Brownian motion 
process under the same fixed exchange rate regime. 
• f * * f* * ' h' h h Aga~n as for the float, the distance PnH -POL ~s l.g er t an 
under the Brownian motion case: 
This time though, the source should be sought in the effect of 
expectations on the money stock instea d of nominal exchange rate. 
The model shows that the d e mand for money depends on the real 
income and consequently on the level of the commodity price. The 
effect of expectations will be reflected in the real income. At 
position L, the agents believe that their income will increase 
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in the next period. This tends to increase the demand for real 
balances and to depress the price level. Conversely at position 
H, expectations of lower income in the next period will reduce 
the demand for money and result in a higher level of the domestic 
price than it would normally do. 
The conditional and unconditional variances can be obtained by 
following the same procedure as above: 
(95) 
(96) 
The comparison between the two exchange rate regimes can be 
undertaken on the basis of the domestic price variance. The 
flexible rate will be preferred to the fixed rate provided the 
former displays a lower variance of the domestic price. In terms 
of the conditional and unconditional variances respectively, this 
takes the form: 
(97 ) 
1 [<i + 2 ( K2 (1 - 8) ) 2 ( . ") 2 ] < T=11 1 g K (1 - 8) - 1t - 1t 1t LH PH- PL 
2 LH HL 
(98 ) 
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If we assume for example that a managed float can succeed in 
insulating the domestic price from external shocks, then 
express~on (97) for example will be reduced to: 
(97) I 
We can see the implications of introducing the Poisson process 
compared with the Brownian motion process where the expression 
was: 
(61) I 
with cr2 2 denoting the variance of the commodity price. The term 
corresponding to cr/ in the case of a poisson process 1S 
1tLH (PH* -PL * ) 2 . Again, the managed float offsets completely the 
effects of expectations, which represents an advantage with 
respect to the fixed rate regime because the Poisson process 
involves expectations not offset under the fixed exchange rate 
regime and which increase the variance of the domestic price 
compared with the Brownian motion process. 
It follows that an optimal policy would require from a given 
small open economy to favour a flexible exchange rate more when 
it faces shocks which follow a Poisson process than when the 
disturbances alternatively follow a Brownian motion process, 
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everything else being equal, particularly if the float (assumed 
here to be a managed float) can eliminate any influence of the 
commodity price fluctuations on the domestic price index. But it 
might be possible for the Government to offset the effects of 
expectations under the fixed rate regime so that the variance of 
the domestic price with the Poisson process be the same as with 
the Brownian process. Such a case may arise through the 
functioning of a Stabilization Fund whereby the fluctuations in 
the commodity price are not passed on to the representative 
consumer (cf. chapter 5). 
c. Domestic price protection. 
In the BG/SD model there will be the case of two degrees or 
types of managed float. The first type is similar to the one 
described in the previous chapter. It will result from the 
presence of anticipations as implied by the introduction of a 
Poisson process to represent the behaviour of the commodity 
price. This managed float related to the poisson process will 
consist of eliminating the smoothing effect which originates from 
the anticipations by reinforcing the appreciation or the 
depreciation of the exchange rate. When the managed float is 
limited to this case, it will be referred to as a moderate 
managed float, type P (MMF p ). 
The second type or degree of managed float will result from the 
fact that even without anticipations, the equilibrium domestic 
prlce depends on the commodity price in foreign currency. This 
means that the exchange rate does not respond to the external 
disturbances sufficiently to offset their effect on the other 
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variables of the economy: a part of the adjustment is borne by 
the domestic price whereas in the simplified model the response 
of the exchange rate was enough to insulate the economy from the 
external shocks, at least in the absence of anticipations. This 
second case will be referred to as the moderate managed float 
type B (MMFs)' If the managed float encompasses the two degrees 
of managed float MMFs and MMF p , then that would be the full 
managed float (FMF). But the latter case is not covered here. In 
what follows, we look at the MMFs type first which will enable us 
to compare with the results of BG (1990). 
(i) The degree of management: the Brownian motion case 
The condition for a full response of the exchange rate and an 
insulation of Pn in the absence of anticipations can be seen from 
equations (18) and (19) which give the relationships of the 
equilibrium values Pn* and S* with respect to Px* and m in the 
context of a float. Considering the standard case where the 
income elasticity of the demand for money equals unity, the 
relative importance of the direct and indirect effects of an 
increase in the commodity price will determine the degree of 
response by the exchange rate. The domestic price will be 
protected if the direct effect via the supply and demand channels 
(directly related to the increase in Px* ) are balanced by the 
indirect effects (via the supply and the demand channels) that 
the appreciation of the exchange rate brings about. In the 
simplified model, the comparison was between the increase in the 
commodity price or terms of trade P x* and the appreciation of the 
exchange rate S. Here the change in the exchange rate takes the 
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form of the direct effects scaled by the indirect effects (ratio 
between the two types of effects). If the former exactly equal 
the latter, then the appreciation of the exchange will reflect 
on a one-for-one basis the jump in the commodity price. This will 
depend solely on the equality or non-equality between the direct 
and indirect effects on the demand side, that is, on the share 
of the external sector which represents the direct (demand) 
effects, compared with the price elasticity of demand which 
represents the indirect effects. The type of managed float 
implied here will require amplifying the indirect effects so that 
they equal the direct effects. The reverse would apply if the 
direct effects were less than the indirect effects. 
Managing the float to protect the domestic price amounts to 
reinforcing the changes in the exchange rate. The size of the 
reinforcing action will be a determinant factor of the exchange 
rate rule. The calculations below aim at deriving a measure of 
that factor in the case where the commodity price follows a 
Brownian motion process. 
The monetary rule to insulate the domestic price takes the form: 
m = mo - VPx * ( 9 9 ) 
where m represents the actual l eve l of the money supply and ~ 
the exogenous component of the money supply which would prevail 
if there was not the active involvement of the monetary 
authorities. The parameter V denotes the degree of intervention. 
The monetary authorities seek to protect the domestic price from 
the external shocks. They choose to use the exchange rate as a 
mean of achieving this aim, and that is the sense of equation 
(99) under a regime of exchange rate float. 
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Replacing m by its value ln the money market equilibrium 
equation of the model set up at the beginning of the present 
chapter would give: 
mO-Pd-vP/ = Y(Y+P-Pd)-Ei (I)' 
The steady state solutions that we obtain with the modified 
money market equation and the other equations (2) to (10) of the 
model and that one may denote Pn ,MFs* and SMFS* respectively for the 
domestic price and the exchange rate can be shown to be: 
p" n,MFB - (100) 
(101) 
Equations (100) and (101) provide a more precise basis for the 
discussion raised by BG (1990) about the conditions under which 
the managed float would be a policy of leaning against or with 
the wind. According to equation (101), a positive value of v 
corresponds to the second type of policy while a negative value 
would correspond to the first one . We obtain the value Vo of v 
which achieves the complete protection of the domestic price from 
the external disturbances by setting to zero the coefficient of 
P x* in equation (100): 
K (I - A.) [_1 _ (l - A.)Y - VJ - a 
K2 
(102) 
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(103) 
This result gives further light on the discussion by BG (1990) 
about the issue of whether to adopt a policy of leaning with or 
against the wind. The value of Yo is positive (leaning with the 
wind) if K1 /K2 -Y > 0 that is when the characteristics of the 
economy (see discussion above on this point) are such that an 
increase in the commodity price provokes an increase in the price 
level. One may agree quite easily that those circumstances call 
for a policy which consists of reinforcing the appreciation of 
the exchange rate, as far as the concern of the monetary 
authorities focuses on price stability. 
Conversely, the monetary rule should be a policy of leaning 
against the wind (vo < 0 or equivalently K1 /K2-y < 0) when an 
increase in the commodity price caus es a decrease in the domestic 
price level, if again the primary conce rn is to maintain price 
stability. 
(ii) The Poisson process case 
This is to determine the d e gree of management in the case of a 
MMF float type P. We know that the anticipations implied by the 
commodity price behaviour whe n it follows a Poisson process lead 
to more variation in the domestic price. The MMFp float will aim 
at keeping Pn at the level it would take in the absence of such 
anticipations, that is in the Brownian motion case. The monetary 
rule is written as before: 
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We denote the equilibrium values of Pn at positions Land H by 
.. * 
PnLIn and 
.... 
PnHm respectively when the managed float is in 
operation. Given the form of equation (84) and (85), and the way 
the parameter Y enters the solutions in the Brownian motion case, 
it follows: 
(104 ) 
(105 ) 
where YL and YH denote the values of the degree of management at 
positions Land H respectively. The managed float MMFp will 
ensure the equality: 
* .. .. 
PnL and PnHm 
.. 
= PnH (106) 
Replacing in (104) and (105) will give: 
- [K2 (1-8) -1tHL ] PL" YL +1tLHP H " YH = (PnL" -PnL .... ) [K2 (1-8) -1tLH - 1tHJ 
1tHr.PL " Y L - [K2 (1-8) -1tLH ] PH*YH = (PnH* -PnHu ) [K2 (1-8) -1tLH -1tHL J 
(107) 
(108) 
Solving the system of equations (107) and (108) provide the 
values taken by the degree of management: 
v -H 
IT HL (P;H- P;C.) 
K2 (l-e)p~ 
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> 0 
These results generalize those of chapter 3. Before the 
management action, we know that to the position L corresponds a 
value of the exchange rate which shows a depreciation compared 
with its level at position H. But because of the anticipations 
involved, the depreciation is less than the case without 
anticipations . At the position L, what is required therefore is 
an action supporting the move for a full stretch of the 
depreciation as a way to protect the domestic price. This means 
an increase in the money supply as indicated by the negative sign 
of vL • Conversely, at position H, the monetary authori ties 
operate a decrease in the money supply (vH > 0) to appreciate 
further the exchange rate. As in the previous chapter, we find 
in the extended model the policy of leaning with the wind as the 
policy called for in response to commodity price shocks to 
protect the domestic price index if the commodity price proves 
to follow a Poisson process. 
Conclusion 
The extension of the simple monetary model to a two-sector 
economy has led to consider the trade-theoretic or dependent 
economy model, in particular with reference to the specification 
adopted by BG (1990). This is the case of a small open and 
essentially commodity-exporting economy. The stochastic analysis 
in continuous-time setting has given an explicit determination 
and comparison of the objective function, that is the variance 
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of the domestic price index, under different exchange rate 
regimes. The choice between the float and the fixed rate regimes 
is shown to depend on the relative size of the monetary and 
external shocks. More importantly, the results indicate a way to 
assess this relative size in comparison to a reference value. 
Except for very particular cases, the reference value depends on 
the parameters which characterize the economy such as the speed 
of adjustment, the price-elasticity of demand and supply on the 
goods market and the degree of openness of the economy. It 
appears that the difference of two economies with regards their 
demand elasticity is determinant for the optimal choice of an 
exchange rate regime. The context of the FZ economies would call 
for a more flexible regime than the present peg. 
The results also indicate a way to handle the effect that the 
degree of openness has for the choice of an exchange rate and to 
clarify the seemingly inconsistent implications between Kenen's 
and McKinnon's criterion. The former criterion could be qualified 
as the general rule while the latter would apply only in the case 
of a very open economy. The numer i cal simulation in section 4.4 
gives support to this result. 
An additional step has consisted of introducing the Poisson 
process 1n the two-sector model to investigate further the 
implications of anticipations related to the fluctuations in the 
commodity price. In fact the two-sector model leads to identify 
two sources which might call for some degree of management, at 
least as far as the monetary authorities aim in priority to fight 
against inflation. The first one results from the presence of the 
non- traded good, which explains why the spontaneous response of 
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the exchange rate is not enough to insulate the domestic price. 
Considering this case has given a more precise basis to the 
discussion ~n BG (1990) about the exchange rate policy of 
II leaning with or against the wind". The policy implications 
related to the presence of anticipations with a Poisson process 
in the commodity price behaviour provide a generalization of the 
results obtained in the simple model of the previous chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Consistency between saving and exchange rate 
rules. 
Introduction 
We know that the FZ countries, because of their fixed exchange 
rate regime face risks of macro-instability when terms of trade 
shocks arise. They may view the functioning of their Commodity 
Marketing Boards or Stabilization Funds as a way to reduce 
significantly these risks, for example through the sterilization 
of the foreign reserves fluctuations associated with the change 
in the price of their main export commodity on the world markets. 
This will amount to the question of what would be the optimal 
saving rule in the context of the FZ exchange rate regime, 
leading to examine the circumstances if any, under which a 
flexible exchange rate regime may be called for in addition to 
the existence of the Stabilization Fund. But the rationale for 
the establishment of this Stabilization Fund should be addressed 
in the first place and will be the main concern over the next 
sections. 
The existence of Commodity Marketing Boards or Stabilization 
Funds constitutes a common feature in developing countries. In 
general, these have one or two commodities which provide most of 
their export receipts. In fact, the framework corresponds to our 
previous description of a typical commodity-exporting economy. 
The question to be addressed is then to model the functioning of 
a Stabilization Fund as a tool of macroeconomic management and 
to look at its link with the exchange rate regime. 
It is important to note that this paper will analyze the 
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Stabilization Fund as it may exist at the national level, for a 
small, open commodity-exporting economy. The idea of a 
stabilization mechanism at the international level represents a 
different issue and will not be a concern here. The two concepts 
differ fundamentally for the reason that at the national level, 
the commodity price represents an exogenous variable and is taken 
as given and there is no attempt to influence the world markets 
by means of building or destoring inventories. 
In what follows, section 1 describes a few features of 
Stabilization Funds in the FZ countries. Section 2 gives a brief 
review on the relevant literature while sections 3 to 7 deal with 
the modelling under different assumptions about the behaviour of 
the commodity price. The last sections 8 and 9 before the 
conclusions relate to a comparison with other results of the 
existing literature and to the case of a flexible exchange rate 
respectively. 
5.1. Some observations on the Commodity Marketing Boards. 
As indicated above, our concern will be on Stabilization Funds 
at the national level. Therefore, considering the quantity of the 
commodity produced in each period, we assume that it is sold at 
the prevailing world price. The stabilization mechanism affects 
the price for the domestic producer so that all the fluctuations 
in the world price are not passed on directly to the producer. 
Indeed, for an agricultural product, stabilising the price for 
the producer is often stated as the "primary aim" of a 
Stabilization Fund. The implied mechanism is very simple: a tax 
will be levied in the case of a temporary increase in the world 
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price and conversely, the Fund would pay a subsidy to the 
producer to offset the transitory decrease in the export price 
of the commodity. 
To some extent, the situation differs for a mineral resource 
like oil, where a significant proportion of the export price 
accrues directly to the Government as a revenue. In consequence, 
this involves the Government expenditures in goods and services . 
The Government budget may expand, following an increase in the 
world price and vice-versa. In this case, the National Budget and 
the Stabilization Fund are closely interconnected. By contrast, 
one may consider, in the case of an agricultural product, whether 
the producer can himself take in charge the task of stabilization 
v~a saving and dissaving or if the task should be undertaken by 
the Government. Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990) have discussed 
this issue. Even if the Government operates the stabilization 
mechanism, there is the possibility of a separation between the 
Fund and the National Budget. Conceptually, the Fund could exist 
as a separate and financially independent body which, in face of 
temporary shocks, will receive the surplus of the export price 
above the target or long-run level and which spends to close the 
gap when the export price decreases below the long-run level. In 
practice however, the functioning will depend on the 
institutional and administrative links with the National Budget 
on the basis of which the Fund has been created . In most of the 
analysis below, it is assumed implicitly that the stabilization 
mechanism is operated at the Government level. 
The Stabilization Fund as it exists in Senegal may provide an 
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illustration: the CPSp24 has the characteristics of many 
mechanisms of this type. However the following features may be 
more specific. For example, the CPSP illustrates the possibility 
of combining in a unique Fund, the stabilization mechanisms for 
a variety of products, some exported (e.g groundnut oil and 
cotton) and others imported such as rice. Also, the CPSP is a 
separate body for its administration but from the financia+ point 
of view and as a matter of fact, it works as a special account 
of the National Treasurer. In these conditions, its role as a 
tool of macroeconomic management cannot be guaranteed since 
positive surplus (export price higher than producer price) may 
lead to higher level of spending by the Government budget and 
conversely, so that the export price fluctuations will cause 
changes in the domestic absorption. In this case where there is 
actually no stabilization in face of (assumed) temporary shocks, 
its operations result in shifting the change in spending from the 
producers to the Government. 
Another related question concerns the nature of the expenditures 
that the Government will undertake with the use of commodity 
revenue. These may consist of investment outlays or alternatively 
they may receive the treatment of the ordinary spending of the 
National Budget. The latter form has received the attention of 
many observers and it gives strength to the argument according 
to which the rural sector has for too long subsidized the urban 
sector: in this case, the Stabilization Fund can be identified 
as the main channel of the transfer between the two sectors, 
24 The acronym CPSP stands for the name of the Stabilization 
Fund: "Caisse de perequation et de stabilisation des prix" 
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typically if the domestic price paid to the producer of the 
agricultural producer is kept low relatively to the trend of the 
world price. 
In most African member countries of the FZ, there exists an 
account25 , the purpose of which is to finance domestic 
investments and repayments of the Government debt. Its resources 
come from taxes specifically allocated, for example a given 
proportion of road taxes, and from external borrowing. But in a 
country like Ivory Coast, revenues drawn from the coffee and 
cocoa boom during the 1970's and early 1980's constituted the 
main resources of this amortization fund. The existence of the 
account should help to channel the revenue drawn from the 
commodity exports towards investment and not consumption. But it 
did both. This is represented in Devarajan and De Melo (1987b) 
and further, when the commodity prices suffered a severe slump 
during most of the 1980's, it appeared that current expenditure 
(wages, subsidies and other spending on goods and services) 
previously financed from the commodity booms were no longer 
affordable. However, adjustment tended to be rather slow and so 
investment and consumption were instead financed by external 
borrowing. 
5.2. Income fluctuations and consumption smoothing: a brief 
rev~ew. 
The existing literature has dealt extensively with the question 
of optimum consumption/saving rule when an agent faces 
25 The most used named for this account is: "Caisse Autonome 
d'Amortissement" 
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fluctuations in its income. This agent may be an individual 
consumer, a representative consumer or the Government. We will 
specifically look at the latter case, but the models 
corresponding to the three cases share a number of similarities. 
The model building includes the following steps: 
(i) choice for an utility function 
(ii) determination of the budget constraint 
(iii) characteristic of the ~ncome variable ~n the broad sense 
of capital and non-capital income. 
The utility function depends on the level of consumption and the 
"consumer", as in a classic optimization problem, seeks to 
maximize his level of utility, taking account of the income 
behaviour and the budget constraint. 
But let us indicate at this stage that this optimization problem 
which involves the consumption level as the control variable is 
to be distinguished from the other category known as the 
"storage" system or inventory management. Davis and Norman (1990) 
call this other category the "singular control" type and the 
former, the "continuous control" type. In the case of inventory 
management, the system would follow a stochastic process if there 
were no interventions. In contrast the controller would intervene 
to keep the level of the inventory above or below a given target 
or even inside a specific band while seeking to minimize the 
management cost. The continuous control in its usual form has 
simply the budget constraint but this may be combined with 
additional constraints such as borrowing constraints as in Deaton 
(1991), Hausmann,Powell and Rigobon (1993) or transaction costs 
as treated by Davis and Norman (1990). Brock (1991) uses a 
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constant absolute risk aversion utility function and a simple 
budget constraint combined with capital-accumulation dynamics to 
look at the effect of export instability on variables such as 
savings, capital formation and growth. 
Before going further on these recent papers, let us indicate the 
other important step in the modelling exercise, which is the 
characterization of the income process. On this, a large part of 
the literature has put much focus on the description of the 
capital income behaviour. The asset price may be assumed to 
follow a deterministic process or stochastic process. If the 
process 1S stochastic, it constitutes a source of uncertainty to 
handle by the decision-maker. Most models assume that the 
consumer is risk-averse so that the situation of uncertainty 
affects negatively his well-being. Depending on whether the 
stochastic process is stationary or non-stationary, different 
methods have been used to solve the maximization problem. 
The case of stationary income or asset prices has drawn a great 
deal of attention and has been closely related to the theory of 
permanent 1ncome and business cycle. Friedman (1957) and 
Blanchard and Fisher (1989) contain an account of this tradition. 
The approach has its applications in a number of domains. In 
particular , a case which will be of special interest for us will 
be when considering a small commodity-exporting economy for which 
the terms of trade fluctuate very significantly. Under the 
assumption that these have the form of a stationary process, the 
small economy would not change its level of consumption in 
response to each change in the relative price of its exports. 
Instead it would optimally smooth its level of consumption by 
222 
means of saving and dissaving. A commodity Marketing Board or 
Stabilization Fund in the small commodity-exporting economy would 
play the role of saving and dissaving. The farmers' spending 
would not need to change to accommodate an increase or decrease 
in the world price of the cash crop, provided the terms of trade 
fluctuations can be described as temporary shocks. In 
consequence, modelling Stabilization Funds in the context of 
stationary terms of trade appears to find a solid theoretical 
ground. 
Now, considering the range of export commodities produced in the 
mineral sector and in the agricultural sector in different 
countries, it may happen that the stationarity hypothesis does 
not hold for all of them. In these conditions, a difficulty 
arises with the question of how and to what extent it would be 
optimal and rational for the small economy to have and to operate 
a Stabilization Fund when the price of its exports proves to 
follow a non-stationary process. The same question arises about 
the saving rule for a consumer (an individual or a representative 
consumer) whose income is non-stationary. Furthermore, one may 
look for other factors, and the way they would combine with the 
price/income characteristics to affect the saving rule. In this 
respect, the existence of borrowing constraints and/or 
macroeconomic adjustment costs might play a significant role as 
underlined by Deaton (1991) and Haussman, Powell and Rigobon 
(1993). We will focus more on these two papers, and their main 
assumptions and results are presented below. 
The Deaton paper makes the following assumptions. First, it 
introduces an additional constraint, that is the liquidity 
223 
constraint which is thought of as representative of various 
situations including the case of some consumers in u.s. and of 
small farmers in developing countries. Also, time preferences are 
assumed to be higher than the market interest rate. With regards 
the behaviour of the consumer income, the different cases of 
probability distribution corresponding to independently and 
identically distributed (iid) income draws,serially correlated 
income and non-stationary income are analyzed successively. 
The main results obtained by the Deaton paper may be summarized 
as follows: 
(i) in a stationary setting where income can be described as iid 
over time, there will be a motive for saving and dissaving so 
that consumption will be smoothed. 
(ii) in the case the income lS stationary but serially 
correlated, it happens that the basic result about the saving and 
dissaving rule is the same as under the iid assumption, although 
in a less effective way. 
(iii) with a non-stationary income, consumption will adjust to 
income and the standard saving b e haviour will not apply any more. 
In this model, the type of stochastic process followed by income 
appears as the determinant factor for the saving rule. We note 
however that the model does not provide explicit solutions and 
the results are based on simulation techniques. 
Haussman, Powell and Rigobon (1993) build a model for the case 
of Venezuela which is an oil-exporting country. The relevant 
tests have been undertaken on the series of oil income and price, 
and the results indicate that these variables can be described 
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as following a non-stationary process. This means that the 
current models do not provide a basis for a saving rule as 
represented for example by the Venezuelan Stabilization Fund. The 
authors point out the existence of macroeconomic costs that the 
changes in Government spending may cause, as a factor which 
could possibly justify the existence and the functioning of the 
Fund. Their demonstration uses a quadratic utility function, 
chosen to capture the macroeconomic costs. Our exploration in 
the next sections of the Commodity Marketing Boards issue will 
use elements of this approach and of the portfolio method as in 
Merton (1971). The exploration will therefore involve stochastic 
calculus with the aim of finding closed-form solutions under 
assumptions which seem to fit a good description of the 
conditions in the FZ. 
Before coming to that point, the presentation of the Merton 
method by Davis and Norman (1990) is an important contribution. 
Consider a consumer who has two assets, a risk-free one such as 
a bank account, the second one being a risky asset such as a 
stock the price of which is a geometric Brownian motion process. 
It is then possible to obtain a closed-form solution to the 
optimization problem under the budget constraint, for a class of 
utility functions and where the control variables are the 
consumption and the share of the risky asset in the total wealth 
in each period. Davis and Norman (1990) point out the fact that 
this solution implicitly assumes "instantaneous and free 
transactions" between the two assets. In a second step, they 
proceed to analyze the more general case in which transaction 
costs exist . Although their paper does not derive a closed-form 
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solution ~n this general case, the authors indicate how the local 
times of the stochastic system represent an optimal policy and 
provide an algori thm for the corresponding derivation. Where the 
portfolio method is applied, we will assume for simplicity that 
there are no transaction costs involved. 
5.3. The quadratic utility function. 
The intertemporal maximization problem usually involves a 
utility function U of the form: 
U = EJo"e-litu(ct}dt (l) 
where: E represents the expectation operator, 8 the rate of 
time preference, c t the level of consumption and u the 
instantaneous utility function. This is a continuous time setting 
and one can read U as the expected present value of future 
utility to be obtained from the stream of consumption over the 
lifetime span. The function u is generally defined to have the 
basic property of a monotone, increasing and concave function. 
This property can be expressed in terms of the positive and 
negative signs of the first and second order differentials of u 
respectively: u' >0 and u" <0. The first condition simply reflects 
the fact that the consumer will be better off with more 
consumption everything else being constant. The second condition 
indicates the risk-averse attitude of the consumer. This means 
that increased uncertainty will translate into a loss of expected 
utility. 
When written more specifically, the function appears very often 
as belonging to a set of functions known as the HARA (hyperbolic 
226 
absolute risk aversion) family. Hakansson (1970) and Merton 
(1971) give a formal description of this class of functions. Four 
of them are the most used in the optimal saving/consumption 
literature. These are the quadratic function and the following 
three cases: 
(i) u(c) =c ll /11 where 11 is a parameter and 11<1. This case 
belongs to the subset of iso-elastic utility functions, that 
is, with a constant relative risk-aversion26 
wi th 11 > O. This function is of the 
exponential type which is known to have a constant absolute 
risk aversion. 
(iii) u(c) = Log(c), which can be obtained as a limit case of 
the iso-elastic function above when 11 tends to zero. 
The HARA family has the interesting property of providing 
closed-form solutions to the maximization problem yet, in 
contrast to most of the other forms of utility functions. 
Hakansson (1970) notes in his study of cases (i), (ii) and (iii) 
that this is because these functions are the only solutions to 
the generalized Cauchy equations. However, the availability of 
explicit solutions will depend also on the constraints and the 
type of stochastic process the income or asset price will follow. 
Merton (1971) obtains closed-form solutions when the system can 
26 By definition, the absolute and relative risk aversions 
are respectively: 
u" (c) A(c) - - --,......,......._ 
u' (c) 
c. u" (c) R(c) - - -......-:---,-_ 
u
' 
(c) 
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be characterized as stationary and for a few other non-stationary 
cases, but the budget constraint has the classic form. In the 
presence of addi tional constraints such as liquidity constraints, 
the maximization problem becomes more complex and has not been 
solved explicitly, except for the stationary case (Hakansson, 
1970). Instead, simulation techniques have been used to suggest 
a solution: Davis and Norman (1990) and Deaton (1991) as already 
mentioned. 
Another difficulty arises where both the asset prlce and non-
capital income display some degree of uncertainty. Skinner (1988) 
proceeds by Taylor expansion of the Euler condition in addition 
to the use of iso-elastic utility-function, to get an approximate 
closed-form solution to this type of problem. 
To select a member of the HARA family appears therefore only 
a step towards an exact solution, not a sufficient condition to 
obtain it. Still, one may ask the question of which HARA function 
to choose when it comes to do so. The distinction generally runs 
between the quadratic utility function and the other HARA 
elements described in (i), (ii) and (iii) above. The former seems 
to be less interesting than the latter to handle the situation 
of risk because its marginal utility does not present any 
curvature: its third order differential equals zero in contrast 
to the other cases. Consequently, uncertainty will not affect the 
optimal behaviour, at least as far as this is represented by the 
Euler condi tion: uncertainty will affect the expected utility 
only. But as we will see, the result differs if the decision 
variables include the portfolio distribution in addition to the 
optimal consumption/saving pattern which corresponds to the Euler 
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condi tion. Also, the absolute risk averSlon of the quadratic 
utility function lncreases with the level of consumption27 
whereas one would expect the reverse relationship to hold. A 
final observation concerns the fact that the quadratic function 
will be defined on a limited range of the control variable 
values. 
To model the handling of a Stabilization Fund in the context of 
a small commodity-exporting economy, we will adopt a quadratic 
utili ty function. The rest of this section will explain the 
reason of the choice made despite the existence of some 
disadvantages as just seen. 
Apart from the fact that it belongs to the set of functions the 
most susceptible to provide an exact solution, the quadratic 
utility function seems to represent best the account of 
macroeconomic costs which go with change in aggregate spending. 
Haussman, Powell and Rigobon (1993) give the argument in support 
of this approach, where the utility function is defined as in 
equa tion (1) wi th2S : 
(2) where G 
denotes the Government spending and ~ a positive parameter. 
Here follows an illustration on a particular way that may lead 
to this specification. Let us consider a model, for example the 
Dornbusch model in which the price adjustment formula takes the 
form: 
27 One may note however that this does not apply to the 
relative risk-aversion index. 
28 Actually, the function defined by Hausmann, Powell and 
Rigobon. is slightly more complex it incorporates different 
categorles of macroeconomic costs. 
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dp/dt = 9(y-yo) (3) 
where: p lS the price index 
9 the speed of adjustment 
y and Yo represent the desired demand and the full-
employment output respectively. 
It is possible to show that combining (3) with an appropriate 
objective function can lead to the utility function in question. 
For this purpose, let us use the example in s. Black (1985) which 
represents a trade-off between the level of income or demand y 
and price stability: 
v = E(y)-k.var(p) (4) 
where E(y) denotes the expected demand and var(p) the variance 
of the price index, k giving a measure of the relative aversion 
of the monetary authorities towards inflation. Here the shocks 
which affect the system come from the terms of trade fluctuations 
and this in turn affects the demand side. The variance var(p) 
equals: 
(5 ) 
substituting (5) in (4) gives: 
( 6) 
Equation (6) provides a utility function similar to (2) if one 
takes the expectation operator into account29 • It represents the 
type of trade- off at the macroeconomic level which will concern 
the Authorities of the commodity-exporting economy. Comparatively 
29 There is the difference between y (equation 6) and G 
(equation 2) however. But G is an element of the demand y and 
since the focus here bears on the Stabilization Fund, one can 
argue that y may be replaced by G. 
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to the analysis in chapters 3 and 4, the objective function 
considered there consists of the domestic price variance only 
whereas equation (4) or (6) incorporates the desirable outcome 
of higher consumption and compares it with the cost of price 
instability which may result. 
After the choice for the utility function, the next step will 
consist of considering different assumptions about the budget 
constraint and the behaviour of the commodity price, and solving 
correspondingly the optimization problem. 
The deterministic case is the simplest one to start with. 
Throughout the modelling exercise, the continuous time setting 
will be used. Also, in the next sub-sections till sub-section 8, 
we assume the case of a fixed exchange rate so that the domestic 
export price and the world market price are identical. 
5.4. Deterministic case. 
We assume that the Government seeks to maximize the following 
utility U: 
under the budget constraint: 
dS/dt = rS+y-G 
with the following notations: 
(7) 
(8 ) 
U clearly represents the present value as of time zero of 
discounted future streams of utility. 
G : level of Government spending. The case where "G represents 
aggregate consumption could be handled easily. Indeed although 
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in strict terms the model would refer to the part of aggregate 
spending of the small economy which is directly influenced by the 
fluctuations in the terms of trade, such a notation would be 
acceptable when we assume, referring back to the model in chapter 
4, that the degree of openness of the economy (the parameter l-A 
in chapter 4) does not change so that the aggregate demand is 
linked directly to the terms of trade. 
~: indicator of the trade-off between the level of consumption 
and the adjustment costs due to variation in consumption. 
b: the rate of time preference. 
S: the level of saving holdings by the Stabilization Fund. These 
savings provide interest earnings at the rate r. 
y: the export receipts or income. 
The uncertainty in the variable y comes from the fluctuations 
in the commodity price and production level. But very often, as 
far as the stabilization mechanism is concerned, only the 
uncertainty in the commodity price will matter. So where 
necessary, we can assume that the production level is constant. 
The budget constraint (8) shows how in each period the total 
income rS+y (interest earnings and income) will be used up 
between spending on goods and services G and increasing the level 
of savings by dS/dt. 
As already indicated, the definition of the quadratic utility 
function will hold only for a limited range for the variable G, 
namely between zero and 1/~. At first sight, this might seem 
very restrictive . In practice, one can get around of the 
restriction by means of an appropriate scaling of the variable 
G. For example, G may be defined in terms of consumption per 
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capita. 
The model does not involve a liquidity constraint: it allows for 
negative values of $: one may denote -$ as the Government debt 
and in a way, this is to simplify the analysis. However, the 
context of the FZ can justify such an assumption. Indeed, the FZ 
countries have instituted between them a system whereby their 
external reserves are pooled, and also they benefit from the 
guarantee by France of the CFA convertibility. This means a 
particular country can be allowed to run an external deficit 
provided the overall situation of the group as a whole remains 
favourable. Consequently, the FZ countries do not experience the 
type of reserve constraint for their need of imports they would 
otherwise do. But the need for adjustment in the long run should 
apply to any of these countries. In other terms and in the 
context of this model, the accumulation of savings and external 
reserves will not constitute an objective itself on the one hand 
and on the other hand, the Government debt should not be allowed 
to 10 explode 10. How does the model account for the long run 
condition? 
To bring about an answer to this question, let us take the 
integral of the dynamic budget equation. It follows the 
expression below: 
Equation (9) represents the intertemporal budget constraint 
which insures that the appropriate balance as stated above will 
hold in the long run. It equates the present value of the future 
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streams of consumption to the sum of the initial wealth level and 
the present value of the stream of future income streams. This 
may be viewed as equivalent to the "No-Ponzi-Game" condition 
(Blanchard and Fisher, 1989) whereby the debt growth rate should 
not exceed the interest rate, asymptotically. 
Let us restate the maximization problem in which G represents 
the control variable as follows: 
Max fo~ (G- (<1>/2) G2 ) e -5tdt 
G 
s.t. dS/dt = rS+y-G 
The notations are the same as above. 
(7) , 
(8) , 
To solve the deterministic proble m, the use of the Hamiltonian 
technique will suffice. For this purpose we define the variable 
H as below: 
(10 ) 
where A. denotes here the mul tiplier corresponding to the dynamic 
e quation (8)'. 
The first order conditions of the maximization problem will be: 
aH/aG = 0 (11) 
aH/aS = -d~/dt (12) 
Expliciting (11) and (12) will bring about: 
(1-<I>G)e -5t_~ = 0 (11)' 
~r = -d~/dt (12) , 
After substitution of (11)' into (12)', it follows that: 
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dG _ r - 8 (l - <j>G) (13 ) 
at --q> 
Expression (13) gives the proper dynamics of the consumption 
variable. It will be used to derive the consumption level as a 
function of the level of wealth. To do so, we need a 
rearrangement of equation (9) as of time t instead of time zero: 
Transforming the first integral by parts will give: 
Substituting (13) into (15) leads to: 
or equivalently: 
If we denote by w(t) the level of wealth 
w(t) == S(t) + fo"y(u)e-r(U-t1du (18 ) 
then combining (16) and (17), we can derive from (14) the 
relationship of G with respect to the level of wealth: 
Result 1 
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G - (2 r - 0 ) w- (r- 0) 1 ( 19 ) 
r l 
Equation (19) displays G as a linear function of w. The linear 
relationship is exactly the type of result obtained with the HARA 
functions described above. Equation (19) to make sense needs the 
additional assumption that 2r-O ~ O. This does not seem to be 
restrictive. In practice, the interest rate and the rate of time 
preference are deemed to be very close. If there was the equality 
r=o as it would tend to be the case for an open economy, then 
equation (19) would take the simple form: 
G = rw (18) , 
In the representation of an impatient consumer, described by 
Deaton (1991) to fit the situation of small farmers in developing 
countries, the rate of time preference is larger than the 
interest rate: o-r ~ O. Consequently, from equation (19) we can 
see that a higher avers~on towards inflation or other 
macroeconomic costs, that is a higher value of the parameter ~ 
will result in a lower level of consumption for every given value 
of wealth w. 
The main result may be summarized as follows: the relationship 
between G and w implies that consumption will smooth the 
variations in export receipts. This justifies the setting up of 
a Stabilization Fund to play the smoothing role, saving ~n 
periods when income is higher than the trend of future incomes 
and dissaving when income is lower than the trend. 
An illustration of this can be seen by assuming that r=O so that 
equation (13) reduces to: 
dG/dt = 0 or equivalently that G equals a constant Go. Then a 
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change in y will not affect the level of consumption and will be 
passed on entirely as a change in saving: dS/dt = rS + y -Go. An 
increase in y leaves the level of consumption unchanged. Instead 
the saving flow dS/dt will increase. 
5.5. Stochastic case with stationary export receipts. 
The first step to extend the previous analysis will consist of 
introducing uncertainty in the model. The export receipts will 
be assumed to follow a stochastic process. Not only for the FZ 
countries but many other small economies have experienced shocks 
on their export receipts. Very often, the shocks take the form 
of fluctuations in the commodity price. But in a number of cases, 
the change has also concerned the quantity produced or exported, 
due to natural calamities such as droughts. 
We will adopt a new notation whereby the flow of export 
receipts or income will be dy. This leaves a possible 
interpretation of y(t) as the cumulative level of export receipts 
in the period [0 t], while dy de note s the flow during the period 
dt. 
In the stochastic setting, the maximization problem takes the 
form: 
Max Efo" (G-(<!>/2)G 2 ) e -Stdt (20) 
G 
s.t. dS = rSdt+dy- Gdt (21) 
The Government will seek to maximize, under the budget 
constraint, the expected net utility derived from the different 
levels and variations of consumption over time: this is 
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represented by (20) and (21) where E indicates the expectations 
operator, S,r and 0 denote as before the saving holdings, the 
market interest rate and the rate of time preference. 
By the assumption of stationarity, we will mean that the export 
receipts will in this logarithmic notation follow the process: 
dy = adt+adz (22) 
where a and a are two constants. The variable z(t) is a 
standard Wiener process so that the variable y(t) can be 
described as a brownian motion or diffusion process with drift 
a and variance a2 • The export receipt flow has two components: 
the expected export receipts adt and the unexpected element adz. 
The budget equation (21) takes then the form: 
dS = (rS+a-G)dt+adz (21) , 
Note that in general the shocks on the export receipts will come 
from two sources: the shocks on the commodity price on the world 
market on the one hand and the shocks on the production of the 
commodity itself. A priori, one may think of dy as equal to: 
where a1 and a1dz1 relate to the commodity price while a 2 and a 2dz 2 
relate to the commodity production, assuming that the two 
variables are independent for a small economy. Then it suffices 
to reinterpret a and adz as equal successively to: a = a 1+a2 and 
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adz = a 1dz 1+a2dz 2 • 
In the procedure to find a solution, we define as in Merton 
(1971) a value function in a way similar to the maximization 
problem except that it will be considered as of time t instead 
of the ini tial period zero. We denote the value function by 
V(S, t}: 
V(S,t} = Max Eft" (G-(<!>/2}G 2 }e-otdt (23) 
G 
s.t. dS = (rS+u-G}dt+adz (24) 
The next step will consist of writing the Bellman equation of 
dynamic programming for our maximization problem, to be solved 
for the function V(S,t) as follows: 
(25) 
where Vt , Vs and Vss are differentials of V: 
Vt == dV/dti Vs == dV/dSi Vss == d2V/dS 2 • 
The first order condition to obtain the optimal value of G 
gives: 
(l-<!>G} e -Ot-Vs = 0 
which leads to: 
G* = [(l-eot}Vs]/<!> 
(26) 
(27 ) 
Replacing back into (25), it follows the partial differential 
equation for V(S,t): 
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(28) 
or equivalently: 
To solve the differential equation (29), we consider a trial 
solution. One advantage of the HARA utility functions is that the 
value function such as V(S,t) will have the same " form as the 
utility function. Our trial solution will therefore take the 
form: 
where Ao , A and B are constants to be determined. 
using (30) in (29) and considering the identity to zero gives 
a system of three equations which will provide the values of A OI 
A and B: 
T + (r- 0) A+ 2 ( (l- ~ ) B - 0 ( 32) 
2B c,: 
+2r- u - 0 T (33) 
This implies ln particular: 
B - - q, (2r- O) 2 (34) 
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and 
A - - (roj> - 1) (2 r - 0 ) (35) 
r 
The combination of (34) and (35) with equation (27) provides the 
optimal value G*: 
G" -
Result 2 
(2r- O) (S+ a) _ (r- O) 1 
r r q> (36) 
The solution G* appears as a linear function of the saving stock 
S. We note the similarity with the solution in the deterministic 
case (equation 19). The term air can be viewed as the stream of 
expected future export receipts so that the value S+a/r will 
correspond to the wealth w(t). Again, the optimal consumption 
level will not follow one for one the fluctuations of income or 
export receipts and this will result 1n savings and dissavings 
depending on whether the current export receipts are higher or 
lower than the long run trend a. 
We note also that the uncertainty indicator cr does not enter the 
express10n of G*. This reveals the property of certainty 
equivalence that this model has. We know that the two 
characteristics which result in the certainty equivalence are the 
quadratic form of the utility function combined with the 
linearity of the budget constraint. However, because of the 
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concavity of the utility function, the value function will depend 
on the variance 0'2 as can be seen in equation (31), which 
determines the constant Ao . 
The final observation relates to the debt problem treated in the 
optimization literature. Blanchard and Fisher (1989) gives an 
outline of the approach. Our specification can be reinterpreted 
to deal with the debt and current account issue. Let us take the 
small economy with a large export sector in which one commodity 
is predominant. To a large extent, -S can be viewed as the 
external debt and -dS/dt as the current account deficit. In the 
budget constraint, the variable G would represent the aggregate 
spending, that is consumption and investment at the 
macroeconomic level. Suppose the net between production and 
consumption of the non-export s e ctor is constant and normalized 
to zero. Then the budget equation would resemble the resource -
spending identity of the national accounts just like in the 
specification of the debt problem. 
5.6. Non-stationary case. 
On the basis of the solutions d e rive d above, the the oretical 
results about the optimal consumption/saving in the FZ countries 
provide a characterization and a justification of the 
Stabilization Funds. But that holds so far as the deterministic 
case or the stationary case appe ar representative e nough. The 
present subsection deals with the alte rna tive situation in which 
the export receipts follow instea d a non-stationary proce ss as 
it may happen in some if not all of the FZ countries. In general, 
the existing literature faces a great difficulty in solving the 
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non-stationary case. In what follows, we take the example of a 
non-stationary process which can be solved explicitly30 
Let us assume that the export receipts follow the process: 
dy = Xdt+<J1dz 1 (37) 
where the instantaneous value of exports is not constant but 
instead it will follow a stochastic process in the form: 
(38) 
This describes a situation l.n which expectations have not 
"settled down" arid are still adjusting. Thus typically, the 
stationary case would describe the long run equilibrium while the 
short run description would introduce the specification in (37) 
and (38). In the present model, both y and X are brownian motions 
with the variances cr/ and cr/ . Let assume that both variables are 
observable. If X was not observable, then arises the problem of 
partial observations, the solution of which requires the 
application of the separation principle and the Kalman-Bucy 
filter (Fleming and Rishel, 1975). 
If now we consider the budget equation, it can be rewritten, 
taking account of equation (37), as follows: 
dS = (rS+X-G)dt+cr1dz1 (39) 
Then we define a new state variable H: 
H = rS+X (40) 
Differentiating the two sides of (40) and using (38) gives: 
(41) 
Using the definition of H and substituting in (41), it follows 
30 Some other special cases are solved in Merton (1971). 
that: 
dH = r (H-G) dt+r<J1dz 1+adt+<J2dz 2 
or equivalently: 
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(42) 
(43 ) 
Following the same procedure as in the stationary case, it is 
possible to derive the optimal level of consumption: 
G--2(2r- 8)(H+ a ) _ r - 8 i (44) 
r r r 'f' 
The solution appears as a linear function of H and therefore it 
does not reflect exactly the fluctuations in the variables y or 
x. Indeed beside the variable H, only the expected stream of 
future export receipts air enters the expression (44). This 
result again allows for a saving scheme and the existence of a 
Stabilization Fund. The most important aspect of this result is 
probably that a non-stationary (non-capital) income does not 
necessarily imply that consumption should adjust instantly and 
fully to income, leaving no place for a s aving scheme. 
The combination of a quadratic utility function which takes into 
account the macroeconomic costs and a budget constraint specified 
with non-stationary export receipts proves to have maintained the 
rationale for a Stabilization Fund. 
5.7. Portfolio method. 
The previous analysis might be extended to the case where we 
consider that the economy has two assets instead of one. 
Bevan/Collier and Gunning (1990) address the issue of temporary 
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shocks in the context of a small economy which receives a 
significant part of its income from exports. The authors consider 
two forms of savings to describe the stabilization scheme which 
should be in place in the case of temporary shocks: savings in 
the form of foreign asset acquisitions or alternatively 
(physical) investments in the domestic economy. At the same time, 
we will look at different ways of specifying the behaviour of the 
shocks. 
Below, we propose a formal treatment of the question as a 
portfolio decision. The two types of assets will be a risk-free 
asset such as bond holdings and a risky asset which will consist 
of investment in the export sector. Note a slight difference with 
the presentation of Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990) where the 
investments are supposed to go mainly into the non-tradable 
sector. But assuming full competition between the sectors for the 
use of the available resources, we can get the equalization of 
the marginal products of any given factor across the economy. 
Under these conditions, the choice of the sector will matter less 
as long as our concern focuses on the return of the investment. 
However we are aware of the problem of inflation pressures which 
may result from the investments in the non-tradable sector in 
contrast to the case where the investments take place in the 
export sector, raising no serious problem of inflation pressures. 
To rule out the inflation problem in the former situation, we 
need to make sure that an investment in the non- traded sector 
translates quickly enough in the production of goods and 
services. 
Also, the introduction of two assets in the economy could 
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receive a more general interpretation. The risk-free asset may 
include the investments ln any competitive enough sector 
(including the bonds market) which faces much less or no 
uncertainty with regards its returns, compared with the degree 
of uncertainty affecting the export sector. In this general 
perception, the risk-free asset would be representative of the 
sectors with relatively negligible uncertainty regarding the 
return on investment while the export sector or the risky asset 
would be representative of all the other sectors of the economy. 
Such a presentation would have the advantage to allow for the 
existence of two goods at least in the economy. In what follows, 
we set up the form of the budget equation of this two-asset model 
and solve the maximization problem. 
a. Budget constraint 
The source of uncertainty about the return of the risky asset 
will come, as in the previous subsection, from the uncertainty 
in the production of the sector on the one hand and on the other 
hand from the fluctuations in the commodity price on the world 
market. 
The variables Sand k will denote the stocks of the risk-free 
and risky assets respectively. The total wealth will be 
represented by the variable wand will be defined as the sum of 
the two asset stocks: 
Or alternatively, one might write: 
w = S+k (45) 
k = row 
S = (l-ro)w 
(46) 
(47) 
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where ro is the share of the risky asset in the total wealth. 
The return in the export sector is defined per unit of existing 
capital and might be specified as follows: 
The idea of a stochastic return from a production technology as 
indicated in equation(48) 1S presented in Stulz (1986). 
Note that the drift term a l represents the instantaneous level 
of export receipts per unit of capital in the export sector, to 
compare with the drift terms ex. or X above which correspond to the 
total value of export receipts. In this respect, a l compares with 
the market interest rate r (return of the other asset) better 
than ex. or X because it has actually the meaning of a return on 
an asset. Also we may think of dy per unit of capital dy/k as a 
capital gain from two sources: a productivity gain dq/k where dq 
would represent the new output or export quantity flow on the one 
hand and an increase in the commodity stock price Px' dpx/Px on 
the other hand: 
dy /k = dq/k + dpx/Px. 
Then assuming that: dq/k = (X.l 'dt + 0"1'dz1 
dpx/Px = u2 I dt + 0"2 I dZ 2 
it will follow that dy/k can be interpreted as in equation (48). 
Wi th these different notations I the budget constraint can be 
written as follows: 
dw = rSdt+k(dy/k)dt-Gdt (49 ) 
Equation (49) could be rewritten in the form: 
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dw = rSdt+dy-Gdt (49) , 
to show the similarity to a large extent with the previous 
specification of the budget constraint. But the term dw on the 
left hand side instead of dS introduces the portfolio decision 
in addition to the consumption/saving decision. Typically, the 
decision-maker will have to decide simultaneously on two 
variables: the level of consumption G and the share ro of the 
risky asset. However the condition of non-explosion of the debt 
continues to hold. It suffices to integrate the budget constraint 
and to take the expected value on each side. 
Let us now rewrite equation (49), introducing the variable 00: 
dw = r(l-ro)wdt+row(dy/k)-Gdt (50) 
Replacing the term dy/k in (50) by its expression in (48) gives: 
dw = r (l-ro) wdt+row (a1dt+cr1dz1) -Gdt (51) 
or equivalently: 
dw = row(a1-r)dt+(rw-G)dt+rowcr1dz 1 (52) 
In the new set-up, the interpretation of the term dy has changed 
from the representation of non-capital income to the meaning of 
capi tal income. In general such a transition is obtained by 
assuming that non-capital or labour income is diversifiable, and 
doing so makes the maximization problem much easier to solve. The 
holding of assets such as life insurance may portray ways in 
which the diversification of labour risk could be constructed. 
But to consider that all labour income risk would be 
diversifiable is not a generally accepted assumption in the 
existing literature: Blanchard and Fisher (1989). In the present 
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model where dy refers to the export receipts, the transition from 
one definition to the other raises less difficulty. After all, 
the production in the export sector is derived from an existing 
stock of capital, essentially land, and there is a market for 
land. Conversely, if we take the stock of capital as given and 
equal to ko, then this would amount to reducing the use of export 
receipts for consumption and for saving in the risk-free asset 
only, that is, the one-asset model analyzed earlier on. 
b. Solution of the maximization problem. 
The maximization problem will be written as follows: 
Max Efo" (G- (<j>/2)G 2 )e-Otdt 
G,O) (52) 
S.t. dw = (Ow(a1-r)dt+(rw-G)dt+ffiwcr1dz1 
To solve this problem, we will follow a number of steps, 
starting by defining a value function V(w,t): 
V(w,t) = Max Eft " (G-(<j>/2)G 2) e -Stdt 
G,O) (5 3 ) 
S.t. dw = (OW(a1-r)dt+(rw-G)dt+ffiwcr1dz1 
One can easily show this other e quivalent expression of V(w,t): 
V(w,t) = Max (-(<j>/ 2 )Ef t~ (G-(I/<j»G 2 ) e -Otdt +Constant) 
G,O) (53) , 
s.t. dw = ffiW(Cl1-r)dt+(rw-G)dt+ffiwcr1dz l 
with the constant term equal to -2/ (<j>0). 
Considering the expression (5 3)' which give the same solutions 
as (53) and ignoring the constant term will facilitate the 
calculations. The corresponding Bellman equation will be: 
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The first order conditions giving the solutions G* and 00* appear 
as: 
G' - (55) 
(ifw- ( 56) 
Replacing back into (54) then gives the partial differential 
equation for V(w,t): 
To find the solution of equation (57), we will proceed again 
with a trial solution such as: 
v (w, t) = Ke - lit [ -w+ 1/ (r<») ] 2 (58 ) where K is a 
constant to be determined. 
substituting (58) into (57) l eads to an equation 1n K: 
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which implies that: 
=> K _ <1> [0 _ (2 r - (ex,. - r) 2 ) ] 
""2" ~ 
and therefore: 
(60 ) 
From the first order conditions (55) and (56) and considering 
the expression (60) of the value function, it follows that the 
optimal values of consumption and portfolio share will be: 
Result 3 
G- _ (2r- o - (ex,. - r) 2 ) w- ~ [r- o - (ex,. - r) 2 ] 1 (61) 
~ r O"i (j) 
(fJ'W- (62 ) 
In the expression (61), we find again the optimal level of 
consumption G* as a linear function of w, the level of wealth. As 
previously, we will assume that the coefficient of w is positive: 
The linear relationship with the level of wealth implies the 
existence of savings/dissavings, that is , the operation of a 
Stabilization Fund in the context of a small commodity-exporting 
251 
economy subject to commodity export shocks. 
The effect on G* of the risk aversion towards inflation ~ will 
depend on the sign of the term: 
r - 0 - (a l - r ) 2/ (J 1 2 • 
There is some presumption that it has a negative sign (for 
example r-o < 0 with impatient consumers), in which case higher 
values of ~ will cause a lower value of G*, everything else 
remaining constant. The same conclusion holds in particular when 
r=o, about the way the trade-off operates between the benefit 
derived from higher levels of consumption on the one hand and the 
related adjustment costs which are 
represented in the utility function by G2 /2, on the other hand. 
With regards the amount of the wealth which will go into the 
export sector in the form of the risky asset investment, a 
positive relationship with the average return a l or for that 
matter the differential return al-r between the risky and risk-
free sectors. This conforms the view that a boom (with higher 
values of a l ) leads to a reallocation of resources in favour of 
the booming sector. However, the uncertainty does penalise the 
exposed sector since expression (62) clearly shows that the 
optimal share will decrease if the variance (J/ increases. 
c. Effects of uncertainty and wealth. 
We can see that the two-asset model has led to a result which 
involves the variance (J1 2 of the export receipts. This is a new 
feature in comparison to the result obtained in the one-asset 
model. As already suggested, the difference comes from the fact 
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that the optimality condition of the one-asset model operates 
through the marginal utility which is itself linear and therefore 
the variance of the stochastic process has no effect on the 
optimal solution. In the two-asset model by contrast, there is 
an additional non-linear first-order condition, and the two 
optimality conditions simultaneously determine the solution, 
which explains the presence of cr/ in the equations (61) and 
(62) . 
One would generally expect from a risk-averse behaviour to defer 
more consumption from the present to the future in face of more 
uncertainty. The result of equation (61) is compatible with such 
a prediction. The differential of G* with respect to the variance 
cr/ gives: 
dG" 
dcri 
(~ - r)2 1 
---"'4 - ( - w+ ~ ) 
cr1 r'f' 
(63 ) 
The sign of this differential can be determined quite easily. 
We recall that the domain of validity for the utility function 
implies that the inequality below holds: 
G* < 1/</> 
It can be shown that G· -1/</> < 0 leads to the inequality w-l/(r</» 
< O. Consequently G* appears as a decreasing function of the 
variance cr1 2 • 
With regards the solution ro· , we consider the condition 
-w+1/(r</» > O. Also our presumption is that the instantaneous 
return of the risky asset will be higher than the return of bond 
asset otherwise the investors would tend to prefer markedly the 
latter asset. In consequence the term on the right hand side of 
equation (62) will generally have a positive sign. The share of 
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the risky asset will reduce to zero when u1 = r. However, if the 
return u1 happens to be lower than r, then there will be 
"shortselling" on the risky asset. This will lead to a negative 
stock of the risky asset and as a result we will have: roW ~ o. 
Conversely, when the difference u1-r is sufficiently attractive, 
up to the point of outweighing the uncertainty attached to the 
risky asset, then borrowing ("leverage") may occur on the bond 
asset so that the share roW will be higher than one: roW ~ 1. 
Under the assumption that u1 > r, the optimal share will appear 
as a decreasing function of o} and also of <1>. The former 
relationship is easy to understand since more uncertainty will 
make the risky asset less attractive. For the latter 
relationship, higher aversion with respect to adjustment costs 
should mean a reduction in the proportion of wealth held in the 
risky asset. Indeed, it is this risky asset which constitutes the 
source of the shocks and consequently the cause of adjustments. 
Finally, we could also note that the optimal share roW of the 
risky asset will be a decreasing function of the level of wealth. 
This seems to be a consequence from the specification of the 
utility function as a quadratic one. As we know already, for this 
type of utility function, the absolute risk aversion increases 
with the level of wealth. But more interestingly, the 
relationship of roW with respect to w could mean that the economy 
will diversify itself as it grows. Indeed more diversification 
reduces the exposure of the economy to the external shocks. This 
line of argument is precisely the one used by Kenen (1969) and 
referred to amply in chapters 2 and 4. Also Branson (1980) found 
that the terms of trade shocks are more acute for countries at 
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low levels of income per capita. As a matter of fact and for the 
sake of further illustration, let us simply indicate that 
developed countries have more diversified economies than 
developing countries and are less prone to external shocks. 
5.8 More on the stabilization aspect and other characteristics 
(i) In solving the optimization problem above, we have at the 
same time provided the elements of answer regarding the 
insulation feature of a Stabilization Fund. Two cases need to be 
distinguished: the one asset model and the portfolio model. The 
former indicates by means of Results 1 & 2 that the optimal level 
of consumption G does not depend on the degree of uncertainty cr2 • 
This suggests that the Stabilization Fund can insulate from the 
commodity price shocks if the savings go to a (unique) risk-free 
asset only (a bond in foreign currency for example) . 
By contrast, the portfolio model indicates that the combination 
of a risk-free asset with a risky asset gives a different result. 
This time the optimal solution G as shown in Result 3 is a 
decreasing function of cr2 • The uncertainty displayed by the 
commodity price in the world market affects negatively the small 
economy despite the existence of the Stabilization Fund. This 
means the insulation that the latter provides is not complete: 
the investment in the export sector may give a substantial level 
of return but this is subject to fluctuations due to the shocks 
on the export price. Then the introduction of a flexible exchange 
rate may be appropriate as the next section 5.9 will discuss. 
(ii) The scope of the results obtained in the previous sections 
is not limited to the stabilization aspect. They seem to give 
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also some useful indications about other questions addressed by 
the literature, especially on the effects of export instability 
on a small open economy. Brock (1991) is most notable for having 
attempted a theoretical framework on this issue. He then compares 
the results of his model with the results of the existing and 
mostly empirical literature (which uses cross-section data) on 
the effects of export instability. Let us introduce our results 
in this comparison. Consider the effect of export instability on 
capital and savings for example. Brock indicates that the capital 
stock will decrease with the variance of export. This is the same 
as our finding in Result 3 that the share of capital in the total 
wealth will decrease with 0'2 . The comparison in Brock (1991) 
considers also the investment expenditures. But our model has not 
dealt explicitly with this variable. 
With regard savings, the effect of export instability is 
ambiguous ~n Brock (1991) while generally the empirical 
literature finds a positive effect. One exception reported by 
Brock is the study by Moran (1983) which finds different results 
depending on the source of the export instability: positive 
effect when considering the price component of export 
fluctuations but negative effect with the quantity component of 
these fluctuations. Brock (1991) seems to favour the latter case 
on the basis of his argument about the importance of the capital 
risk. On this point about the effects on savings, our findings 
indicate clearly that the optimal consumption level G will 
decrease with (j2 and consequently saving will increase with 
export instability. This is consistent with the empirical 
literature, including Moran (1983) since our analysis deals with 
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the price component of export instability as well. 
5.9 Case of a flexible rate 
The portfolio model above has indicated that the Stabilization 
Fund in a fixed rate regime would not be enough to insulate the 
small open economy from the commodity price shocks. Then the 
combination of a Stabilization Fund with a flexible exchange rate 
regime might insulate more the economy in question. To examine 
the conditions under which the exchange rate may matter, let us 
specify further the way the economy works, namely a case of 
complete specialization whereby the small economy produces only 
the commodity good and exports all its production. It uses the 
export to buy import goods for consumption and (physical) capital 
formation in the export sector. In such a context, the exchange 
rate will not matter if the risk-free asset is set in foreign 
currency. Indeed, any element of the capital stock can be 
expressed as a tradable and its price (or the return of the 
capital stock) in foreign currency does not vary with the 
exchange rate. Consequently, the arbitrage between the two assets 
to decide of the optimal portfolio will not depend on the 
exchange rate . By contrast, the exchange rate will matter if the 
risk-free asset is in local currency denomination because the 
return on the risky asset in local currency will be affected by 
changes in the exchange rate. In the latter case, the stochastic 
process which describes the behaviour of the return in domestic 
currency of the risky-asset (that is the capital installed in the 
export sector) will have two components: one related to the 
commodity price in foreign currency and another one related to 
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the exchange rate. Equation (48) can then take the form: 
(48) I 
where u1dt and cr1dz1 correspond to the drift and stochastic terms 
for the commodity price fluctuations in foreign currency while 
u 2dt and cr2dz 2 relate to the exchange rate process. The parameter 
u 2 may be chosen to measure the difference between the drift of 
the flexible exchange rate and the constant term which 
characterises the fixed regime. The latter may include the case 
of a crawling peg in which the exchange rate is depreciated or 
appreciated over time at a constant rate. A negative value of u 2 
would typically mean that the corresponding fixed exchange rate 
regime results in an overvaluation. 
Let us rewrite (48)' in a more compact form: 
dy _ adt+crdz 
K (48)" 
The parameter P12 denotes the coefficient of correlation between 
the commodity price in foreign currency and the exchange rate. 
It should be negative because an increase in the commodity price 
on the world market is generally believed to cause an 
appreciation of the exchange rate for the small commodity-
exporting economy, and vice-versa. But the question whether cr2 is 
less or higher than cr12 to determine whether the commodity price 
in local currency is more volatile under the fixed regime or the 
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flexible regime will remain an empirical one since other shocks, 
namely the monetary shocks may be involved. 
In any case the introduction of a flexible exchange rate to 
supplement the Stabilization Fund will be justified if this has 
the effect of increasing the drift term and/or reducing the 
variance of the return offered by the risky asset. To examine 
this question in the two-asset model, let us consider the case 
of a stationary process. The results obtained when the economy 
is assumed to have two categories of assets indicate that the 
value function as of time zero takes the following form as a 
function of w (from equation 60) : 
V(w,O) _ -*"[O - 2r+ (a- r) 2 ] ( - w+ 1 ) 2 
L. 0'2 rq> (60) / 
It appears clearly that the value function is a decreasing 
function of the variance 0'2 and an increasing function of the 
parameter a. Hence the following conclusion will apply: more 
uncertainty with regards the export receipts in domestic currency 
under the fixed exchange rate compare d with the flexible exchange 
rate regime would mean a r e latively lower satisfaction with the 
fixed rate regime, and conversely. Also, lower average of the 
export receipts in the domestic currency due for example to 
overvaluation would correspond to a net loss since exporters' 
income would limit significantly their level of consumption. 
When we look at the solution G*, we see that it is clearly an 
increasing function of the parameter U. But this solution G* has 
the additional feature of involving the variance 0'2 in the two-
asset model. As it can be seen from equation (61), the optimal 
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level of consumption 1S a decreasing function of cr2 . The 
differential gives: 
(a- r)2 1 
--era""'-- w- rq> 
or equivalently: 
(a- r)2 (w- 1 ) 
era rq> 
(61) I 
< 0 
The differential is negative for the reason already given. More 
uncertainty in the export receipts under one exchange rate regime 
relatively to the other regime will affect adversely and directly 
the level of consumption. This relationship between G* and cr2 
goes into line with the terms of comparison between the two 
regimes reached on the basis of the value function. However, 
the question arises of the situation where the external shocks 
and the performance of the flexible exchange rate policy combine 
to produce a higher value of a and cr2 • Such a situation will not 
occur if the exchange rate policy is driven mainly by the 
formulation of an appropriate response to the external shocks. 
But suppose that the exchange rate is too volatile as a direct 
result of monetary shocks. Then the case may occur: a continued 
depreciation due to repeated money expansion would increase both 
a and cr2 • Our results accommodate easily to handle this type of 
problem. 
In the expression of V(w,O) and G*, the parameters in question 
appear under the form of the ratio: 
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(a- r) 2 
(J2 
and one can see that both V(w,O) and G* are increasing with 
respect to this ratio. So when a and cr2 change in the same 
direction due to the fact of introducing one of the two exchange 
rate regimes to replace the other one, we need only consider the 
resulting change in (a-r) 2/cr2 to be able to determine whether the 
country will be better off or not under the new exchange rate 
regime. 
In the above example of monetary expansion, the economy will 
certainly witness a surge of inflation. The increase ln a to 
reflect the lncrease ln export receipts resulting from the 
depreciation of the currency does not necessarily mean that the 
purchasing power will boost for the exporters. Implicitly, we 
have taken a to correspond to the real purchasing power of the 
export receipts when one takes into account the domestic price 
change. An increase in ex corresponds to the case where 
depreciation of the currency outweighs the increase in the 
domestic price. 
Conclusion 
The FZ countries as many other commodity-exporting countries 
have used national Stabilization Funds as a device to handle the 
fluctuations in the commodity price. The analysis bears first on 
the question raised by Hausmann, Powell & Rigobon (1993), whether 
or not one can justify the existence of a Stabilization 
Fund,particularly when the export receipts follow a non-
stationary process. The setting uses a quadratic utility function 
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and a budget constraint which shows that the export receipts 
accruing to the Stabilization Fund will serve either to increase 
the stock of assets or for consumption. 
The results of the analysis indicate that in the case where the 
instantaneous export receipts follow a non-stationary process in 
the short term but a stationary process in the long run, then a 
theoretical basis for the Stabilization can be established, thus 
extending the results obtained in the stationary case. 
The optimization problem can be given a seemingly richer 
presentation which is the portfolio method. One considers two 
assets instead of one. In addition to the traditional risk-free 
(bond) asset, there is the risky asset. Every year the 
Stabilization Fund will have to decide the amount to save and 
also the allocation of this saving into the two alternative 
assets. This approach brings about the result that uncertainty 
will affect the decision : the optimal level of consumption will 
decrease as a function of the export receipts variance. 
Secondly we consider the role of the Stabilization Fund in 
relation with the exchange rate regime. The question arises 
whether these two instruments, that is, the saving rule and the 
exchange rate rule combine each other or not for the task of 
stabilization. Introducing the saving rule is one feature 
extending the analysis presented in the previous chapters. A 
second feature of the extension relates to the form of the 
utility function which establishes a trade-off between the costs 
of inflation and the benefits of a higher output. 
Considering the stationary case, one can see that the exchange 
rate will affect both the drift term and the variance 
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(uncertainty) of the export receipts. More importantly, the 
exchange rate will matter if the risk-free asset is set in local 
currency, and in this case it may contribute to dampen the 
effects of the commodity price shocks on the small economy. This 
is illustrated in the portfolio model by the fact that the 
optimal level of consumption interestingly appears as an 
increasing function of the ratio of the return differential 
between the risky asset and the risk-free asset, with respect to 
the level of uncertainty. Also, the share of the risky asset 
seems to decrease with the level of wealth. 
Furthermore, the model can be used to look at the effects of 
export instability on savings and capital formation. The results 
obtained are compatible with the findings of the empirical 
literature on this issue. 
Chapter 6: The overvaluation issue ln the FZ 
Introduction 
The question whether the CFA currency was overvalued remained 
unsettled for a long time. More recently, Boughton (1991) found 
only three out of the thirteen member countries of the Zone, for 
which the currency showed a clear real appreciation3 ! during the 
period 1978-90. Nevertheless a big devaluation of 50 % occurred 
recently, in January 1994. In fact, the financial difficulties 
of the FZ countries offered no other alternative way but to 
devalue. So there was a real problem in the sense that on the one 
hand the general line, supported by a number of studies on the 
FZ such as Bhatia (1985), Guillaumont et al (1988), Medhora 
(1990) and Boughton (1991), did not point to the need for a 
devaluation and instead favoured to keep the statu-quo, and on 
the other hand the mounting difficulties in the Zone some 
observers attributed to an overvaluation of the CFA currency. One 
is certainly struck by the contrast between the view which was 
prevailing on the issue and the scale of the devaluation which 
occurred in the end. 
In the present chapter, we suggest that the problem laid in part 
in the choice of the indicator upon which to assess the change 
in competitiveness of the Zone. We will look at a longer period 
as well, that is 1972-93. 
31 The measure used in Boughton (1991) defines the real 
exchange as the effective exchange rate deflated by the ratio of 
the domestic and foreign price indices (Cpr) while in most of 
this paper, the real exchange rate is defined as the ratio 
between the import goods price and the non-traded good price of 
the small economy, following the dependent economy model. Some 
scaling factor may link the two measures. 
264 
To organize the discussion, we use the framework of the 
theoretic-trade models in the form which allows the introduction 
of the monetary aspects to describe the adjustment process. The 
model provides a number of results ln the light of which the 
behaviour of competitiveness in the FZ can be reassessed. 
The first section presents a review of the literature. The 
second section presents the issue of the overvaluation and gives 
a detailed description of the model. It draws the distinction 
between the actual real exchange rate and the equilibrium real 
exchange rate. The third and last section compares the findings 
of the model with the experience of the FZ. 
6.1. The theoretic -trade models: a review 
This is a brief review of models which belong to the category 
of theoretic-trade models. They are used mostly to look at, in 
the context of a dependent economy, a vast range of issues, 
including stabilization programs, the deindustrialization problem 
or "Dutch disease". The review will start with the model of 
Salter (1959). The other papers to be covered include: Corden & 
Neary (1982), Neary and wijnbergen (1986) and Lal (1989). 
a. Salter (1959): "Internal and external balance: the role of 
price and expenditure effects". 
By means of a simple diagram, the paper gives an analysis of how 
a small open economy may adjust back to equilibrium, following 
shocks such as: excess demand, rise in foreign prices or capital 
inflow. The analysis has come up with the conclusion that the 
adjustment process would normally combine a change in the 
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expenditure and a change in the relative prices. 
As one of its most important features, the model draws a 
distinction between two categories of goods: the traded good the 
price of which is determined in the world market, out of control 
from the viewpoint of the small economy, and the non-traded good 
the price of which obeys to the balance between supply and demand 
on the home market. Aggregate output is taken as exogenous. 
The traded good appears as a composite of exportables and 
importables and may be treated as such as long as the terms of 
trade are constant. This simplifies the analysis a great deal and 
brings the analysis down to a two-dimension basis: one traded 
good and one non-traded good. The equilibrium point on the 
diagram is depicted as the point of tangency between the 
transformation curve (supply sidel and the indifference curve 
(demand sidel, where the slope of the tangent represents the 
relative price of the traded and the non-traded goods (initial 
equilibr ium point A in fig 6.1al. 
In dealing with the adjustment process32 and the change in the 
relative price, the model considers among other possibilities, 
the use of the exchange rate as a stabilization instrument. For 
example when the return to equilibrium calls for a decrease in 
the relative price of the non-traded good, the process may take 
32 The adjustment process in the Salter and other theoretic-
trade models involves what is known as the income and 
substitution effects or in the Dutch disease literature as the 
spending and resource-movement effects . 
Fig 6.1b gives the representation of the departure from 
equilibrium after the adverse shock. There is a gap between the 
transformation curve and the indifference curve, reflecting the 
fact that the terms of trade decrease will affect more the 
producer's income than the consumer's demand. The move back to 
equilibrium will in general involve both a cut in expenditure and 
a modification of the relative prices. 
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place by means of an internal deflation or alternatively a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate which causes a rise in 
the traded good price. 
The model can also handle the case of an exogenous change in the 
terms of trade. This is typically done by measuring the traded 
goods in function of the importable (or exportable) . Then a shock 
in the terms of trade leads to a shift of the transformation 
curve and the indifference curves, usually resulting in the same 
implications in terms of policy instruments required for a return 
back to equilibrium. Namely the combination of expenditure cut 
and price switching will enable the restoration of the internal 
and the external balance after, say a terms of trade decrease. 
Furthermore the model gives separately the analysis of the 
adjustment process in the short run in addition to the results 
obtained in the first place for the long run case. It touches on 
the welfare implications of exogenous shocks. 
Most of the trade-theoretic models have developed upon the basic 
model as established by Salter. Three of them are reviewed below. 
b. Corden & Neary (1982) : "Booming sector and de -
industrialisation in a small open economy". 
This paper provides a description of the phenomenon known as 
"Dutch Disease" whereby the tradeable sector is constituted of 
two sub-sectors, one booming for one reason or another and the 
second sub-sector declining as a consequence. One may think of 
the two sub-sectors as being the energy industry and the 
manufacture industry with the boom occurring in the energy 
industry. 
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The framework combines two diagrams describing the effect of the 
boom in the labour market and the product market respectively to 
explain the full extent of the induced de-industrialization. One 
of the diagrams is identical to the representation adopted by the 
Salter model. It derives the increase in the price the non-traded 
good. The other diagram uses the assumption of different factor 
intensities between sectors to demonstrate the decline in labour 
and level of activity in the manufacture sector. Indeed, the boom 
in the energy industry translates into an increase in the wage 
for the economy as a whole and this affects negatively the 
manufacture more than any other sector. We note that the non-
traded sector may draw a positive effect (or a less negative one 
than for the manufacture sector) from the boom because its price 
increases in contrast with the manufacture price which is 
determined from the outside, by the world market conditions. 
It is worth noting that the adjustment process leading to an 
unambiguous phenomenon of de-industrialisation happens in a 
context ~n which only labour is mobile between sectors while 
capital is sector-specific (short run). If one relaxes this 
assumption and allows capital mobility between two or more 
sectors (long run), then whether de -industrialisation occurs or 
not becomes an empirical question. 
c. Neary & Wijnbergen (1986): "Natural resources and the macro-
economy: a theoretical framework". 
This paper attempts to outline the main features of the 
literature on the Dutch disease. It concerns the case of a 
resource discovery. But the framework is suitable to deal with 
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other situations of a boom in a specific sector or cases such as 
the terms of trade fluctuations. Later, we will consider more 
specifically the case of commodity price boom. 
The deindustrialization and the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate which accompany a resource discovery constitute the 
focus of the paper. As in the previous models, the set-up 
represents a three-sector economy: the booming sector, the 
manufacturing sector and the non-traded good sector. The goods 
of the booming sector and the manufacturing sector are the 
tradeable goods. The strains on the manufacturing sector which 
cause the deindustrialization come from the increase in the wage 
on the labour market as a result of the boom. 
(i) The model 
To demonstrate this, the model considers two equations tracing 
the equilibrium on the non-traded good market and the labour 
market respectively: 
(1 ) 
en(q/w)+em(w)+eb(w,b) = Lo (2) 
with the following notations: 
q: the price of the non-traded good relative to the tradeable 
good (chosen as a numeraire). This is the inverse of the 
real exchange rate 
w: the wage rate relative to the tradeable good 
Xn: the supply of the non-traded sector which depends only on 
its price relative to the wage rate. 
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c n: the demand for the non-traded good as a function of the 
non-traded good price and total income. 
yo: the full-employment output 
Lo: the total labour force 
en' ern and e b : the demands for labor by the three sectors 
In equation (1), the total output Yo would translate the impact 
of the boom by an exogenous increase. The demand for the non-
traded good would rise in consequence. The price of the non-
traded good will need to rise to bring the market back to 
equilibrium. 
In equation (2), the parameter b in the labour demand of the 
booming sector represents the effect of the boom. When it occurs, 
the boom will increase the labor demand of the sector which most 
directly benefits from it. As the total labour force is given, 
this will bid up the wage rate until equilibrium is restored on 
the market. 
Figure 6.2 gives in a (q,w) space the relative positions of the 
curve NN which represents the equilibrium on the non-traded good 
market and the curve LL which represents the equilibrium on the 
labour market. 
Both lines are upward sloping as can be seen by considering the 
change required for the wage on the equilibrium line, following 
an increase ln the price of the non-traded good. On the good 
market, the rise in q will cause a decrease in demand for, and 
an increase ln the supply of, the non-traded good. The resulting 
excess supply corresponds to an excess demand on the labour 
market, which causes the wage rate to rise. 
Also the slope of NN is higher than one since an increase in the 
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wa.ge rate and the price of the non-traded good l.n the same 
proportion does not affect the price of the non-traded relative 
to the wage rate and consequently does not affect the supply 
function. But the demand for the non-traded good will decrease 
and cause an excess supply. 
We can give a further illustration of this. Indeed, 
differentiating both sides of equation (1) will provide the same 
result. 
( 3 ) 
where xn' denotes the differentia l of ~1 and acn/aq the partial 
differential of Cn with respect to q. 
It follows from (3) that: 
dw 
Qq -
~ aCn 
w -W -crq 
q 2n 
w 
(4 ) 
Starting from an initial p o int on the 4 50 line whe r e q/w = 1, 
the small combined incre ase dq a n d dw n ecessary t o rema in on the 
NN line implies that dw/dq > 1 b ecau se x n' > 0 and a cn /aq < O. 
The same procedure can b e a p p lied to the l i n e LL. 
Differentiating equation (2 ) g ives : 
or equivalently: 
which leads to: 
271 
e~ 
dw 
aq 
w ( 7 ) 
The signs of the differentials are straightforward: 
This implies that dw/dq > 0: upwards slope of the LL line. In 
addition, starting from a point on the 45° line we have q/w = 1 
and the combined change dw and dq necessary to stay on the line 
of the labour market equilibrium are such that dw/dq < 1: the 
slope of the LL line is less than one. 
(ii) Effect of the boom 
Let us now consider the adjustment from the initial equilibrium 
to the new equilibrium following the boom. Representing the shock 
in the booming sector by db (db > 0), we analyze the overall 
effect on the wage rate after differentiating both equations, 
which gives: 
Equation (9) gives: 
substituting (10) into (8), it follows: 
dq - (~dW+~dY) 1 (10) 
Wo Y ){In dCn 
~ 
I 
enqo ( 1 - _..,....-W--:o:--_) dw _ 
--;r ~ _ dCn 
Wo dq 
Wo - (J(j 
(11) 
The terms on the right hand side of (11) as well as the 
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coefficient of dw are positive on the basis of the signs we can 
easily assign to the differentials. 
It appears therefore that the boom will result in a rise in the 
wage rate as measured by equation (11). This can be given the 
graphical illustration as in the paper under review. Figure 6.3 
represents the adjustment process implied by the boom shock. 
The boom has the effect of shifting the LL curve upwards and the 
NN curve rightwards. The equilibrium point moves from A to B, 
reflecting an increase in the wage rate and the price of the non-
traded good. 
The increase in the wage rate affects adversely the 
manufacturing sector and causes its shrinkage sin ce the price of 
tradeables is fixed by assumption)) . 
In parallel, the increase in the price of the n on-traded good 
represents the real appreciation of the exch ange rate which leads 
to the reallocation of resources between the sectors. But the 
adjustment process triggered by the boom is more completely 
described through the spending (or income) effect and the 
)) W f· . e assume a ~xed rate regime to s impl~fy. 
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resource-movement (or substitution) effect as described in 
chapter 4, the combination of which gives in particular the move 
from A to B in fig 5.3. 
Let us note that Corden (1984) considers particular 
circumstances under which the de-industralisation problem might 
be overcome and that is, the presence of an immigration flow. 
More specifically one may mention that in the area of UMOA in the 
FZ, an important labour movement had been observed from 
neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso. This supply of extra 
labor helps to satisfy the demand coming from the booming sector 
(coffee and cocoa plantations in Cote d'Ivoire) and to lessen the 
bidding up of prices. 
The paper by Neary and Wijnbergen (1986) more interestingly for 
our purpose here introduces the monetary dimension. This 
specification which we consider later provides a framework which 
seems to give, with an adequate application, an account of the 
FZ economic situation during the two last decades, with 
particular attention to the recession these economies have been 
facing since 1987. 
d. Lal (1989): " A simple framework for analyzing various real 
aspects of stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies". 
The framework is based on a trade- theoretic model with two 
goods--tradable and non-tradable-- and three factors although 
these are reduced to labour and capi tal by assuming away the 
intermediate inputs. Again, the traded good is defined as a 
composite of the exportable and importable goods. 
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The analysis of the real economy involves a set of three 
diagrams: the first one describes the product market while the 
two others relate to the factor market in the short run and long 
run respectively . The assumptions on factor allocation assign the 
export sector as the most labour-intensive and the importable 
sector as the most capital-intensive one, and classify the non-
traded sector at the intermediate position. 
In addition to the description of the real economy, the model 
has a second component in the form of a simple representation of 
the domestic banking system. With this set-up comes the 
consideration of the main policy features implied by the 
stabilization and structural adjustment packages. They include 
the reduction or removal of product market distortions such as 
a tariff dis-absorption via a reduction of the Government 
deficit or bank lending, and adjustment of a "repressed" 
financial market such as the ending of an interest rate ceiling. 
A removal or reduction of a tariff 1S shown to lead in the long 
run to a real depreciation if the most labour-intensive sector 
is the export sector and to a real appreciation if it is the 
non-traded sector instead, and an increase of real wages. This 
represents the main result of the paper as the effect of a change 
in the tariff is traditionally presented in the literature as an 
empirical question. A reallocation of resources will occur from 
the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector , following the 
fall in the market price in the former. It will result in a 
change in the factor prices, namely at the expense of capital 
which the importables are most intensive in, and in favour of 
labour which the other sectors are more intensive in. The shift 
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of capital implied in the process will happen more easily if the 
distortions in the financial market are corrected so that to meet 
the need for enough loanable funds and new investment. 
As we can see, the argument has gone much along the lines of the 
Stolper-Samuelson-Rybczinski result ~n the context of the 
theoretic-trade model. 
e. Comparison with the BG model: Blundell-Wignall & Gregory 
(1990) "Exchange rate policy in advanced commodity-exporting 
countries: Australia and New-Zealand" 
As seen in chapter 4 the BG model takes the form of a set of 
equations defining the equilibrium in the money market and the 
good market and specifying the determination of the price level 
dynamics. The economy produces two types of goods: the tradable 
as a composite of the exportable and importable and the non-
tradable. There is no domestic production of the importable good 
which is only available through imports. 
There are a number of similarities between the BG model and the 
models reviewed above. They all share the basic characteristics 
of the theoretic-trade model. In particular, the set of equations 
of the BG model corresponds to the diagram describing the product 
market in the other models. 
However there seems to be a difference about the particular 
variables to focus on. Apart from the Salter model, the above 
models pay more attention to the factor market and aim at 
explaining what happens to the real wage in face of shocks. The 
terms of trade are assumed to remain constant. On this aspect, 
the paper by Salter goes further and in its part III, it 
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considers the effects of an exogenous change 1n the terms of 
trade. The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate viewed as 
a possible alternative to a pure deflation receives some 
attention, that is when the economy faces adverse terms of trade 
shocks and that the exchange rate is flexible. 
But none of these papers directly addresses the issue on the 
choice of an exchange rate regime like the BG model which raises 
the case in consideration of two types of shocks, namely monetary 
and commodity price disturbances. However, Neary and Wijnbergen 
(1986) as already mentioned deal with the money market 
equilibrium and their model gives a presentation of the 
adjustment process under a flexible exchange rate and under a 
fixed rate regime, following a boom as the unique shock, and an 
illustration of the effect on the real exchange rate . 
6.2.Theoretical account of the CFA overvaluation 
a. The .l.ssue 
Although the devaluation of the CFA has occurred only very 
recently, the controversy over whether it was overvalued can be 
traced back to at least ten years ago. In particular France had 
devalued its currency several times the mid-1980's and naturally 
more observers came to ask thems e lves what about the CFA curreny 
itself. Sometimes, this question was raised in the context of the 
wider issue relating to the appropriateness of the exchange 
regime as it existed in the FZ. Some of the opinions which did 
not make the necessary distinction rendered the problem more 
complex. After all, the two aspects of the question (fixity of 
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the exchange rate and maintaining the FZ) do not bear the same 
political weight. The reason why the devaluation took so long to 
occur may be attributed in part to this sort of confusion. It 
holds true that there exists a possible line of argument for not 
drawing such a distinction. A devaluation raises expectations. 
One may therefore think that a devaluation of the CFA would lead 
the agents to speculate about the next devaluation and the 
process would thread to the question of the monetary system 
itself. For the proponents of the FZ, a devaluation certainly 
represents a risk. 
On the other hand, maintaining the status-quo has its costs 
which became more and more apparent and the questions which arose 
were more difficult to put aside. The fact is that for two 
decades, the FZ confronted an international economic environment 
which required some readaptation and most countries around the 
world actually tried to adapt to it. The end of the fixed 
parities of the Bretton Woods in 1973 was a major event on the 
monetary front. In turn, it gave the way to very significant 
fluctuations between the key currencies. Most of the developing 
countries tried to cope with improved exchange rate systems 
(Aghevli & Montiel 1991). In addition to these movements between 
currencies , another dimension of the adverse external shocks came 
in with the terms of trade fluctuations. In this respect, the 
collapse of the commodity price on the world markets, specially 
from 1985 on appeared to represent a heavy burden which quickly 
accumulated to reach an unsustainable level. 
Among the different reasons for the long delay in implementing 
the devaluation, we have chosen to develop the technical point 
278 
of view that the few studies such as Bhatia (1985) and Boughton 
(1991) did not find the need to devalue because of their 
instrument of measure. In the present case, the use of the actual 
real exchange rate as these studies did, is not enough to measure 
the misalignment (as indicated earlier on, these calculations use 
the ratios of domestic and foreign CPI's). The actual rate needs 
to be combined with the equilibrium real exchange rate to capture 
the problem the FZ was still facing at the end of 1993, before 
the devaluation ~n January 1994. 
The interpretation of the real exchange rate has not always been 
easy. The case of Japan provides an example where you can have 
a real appreciation concomitant with trade surplus. The other 
case relates to Italy and Spain as discussed by Giovannini 
(1992), using the definition of the ratio between the tradable 
and non-tradable prices34 • Before we come to the model, let us 
add a point of illustration about the adverse shocks which 
affected the FZ countries and an indication of the disequilibrium 
which appeared during the period. 
In a normal case, where the required adjustments occur without 
great lag, the actual real exchange rate presents itself as a 
good proxy for the measure of the competitiveness. This applies 
to developed and developing countries alike. However, the case 
of the FZ seems to be different in two respects at least. First, 
the fixed rate without any change in the parity for decades 
constitutes a unique case in itself. In face of the external 
34 In what follows, the real exchange rate, unless otherwise 
indicated, will be defined in the same way, that is, as the price 
of tradable goods preferably the import goods, relative to the 
price of the non-traded good. 
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shocks, a small open economy has usually two instruments it can 
combine for the purpose of stabilization: the nominal exchange 
rate appreciation or depreciation, specially if it is free to 
float, on the one hand and the internal deflation on the other 
hand. 
The FZ countries tried to do with the second instrument only. 
But the internal deflation did not go far enough to correct the 
macroeconomic imbalances specially the current account deficits, 
or it was too painful to be fully operated given the scale of the 
shocks and their cumulative effect for a long time. None of these 
countries escaped an unprecedented wave of social unrest from the 
mid-1980's. The reduction in real income and the welfare loss as 
a result of the collapse in the commodity price as illustrated 
in chapter 1 have undoubtedly played an important role in the new 
si tuation. However beyond that direct effect, deep dis-equilibria 
seem to have set in. The FZ as a pool of exchange reserves and 
the guaranty of the CFA convertibili ty by France present a number 
of advantages for the member countries. But this appears more 
significantly only when the external shocks which affect these 
countries do not affect them at the same time and in the same 
direction for too long. What happened and intensified the 
problems of the FZ was instead the long-lasting low level of 
commodity prices. If we take the group of commodities which 
provide most of the exports in the FZ (cocoa, coffee, cotton, 
groundnut oil, phosphate and so on), their export price decreased 
significantly between 1980 and 1990, more than 50% for three of 
them, between 18% and 50% for four other commodities. The terms 
of trade give a more complete picture of these external shocks 
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(fig 6.4): we can observe large variations and, a downward trend 
especially from 1978 on. The terms of trade index fell as low as 
61.4 in 1993 compared with 118.7 in 1978. We recall that other 
shocks affected also the FZ countries as indicated in chapter 1 
but the terms of trade fluctuations certainly represent the most 
significant category. The consequences were dire because for most 
of the FZ countries, the commodities concerned represent their 
main sector of production and the bulk of their exports. 
Belonging to the FZ has presented the member countries with no 
alternative but to deflate (or it seemed so) and at the same time 
it enabled most of them to delay the necessary adjustment. These 
circumstances have favoured the mounting balance of payment 
deficits. 
Our argument is that in this kind of disequilibrium, the actual 
real exchange rate does not reflect well enough the level of 
competitiveness required by the economy. In other words, it is 
not a surprise that most of the studies or discussions based on 
this indicator (the actual real exchange rate) proved at best 
inconclusive about the overvaluation of the CFA currency. 
At the same time, any observer of the FZ economies for a decade 
or so could not do without noting the huge Government deficits 
and balance of payments deficits, in particular for the largest 
economies of the Zone and for the Zone as a whole. Mussa (1986) 
has identified two main ways in which economic policies affect 
the real exchange rate: exogenous shifts in the form for example 
of change in the composition of the excess demand between the 
traded and non-traded goods on the one hand and on the other the 
absorption gap. The latter seems to have been a very 
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characteristic feature of the FZ, specifically through the 
overspending of Government budget. With the fall in the terms of 
trade, also the external disequilibria became more and more acute 
in the area , and to some extent one needs only to look at these 
disequilibria (fig 6.5) to illustrate that there was a problem 
with the unchanged CFA parity. The current account deficit35 in 
percent of GDP increased from 4.2% in 1972 to an average of 14.5% 
during the following five years. It increased further to reach 
29.2% on average in 1978-83. The situation significantly improved 
in 1984 and 1985 with the temporarily higher price of coffee, but 
it worsened again from 1986 on. The overall balance mirrored the 
same pattern, but more significantly from 1986. 
Also data available on the period 1985-89 for five countries 
indicate a severe decrease in living standards; except for one 
country, aggregate demand decreased in nominal terms very 
significantly (cf chapter 1). It remains what might be qualified 
as elements of "bad" policies (fig 6.a to 6.d in appendix 2) to 
constitute part of the explanation for the desequilibria: for 
example prices paid to cocoa growers were increasing or stayed 
high while market prices were decreasing rapidly. For the case 
of Cote d'Ivoire which is a large of producer of cocoa, it 
reduced the producer prices no sooner than 1990, and by that time 
the world prices were half the ir level in 1985 when a steady 
decrease started. Still the reduction in the producer price when 
it ocurred and although important (50 %) proved insufficient to 
tackle the disequilibria. These dis - equilibria had become 
35 These figures follow the definition in IFS which does not 
incorporate the exceptional financing. The latter became more and 
more substantial. 
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unsustainable and eventually the devaluation occurred because 
unavoidable. With the benefit of hindsight, it appears as a 
desperate reaction to a desperate situation. Whatever the 
aftermath of this event, one has the feeling that a chance has 
been missed to conduct an appropriate monetary policy to minimize 
the difficulties which arose with the sharp decline in the terms 
of trade, the adverse effect of the external shocks in general, 
and that the Zone has lost in the process a great deal of the 
gains it claimed to have obtained during the previous more stable 
period. 
Overvaluation involves a loss in efficiency in the way it shifts 
resources to import-substitution sectors from where the economy 
has international comparative advantage, and that is the export 
sectors. These losses might be substantial. Renelt (1991) and 
Ghura et al (1993) note that the slow growth in Africa and Latin 
America in contrast to the high and steady growth in Asia can be 
attributed to a large extent to the "chronic misalignment of the 
real exchange rate" in the former group and to more appropriate 
economic policies in the latter. 
b. The model 
The set-up aims at the characterization of the economic 
situation of the FZ economies in the face of external shocks. We 
consider a two-sector economy which has, like in the traditional 
dependent economy model, a non-traded good and a traded good. The 
latter is a composite of the export good which is a commodity, 
and the importable good. The prlces of the non-traded good and 
of the exportable good are defined relative to the price of the 
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importable. In the same way, the real exchange rate will be 
defined as the relative price of the import good compared with 
the price of the non-traded good. Consequently, considering that 
the foreign price of the import good is given, the real exchange 
rate will equal the ratio of the nominal exchange rate with 
respect to the price of the non-traded good. 
Until further notice, we assume that the monetary authorities 
have adopted a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The model itself is a modified version of the model used by 
Neary & Wijnbergen (1986) and which introduces the monetary 
aspects in the Dutch disease analysis. 
The modifications concern: 
- the nature of the boom which takes the form of a terms of 
trade increase. Our specification considers also the reverse case 
of a bust in the terms of trade. 
- the output level is made endogenous. It will depend on the 
terms of trade index and on the level of competitiveness . 
The following four equations give the representation: 
M/P = ky 
y = y (Px", S/Pn) 
p = P (Pn' S) 
Yn(Pn/S,px") = ~(Pn/S,y,M/P) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15 ) 
The notations are very similar to those of chapter 4 with: 
M: money supply 
S: nominal exchange rate 
P: domestic price index 
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Pn: nominal price of the non-traded good 
y: aggregate output 
yn: supply of the non-traded sector 
~: demand for the non-traded good 
Px*: commodity price in foreign currency or terms of trade 
The parameter k is positive and denotes the velocity of money. 
The money supply will be exogenous under a flexible exchange rate 
regime so that the system of 4 equations will determine 
simul taneously the unknown variables y, Yn' Pn and S. This 
representation is simplified to leave out the explicit mention 
that the tradable sector consists of two goods: the commodity 
good and the other tradable good. We assume in this context that 
the domestic supply of the tradable sector is limited to the 
production of the commodity good and the economy will resort to 
imports for the consumption needs for the other tradable good. 
All the prices will be expressed relative to the price of imports 
in domestic currency36. Under a fixed rate regime, S becomes 
exogenous and M endogenous. 
The representation is quite standard. Equation (12) represents 
the money market equilibrium and equation (15) the equilibrium 
on the non-traded good market. Equations (13) and (14) define the 
variables y and P and their substitution into (12) and (15) 
define a space (Pn' S) which will serve for our graphic 
representation. Equation (13) represents the demand curve. 
We will give a representation of the economy in a (S,Pn) space. 
36 In this context, one may have implicitly: PmY = PnYn + PxYx 
where Yx and Px denote the supply and the price in domestic 
currency of the commodity while Pm represents the price of 
imports in domestic currency. 
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To prepare the construction of the diagram, we start by 
determining the slopes of the curves representing the equilibrium 
on each market. We look at the small changes in Pn and S 
compatible with remaining on the money market equilibrium. 
Differentiating (12) gives: 
_M/p2 . dP = kdy (16) 
or equivalently: 
_ M ( a P dp + a P dS) _ kay ( dS _ S d) ( 1 7 ) 
pi dpn n dS dc Pn "2" P n 
where the notation c=S/Pn 1S used for the competitiveness 
indicator. Equation (17) can be rewritten as follows: 
The ratio between the coefficient of dS and dPn in (18) defines 
the slope of what will be the money market equilibrium curve. One 
can easily see that the coefficient of dS has a positive sign. 
By contrast, the coefficient of dPn does not have a definite 
sign: it might be positive or n egative , which means that the 
curve corresponding to the money market equilibrium might be 
upward sloping or downward sloping. The latter case is more 
likely the more there is monetary illusion so that the domestic 
price index is mainly determined by the price of the non-traded 
good and also the less sensitive output is with respect to the 
level of competitiveness. 
One can see from equations (12) and (13) that an increase in the 
exchange rate would increase the level of output and consequently 
the level of demand for real balances. It would also increase the 
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price index and reduce the stock of money ln real terms. An 
excess demand for money would result. This clear-cut effect of 
a rise in the traded good price is in contrast with the case of 
a change in the price of the non-traded good, which explains the 
fact that the sign of the coefficient of dPn is not determinate. 
Indeed an increase in Pn would reduce the level of output and 
demand for real balances. It would also increase the price index 
and result in a reduction in the stock of the real balances. 
Whether there will be an excess demand or an excess supply of 
real balances will depend on which of these two effects will 
predominate. 
We proceed similarly with the equilibrium equation on the market 
of the non-traded good. Differentiating equation (15) gives: 
d Y n ( dS _ S d ) _ d dn ( dS _ S dp ) + d dn d Y ( dS _ S dp ) _ M d dn dP ( 19 ) 
de Pn ~ P n de P" ~ n dYdc Pn ~ n -pidIi1 
where dYn/dC < 0 and d~/dC > 0, and the notation m represents 
the real balances M/P. 
Since dP = dP/dPn.dPn + dP/dS.dS, we can rewrite (19) as 
follows: 
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The coefficient of dPn in equation (20) is determinate and is 
positive while the sign of the other coefficient might be 
positive or negative. The former case is more likely in the 
context of monetary illusion so that the term dP/dS would be 
negligible. The effect of an initial increase in the exchange 
rate or the price of the non-traded good on the equilibrium of 
the non-traded good can be seen along similar lines as for the 
money market. One obtains the same results but the roles of Pn 
and S are reversed. 
The different possible configurations depending on the signs of 
the coefficients in equations (18) and (20) are represented in 
diagrams 6.6 to 6.9. Let us note that the case treated in Neary 
& Wijnbergen (1986) corresponds to diagram 6 . 8. We can also note 
that the MM curves always have a slope higher than one while the 
NN curves have a slope lower than one. This can be seen by 
looking at the coefficients of dPn and dS in equations (18) and 
(20) respectively. 
What sense to give to these different configurations? They might 
not be equally likely. The price and income sensitivity of the 
demand and supply functions on the goods market as well as the 
income elasticity on the money market will be a determinant 
factor. Also the weights given to the non-traded good price and 
the traded good price respectively in the composition of the 
domestic price index (equation 14) I and the elasticities of the 
aggregate output (equation 13) should be taken into account. 
We have indicated the effects of an increase in the commodity 
P 
o M 
Fig 6.6 
pol 
~, : - -N' . . , 
, 
M' 
M 
Fig 6.7 
P M 
M' 
N', ' . 
N 
Fig 6.8 
pI N' 
0 
M~ , 
M 
Fig 6.9 
S 
M' 
M 
-
~" 
M 
N 
S decreases 
increases 
S decreases (or increases) 
N' 
N P increases (or decreases) 0 
S 
N' 
N' 
S decreases 
P Increases (or decreases) 
0 
M 
. M' 
S 
S decreases (or Increases) 
P increases 
0 
.. tJ' 
S 
ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE COMMODITY PRICE BOOM 
: 87a 
:price in 
following 
288 
the world markets: the shifts of the MM and NN curves 
the occurrence of a boom are indicated for each 
diagram. The equilibrium moves from the initial point A to the 
new equilibrium B. 
In diagrams 6.8 and 6.9, the shift of the equilibrium indicates 
an increase in the prlce of the non-traded good as a result of 
the increase in the commodity price while in diagrams 6.7 and 6.8 
an increase in Pn might occur but also the possibility is open 
for its decrease. The effect on the price of the non-traded good 
appears to involve two elements: the direct effect and the 
indirect effect. The former corresponds clearly to an increase 
in the price Pn of the non-traded good because the rise in p; 
provokes an excess demand on the non-traded good market in the 
first place, which translates into a rise in Pn. Indirect effects 
will take place but the presumption is that the direct effect 
predominate. For example, the nominal exchange rate will 
appreciate with the boom to eliminate the excess demand and 
restore equilibrium on the money market. Such a decrease in S 
which is part of the adjustment process would tend to reduce the 
excess demand on the market of the non-traded good. Consequently, 
this would lessen the inflation pressure and might eventually 
result in the decrease of Pn under some particular conditions, 
specifically in the context of a high income elasticity of the 
money demand. 
Figure 6.10 gives an illustration of this particular case. It 
appears that the decrease in Pn occurs with a relatively large 
shift of the MM locus reflecting an important liquidity effect 
(which is associated with a high income elasticity of the demand 
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for money) combined with a relatively small shift in the NN 
curve. The move of the NN locus in fig 6.10 would correspond to 
a situation of an economy where the supply of the non-traded 
sector is not very sensitive to the change in the price of the 
commodity sector so that the excess demand for the non-traded 
good following a boom in the export sector would prove little 
significant. 
Another factor which can explain the rather small size of the 
excess demand relates to the response of the demand for the non-
traded good itself. Equation (15) shows this demand as a function 
of income. But the effect of the commodity price on income has 
two aspects: the direct effect does increase income. This is the 
spending effect of the boom since the terms of trade improve and 
consequently the real income rises. However, the indirect effect 
works in the reverse sense and will tend to dampen this increase 
in real income because the appreciation of the currency as a 
result of the boom will reduce the degree of competitiveness and 
the level of income. If the indirect effect proves relatively 
important, then the demand for the non-traded good would not 
increase very much when the boom occurs. 
We see that fig 6.10 describes the case of an economy where the 
boom provokes a large liquidity effect. Under the assumption that 
the money supply is given, this liquidity effect will put a 
strong downward pressure on the domestic price for the real 
balances to increase and restore the equilibrium on the money 
market. A significant decrease in the nominal exchange rate will 
follow as can be seen in diagram 6.10. But this may not be 
sufficient. The liquidity effect may spillover and affect also 
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the price of the non-traded good, leading ultimately to its 
decrease. Let us note that the decrease in Pn may occur ~n the 
cases where the NN curve is upward sloping provided the shift 
of MM and NN are sufficiently large and small respectively. Fig 
6.10 derives mostly from fig 6.6 but a similar extension might 
be obtained from fig 6.7 as well. 
With regards the nominal exchange rate, diagrams 6.6 and 6.8 
show it decreasing while diagrams 6.7 and 6.9 suggest that the 
nominal exchange rate might decrease or increase, even though the 
case of a decrease seems more likely. 
The exceptional situation of an increase in the nominal exchange 
rate is illustrated in fig 6.11. In contrast to fig 6.10, the 
present case occurs with the combination of a large shift in the 
NN locus and a small shift in the MM locus, that is a situation 
where the boom causes a large excess demand on the market of the 
non-traded good while the liquidity effect is relatively small, 
leading to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. In fact, 
the possibility of this case occurring is open as long as the MM 
curve is upward sloping and provided the shift in NN and MM are 
large and small enough respectively as described above. Fig 6.11 
corresponds to an extension of fig 6.7 but a similar illustration 
can be derived as well from fig 6.9 where the MM curve is upward 
sloping but the NN curve is downward sloping in contrast to 
fig 6.7. 
We recall from equation (18) that the condition of an upward 
sloping MM locus goes along the following terms: 
- a non-existence of monetary illusion and an important tradeable 
sector so that the domestic price index represents to a large 
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extent a reflection of the foreign price index. 
c. Effect of a boom: a further illustration 
We are going to indicate some calculations to measure the 
overall effect of a boom on the price of the non-traded good and 
on the nominal exchange rate. 
We first give the extensions of equations (18) and (20) with the 
incorporation of the change in the commodity price which occurs 
in the first place and which leads to the shift of the 
equilibrium to a new position. The corresponding changes in Pn 
and S are determined below. 
The extension of equation (18) and (20) can be written as 
follows: 
(21 ) 
where the following notations have been introduced: 
c -
D- ( 0 d n _ 0 Yn) 1 + 0 d n 0 Y 1 _ M 0 dn 0 P de de Pn dy de Pn p2 dIil dS 
The coefficients Band C are definitely positive while the 
coefficients A and D might be positive or negative as already 
mentioned. In addition, the following relationships should hold 
true at least near the 45° degree line: 
A < B 
D < C 
After substitution from equations (21) and (22), we can derive 
the expressions of dS and dPn in function of the boom indicator 
It appears in equation (23) that if the coefficient A is 
negative, that is, if the MM curve is downward sloping as in 
fig 6.6 and 6.8, then the nominal exchange rate will decrease (dS 
< 0) following a boom. This confirms elements of the discussion 
above. If conversely A is positive , then the sign of dS will 
depend on the value of the term k/A.oylopx* compared with the 
other terms between brackets of equation (23). If the term in 
question is not large enough, then we have dS > 0, and this 
corresponds to the illustration of diagram 6.11. Otherwise we 
have the case of diagrams 6.7 and 6.9 where a decrease in S is 
observed . 
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with regards the price of the non-traded good, we can rewrite 
equation (24) as follows: 
or equivalently: 
B (d d n d Y _ d Yn ) d • _ Dk a Yd. 
dPn - BC- AD dY dP; dP; Px BC- AD dP; Px (26) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (26) is 
definitely positive. The sign of the second term and by extension 
the sign of dPn will depend on the sign of D. If D is negative, 
then we obtain: 
This means wherever the NN locus is downward sloping (D < OJ, 
equation (26) ensures that the boom will result in an increase 
in the price of the non-traded good. This case is portrayed in 
diagrams 6.8 and 6.9. 
Conversely, if D is positive instead, the possibility of a 
negative sign of dPn following the boom cannot be excluded. This 
corresponds to what has been said about the diagrams 6.6 and 6.7. 
d. A real appreciation 
The analysis of the previous subsection has dealt with the 
change in Pn or S taken separately. The analysis has outlined the 
circumstances under which one might observe an increase or 
decrease ln these two variables. A question remains to be 
answered however, and that is what happens to the real exchange 
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rate (RER). The different configurations reviewed above all 
suggest that a real appreciation will result from the boom in the 
commodity sector. One has an indication of that by comparing the 
relative positions of the ray through the origin to the initial 
equilibrium which represents the initial value of the real 
exchange rate on the one hand and the second ray through the 
origin to the new equilibrium point which represents the new real 
exchange rate on the other hand. 
To determine the change in the real exchange rate, we start by 
rewriting equation (23) as follows: 
dS _ A (ddn dy _ dY n ) d • _ Ck dY d . 
BC- AD dY dP; dP; Px BC- AD dP; 'Px (27 ) 
We define the real exchange rate like in the dependent economy 
model, as the ratio between the price of the tradable and the 
price of the domestic non-traded good. This emphasizes the 
substitution mechanism between the tradable and the non-tradable 
sectors and its effect on the behaviour of the current account. 
subtracting equation (26) from equation (27), one obtains: 
BS- APn (dd)) dY • _ dYn ) d . _ CPn- DS k dY d • 
--------,.2 -:r:-:- --:r-P x -- 'Px -- P x (BC- AD)Pn oy 0 dP; (BC-AD}p~ dP; 
Since A-B > 0 and C-D > 0 as indicated above, equation (28) 
shows that the change in the real exchange rate is a decrease or 
in other words a real appreciation. This is in accordance with 
the result obtained by the BG model (chap 4) that an increase in 
the terms of trade causes a real appreciation of the exchange 
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rate. 
The result applies to the different configurations of fig 6.6 
to 6.11, despite their diversity. Conversely, a decrease in the 
commodity price will lead to a real depreciation. We discussed 
particular circumstances under which a rise in the nominal 
exchange rate or a decrease in the price of the non-traded good 
might occur. Therefore it is clear that the real appreciation for 
example should not be equated to a nominal appreciation and/or 
an increase in Pn' even though these cases are more likely than 
the others. What equation (28) ensures is that on the occasion 
of a boom, an increase if any in S will be more than matched by 
an increase in Pn and conversely a decrease in Pn will be more 
than matched by a decrease in S so that eventually we will obtain 
a real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
e. Comparison between exchange rate regimes 
The economic difficulties, notably the unprecedented financial 
dis-equilibria the FZ economies faced during the last decade 
might be avoided if the peg to the French Franc (FF) had not 
remained unchanged despite repeated external shocks. As far as 
the external shocks are concerned in contrast to the monetary 
shocks, a flexible exchange rate presents some advantages vis a 
vis a fixed rate regime. 
This implies that in the case of the FZ, at least a change in 
the parity of the CFA parity should have happened a long time 
ago. The reasons why it happened so late are still being 
discussed and may still concern some observers for a time to 
come. 
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In the present sub-section, we illustrate the advantages of a 
flexible exchange rate for a small economy subject to terms of 
trade shocks and we draw a distinction between the actual real 
exchange rate and the equilibrium real exchange rate. The 
difference between the two rates seems to have been substantial 
for the FZ economies. Our belief is that this distinction was 
necessary in order to grasp the extent of the overvaluation of 
the CFA. We start by a look at the inflation concern and the 
availability of adjustment tools. 
(i) The inflation pressure 
We use a configuration similar to fig 6.8 for further discussion 
of the adjustment process. Another configuration might be chosen. 
But the fact that fig 6.8 is the most likely justifies our 
choice. Also, as long as the real exchange rate is concerned, the 
selection of one particular configuration does not matter. 
Indeed, the real exchange rate changes in the same direction in 
each case, following the occurrence of a n external s hock. We 
consider therefore diagram 6.12 which is derived from fig 6.8. 
The boom shifts the line MM of the money market equilibrium to 
M'M' and the line NN of the non-traded good market equilibrium 
to N'N', under the assumption of a freely flexible exchange rate. 
The new equilibrium is therefore located at B. At the new 
position, the price of the non-traded good has increased from PnO 
to Pnb while the nominal exchange rate has decreased from So to 
Sb . The real exchange rate which was represented by the ray OA 
now equals the value corresponding to the ray OB. 
We can see on fig 6.12 that the increase in Pn becomes much more 
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important under a fixed rate regime37 • The fixed rate regime 
means that the money supply becomes endogenous and the boom will 
shift the MM locus to a new position above the point A. The 
equilibrium under the flexible regime moves from A to C in the 
short run. But in the long run, the real exchange rate under the 
fixed rate regime should equal its value under the flexible rate. 
This is to say that the monetary variables do not enter the 
determination of the long run real exchange rate (Edwards 1989a, 
Neary et al 1986). The equilibrium will move from C to D on the 
ray OB so that the real exchange rate does not depend on the 
exchange regime adopted but only on the real shocks of the terms 
of trade. Consequently, the price of the non-traded good 
increases from PnO to Pnd ' The experience of Australia which is 
reported in BG (1990) shows a clear link between inflation and 
commodity booms, and further when the monetary policy shifted 
from a fixed rate regime to a flexible regime, the inflation 
response to the booms diminished. 
Conversely, a decline in the commodity price would lead to a 
decrease in P n more acute under the fixed rate regime than under 
a flexible rate. This may explain in part why the FZ economies 
have traditionally a lower inflation rate than the neighbouring 
countries. Their relative good performance in the domain of price 
inflation is probably the main point generally noted at the 
credit of the Zone. The reason implied up to now is that the 
exchange rate regime with the peg to a key currency enables the 
37 We have assumed that the shift from the fixed rate regime 
to the flexible rate does not change the credibility of the 
Government economic policy so that the core inflation is 
identical under the two regimes. 
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member countries to tackle the monetary shocks and other similar 
disturbances more efficiently. In this respect chapters 3 and 4 
dealt with the choice for an exchange rate regime comparing the 
size of the external shocks relative to the monetary shocks. 
From diagram 6.12, one can note further and more importantly 
that when the conditions of low commodity prices prevail, this 
drives downward the domestic price index more in the FZ than in 
the other commodity-exporting economies with a more flexible 
exchange rate. But it seems better to look beyond the price level 
as such and to capture the underlying adjustment pressures as was 
done with the use of the variance of the domestic price instead 
of its level or expected mean value. 
(ii) The instruments of adjustment 
The diagram 6.12 shows clearly what problem the fixed rate 
raises in an environment marked by important external shocks for 
the simple reason that it leaves the small economy with only one 
instrument for stabilization instead of two. Combining an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate with some degree of 
inflation leads from the equilibrium A to B if one adopts a 
flexible exchange rate. The mixture can even vary if the monetary 
authorities choose to undertake a managed float. They can choose 
their preferred distribution of the adjustment burden borne by 
the currency and the domestic price respectively. An extreme case 
would consist of maintaining the domestic price at PnO and 
appreciating the nominal exchange rate sufficiently enough. 
By contrast, the fixed rate regime presents the small economy 
with only the other extreme: to change only the price of the non-
traded good and sufficiently enough to drive the economy back to 
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equilibrium. 
Losing the exchange rate as an adjustment instrument lS one 
thing. The fact that the exchange rate proves to be the most 
flexible instrument compared to the price index represents an 
additional worry when it comes to the fixed rate regime. The 
domestic price index includes a whole range of individual goods 
prices and it usually takes more time to get it move 
significantly In one direction than with the exchange rate 
(Friedman, 1953). 
Another worry relates to the asymmetry which may characterize 
the domestic price behaviour. In the aftermath of a boom, one 
observes a rise in inflation as more income due to the bonanza 
boosts consumption. It is sometimes difficult to resist the 
increase in demand on the goods market and for the non-traded 
good in particular since this is the only way to take benefit of 
the bonanza (Forsyth & Kay, 1980). One way to prevent the boom 
from imposing inflationary pressure on the domestic economy and 
to "protect" the exchange rate might consist of investing the 
corresponding foreign exchange earnings in foreign assets But 
this means keeping the level of consumption below the new level 
of real lncome with in counterpart the accumulation of external 
surplus (Neary & Wijinbergen, 1986). 
But in the case of a collapse in the conunodity price, the 
reduction In the budget of Government and other directly 
concerned agents, which should go with the decrease in real 
income, appears painful. Consequently, the necessary adjustments 
do not occur quickly enough. 
Leaving the FZ countries with internal deflation as the only 
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mean to adjust in the face of commodity bust presented them with 
a very difficult policy decision. 
Isard (1983) gives a general estimate of two to five years for 
the actual real exchange rate to converge to the long run 
equilibrium. This lag is deemed to be longer for economies like 
FZ's and even longer in face of a decline in the commodity prices 
than during commodity booms. Also one needs to take into account 
the fact that the real shocks which may affect a small open 
economy and influence the real exchange rate constitute a whole 
range of phenomena for which the terms of trade fluctuations give 
only an illustration if even the most signicant one on the recent 
period. This leaves the ERER with important uncertainties and 
tracing precisely its movements as would be required in the 
context of fixed rate regime of the FZ economies represents a 
difficult task. In contrast a flexible rate would enhance the 
adjustment process. 
(iii) Distinction between RER and ERER 
As a matter of fact, the FZ countries did not adjust fully to 
the shocks of the mid-1980's on. One may find elements of an 
inappropriate econom1C policy in the lack of adjustment. For 
example some countries continued to increase the price to the 
crop growers while the commodity price was crumbling down on the 
world market. In any case, the reaction to the new situation was 
very late. In parallel some countries resorted to external 
borrowing instead of cutting in the Government budgets, a policy 
which contributed for much in the huge increase in the external 
debt. 
However, there exist indications that the internal deflation 
301 
required was out of proportion compared with the burden that the 
populations could reasonably accept, witness the dramatic events 
of social unrest many times reported in the capitals of the FZ 
countries in the past decade if these events can be related to 
the economic difficulties even though the political aspects might 
have played an important role as well (the emergence of some sort 
of "glasnost" wind in the subregion). 
In fact the period from the mid-1980's saw a notable lncrease 
in the Government deficits as well as the balance of payments 
deficits. We indicated earlier on that paradoxically, the 
framework of the FZ as a pool a reserves and the support of 
France for the convertibility of the CFA currency favoured the 
continuation of these financial deficits. 
The actual real exchange rate reflected these dis-equilibria. 
It may have increased somewhat to reflect the part of adjustment 
undertaken. But to take this increase as an improvement in the 
degree of competitiveness could be misleading on the issue of 
whether the CFA currency was overvalued or not. The best way 
would consist of looking at the equilibrium exchange rate as well 
as comparing the two rates to better assess the real need for the 
change in the parity. 
In contrast to the actual real exchange rate, the equilibrium 
real exchange rate is by definition that rate which ensures 
equilibrium, notably the balance of payments equilibrium. Our 
hypothesis gives an ERER much higher than the actual RER during 
the decade up to 1993. 
In this paper, we have singled out the terms of trade as the 
most important determinant of the ERER changes ln the FZ 
302 
economies during the last decade. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that other variables (domestic and external) played a 
significant role, depending on specific sub-periods. Among these, 
one generally lists the relative rates of productivity growth, 
the Government budget operations, the commercial policy reforms 
and fluctuations in international interest rates (Aghevli, Khan 
& Montiel, 1991). 
We have the diagrams 6.13a and 6.13b similar to diagram 6.12, 
to illustrate the overvaluation issue. Due to the (S,Pn) space 
chosen for the graphical representation a move upwards vertically 
on the diagram corresponds to a real appreciation and a move 
downwards to a real depreciation. 
The point Eo denotes the initial equilibrium. We choose to take 
it as representative of the situation of the FZ before the 
commodity market boom in the 1970's. The prices did not remain 
steady at that high level during the whole period until the mid-
1980' s. Some fluctuations characterized this intermediate period. 
The situation differed from one commodity to another but one can 
note that most of them had their prices relatively high in the 
first half of the 1980's. We represent this favourable situation 
as the equilibrium point E where the real exchange rate has 
appreciated compared with the initial point Eo. Given that much 
less rigidity opposes the rise in the domestic price, no 
distinction is drawn between the actual real exchange rate and 
the equilibrium real exchange rate for the economic situation 
pictured by the point E. This requires the MM line to move right 
to reach this point. 
Now let us assume that the bust occurs and that this means the 
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commodity price falls back to its level before the boom. With 
respect to the experience of the FZ economies, such an assumption 
might appear rather optimistic. The decline in the commodity 
price reached a scale which took the new price below the pre-boom 
level for some commodities. If one considers the purchasing power 
of the export price, in other words the commodity price in real 
terms, this assessment is even more valid for most of the 
commodities. So for the sake of simplifying the presentation, we 
consider that the new equilibrium real exchange rate would 
correspond to the line ERERI. 
We assume that after the slump on the commodity markets, some 
adjustment has been achieved but at a very limited extent. The 
adjustment process which operates only by internal deflation 
takes a longer time. The limited adjustment leaves the actual 
real exchange rate half way to the long run equilibrium point. 
On the diagram this corresponds to the move from E (RER) to El 
(RERl) . Compared to the level RER which prevailed during the boom 
period and which does not correspond to the present circumstances 
of the slump any more, the new real exchange rate has actually 
improved the degree of competitiveness. But this improvement 
falls notably short of the equilibrium value corresponding to the 
post-boom situation that is ERERI. The gap between RERI and ERERI 
constitutes the thrust of our argument. It indicates that the 
adjustment was not completed yet raising a decision problem. 
Either the FZ countries should proceed with the internal 
deflation whatever the social consequences or use the second 
instrument and undertake the first ever devaluation of the CFA 
currency. The change in the parity corresponds to the shift from 
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So to So' whereby the price of the non-traded good can be 
maintained at Pnl (after the initial adjustment from Pn)' without 
a further reduction. 
(iv) Appreciation of the FF. 
As if the bust in the commodity market was not enough, another 
shock struck the FZ countries. This second disturbance took the 
form of the appreciation of the French Franc with respect to the 
dollar. This change between the two currencies may be best 
illustrated as a decrease in the dollar than as an increase in 
the French Franc if one refers to the sharp rise in the dollar 
during the early 1980's. Nevertheless the policy of "franc fort" 
in the context of the European Monetary System (EMS) has been 
noticed by several observers as a fact which has characterized 
the appreciation of the French Franc in the recent period. 
In our notations, the nominal exchange rate So represents the 
value of the dollar in CFA via the peg to the FF (lFF = 50 FCFA 
before devaluation and 1FF = 100 FCFA after devaluation) . Because 
of this peg, the fluctuations between the FF and the dollar have 
the nature of external shocks for the small economy just as the 
terms of trade shocks. We note ~n this respect that Branson et 
al (1980) counts the movements of the exchange rates among the 
elements of the terms of trade variations. The appreciation of 
the FF has an effect similar to a decline in the terms of trade 
and vice-versa . It results from the position El in fig 6.l3b (the 
same as in fig 6.13a), moving to E'l along N'N'. At E'l' the 
inflation pressure is less than at El but the real exchange rate 
has appreciated. If the decision 1S to stop the internal 
deflation and to resort to the use of the exchange rate 
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instrument with an once-step change 1n the parity, then the 
devaluation Dev 1S designed to bring the real exchange rate at 
its equilibrium on the ERERl line. 
6.3. The experience of the FZ 
The data show that the financial situation in the African group 
of the FZ has worsened since 1978. In particular the overall 
balance of payments deficit as a percentage of GDP reached 
unprecedented levels by 1993. Against this background, let us now 
look at the traditional indicators used to assess the degree of 
overvaluation, if any, of the CFA franc (cf Boughton 1991), 
namely the actual real real exchange rate. Fig 6.14 gives an 
illustration. 
a. Bilateral and effective real exchange rates. 
The first instrument of measure is based on the bilateral rate 
between the currency of the small country and the key currency 
of the large country. Because the CFA is pegged to the FF, the 
bilateral real exchange rate will be determined here simply as 
the relative prices in France and the rest of the FZ. We will use 
the consumer price indexes to calculate the real exchange 
rate38 • The bilateral rate indicates that a real depreciation 
occurred from 1980 on, inflation being lower in CFA FZ than in 
France (fig 6.14). But this is the actual (bilateral) rate and 
the real depreciation should be contrasted with the increasing 
38 There exist different ways to specify the real exchange 
rate: use of consumer price indexes, GDP deflators, wholesale 
price indexes or unit labor costs. A discussion on this can be 
found in Dornbusch & Helmers (1988) and Joshi (1990). 
Fig 6.14: Real ex. rate of the Afr. FZ 
countries:actual and equilibrium rates 
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deficit of the balance of payments over the period under review. 
In this respect, the actual bilateral rate does not seem to be 
the most appropriate instrument of measure for the overvaluation 
of the CFA currency. 
One further step to improve the measure is to use the effective 
exchange rate, because unlike the bilateral rate the effective 
rate picks up the fluctuations between third currencies (e.g. 
depreciations and appreciations of the FF vis-a-vis the dollar 
between 1980 and 1987, devaluations in neighbouring countries 
which started in the mid-1980's their adjustment programs with 
IMF and World Bank). But the effective exchange rate as such 
gives an improvement only. On the period 1978-90, no real 
appreciation appeared ln contrast again with the financial 
imbalance which deteriorated significantly. 
The picture is different for the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
We know that it is a decreasing function of the terms of trade. 
A boom in the commodity market causes a real appreciation of the 
equilibrium rate. until the adjustment process is complete so 
that the actual and the equilibrium rates coincide, the latter 
is not directly observable. But it can be derived from the other 
data. Edwards (1989b) provides a method based on the partial 
adjustment formula to determine empirically the equilibrium real 
exchange rate. We argue that in the context of the FZ where there 
remained a substantial degree of financial imbalance, only the 
comparison of the actual real exchange rate to the equilibrium 
rate can give the full extent of the overvaluation of the CFA 
currency. During the period 1978-90, the actual real exchange 
rate did not appreciate while the equilibrium real rate 
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depreciated largely. The increasing distance between the actual 
and equilibrium rates, represents the scale of overvaluation of 
the CPA . Pig 6 . 14 shows the terms of trade as a proxy of the 
equilibrium real exchange rate (before introducing the scaling 
factor). By 1993, the index of the actual real exchange rate is 
about 95 (basis 1972 = 100) compared to an index level 170 for 
the equilibrium rate. This difference illustrates the extent of 
the overvaluation just before the devaluation occurred. but for 
a more precise comparison, the curve "ERER" which in fact is 
simply the inverse of the terms of trade needs to be scaled by 
the ratio K1 /K2 (cf section 4.2 c chapter 4). Also the curve 
corresponding to the effective real rate or actual real rate, 
because it represents the ratio of CPI's needs to be scaled by 
the factor A. Considering the values of table 4.2 (chapter 4), 
an acceptable estimate corresponding to a = ~ = 1 and A = 0.5) 
for the African FZ countries would give in 1993 the level of ERER 
at 152.3 and of actual RER at 90. This would give a difference 
equivalent to 40% to compare with the devaluation rate of 50%. 
This suggests that although the devaluation was a necess ity, 
there might have been a bit of "overdevaluation". One possible 
reason for that may be that the determination of the devaluation 
rate was based not on the FZ average but on the worst case of 
overvaluation among the African FZ countries, presumably Cote 
d'Ivoire (Le Monde, January 13 t h, 1994). 
b. Modelling the actual real rate 
The previous analysis need to be completed. The discussion based 
on diagram 6.13 related to the e quilibrium and actual real 
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exchange rate. But the model itself developed in subsection b) 
basically deals with the equilibrium real exchange rate only. As 
we have underlined it, the difference between the two indicators 
matters in a context where financial imbalances persist, for 
example when the balance of payments is ridden by large deficits. 
The question does not arise for the flexible exchange rate regime 
in the sense that this regime ensures continuously an external 
balance. But it does with a fixed exchange rate regime. The 
disequilibria that the African FZ countries have experienced 
suggest that the actual real exchange rate differed substantially 
from the equilibrium rate. This implies that the model be refined 
consequently to describe the actual real exchange rate. 
Let us consider the fixed exchange rate regime. The nominal 
exchange rate is given equal to So and normalized to unity. We 
rewrite the model in section 6.2b) as follows: 
M/P = ky 
y = y (p/ , 1/ Pn ) 
p = P (Pn) 
y n (Pn' Px") = ~ (Pn' E, M/ P) 
y = E + T 
(29) 
(30) 
( 31 ) 
(32 ) 
(33 ) 
Two new variables appear ln this setting39 • E represents the 
level of real expenditure and T i s the trade balance (T presents 
some similarities with the hoarding variable in Dornbusch, 1986). 
We take E as an exogenous variable . The equilibrium equation on 
39 A more detailed description of the setting is given in 
section 6.2b 
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the market of the non-traded good has been slightly modified 
where the real expenditure E replaces the real income y among the 
explanatory variables of the demand for the non-traded good. 
Equation (33) defines the variable T. 
The joint equilibrium on the money market and the non-traded 
good market will be called the instantaneous equilibrium. It 
differs from the long run equilibrium which is obtained when in 
addition, we have the external balance (T =0). What the 
instantaneous equilibrium requires for the traded good is simply 
a world market equilibrium. The trade balance normally represents 
the disequilibrium between the domestic production and 
consumption of the traded good. But given that we have a n 
equilibrium on the non-traded good market, the excess demand for 
the traded good equals the overall excess demand in the domestic 
economy, and that is the sense of equation 33 . 
We note also that in the fixed exchange rate the variable M 
becomes endogenous in a sense which refers to the steady state 
value of the money stock whereas reference to the price specie 
flow mechanism applies to the move from the instantaneous 
e quilibrium to the long equilibrium, during which the change in 
the money stock equals the value of the trade balance. 
Differentiating the two equations (29 ) and (33 ) with s ubstitution 
of the other equations would bring about the following equations : 
(k OY ~-...!i oP )dp + elM _ k oy dp; (34) 
oc p 2 p 2 op n P !l • 
n n vPx 
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(35 ) 
From this two-equation system one can extract the change in the 
price of the non-traded good: 
The signs in equation (36) are determinate . It can be seen that 
the coefficients of dPn and dpx* are positive, giving t he same 
result as before with regards the real exchange rate as a 
function of Px*. The last term in e quation (36 ) reflects the 
e ffect of a change in the level of expenditure on the actual real 
e xchange rate. As one would expect , an exogenou s increase in the 
domestic expenditure will cause a n increase in the price of the 
non-traded good and conse que ntly a real appreciation of the 
actual rate and conversely. As can be seen from equation (33 ) , 
s uch an exogenous increase in expendi ture corresponds to a 
deterioration of the trade balance. In terms of the diagram 6 . 13 
a balance of payment deficit and the corresponding real 
appreciation would mean starting from the equilibrium Eo for 
example and moving towards the point El which is simply an 
instantaneous equilibrium. It is understood that the zone 
vertically above Eo depicts the cases of overvaluation and the 
zone below the cases of undervaluation. 
An alternative way of introducing the effect of financial 
imbalances would be to keep the mode l as defined initially I 
311 
except for the second equation modified to include the fiscal 
stance (Miller & Williamson, 1988): 
M/P = ky 
y = y (Px" , g , 1/ Pn ) 
P = P (Pn) 
y n (Pn' Px" ) = ~ (Pn' y, M/ P) 
(12) , 
(13) , 
(14) , 
(15) , 
The variable g denotes the fiscal stance. Changes in g will 
replicate the exogenous changes in E above.In practice, on e may 
interpret it as the fiscal deficit or the amount of external 
borrowing or even the (state variable ) ext ernal debt. In any 
case, we will assume that the leve l of output responds posi tively 
to the variable g: ay/ag > o. This spec i fication is also 
compatible with the result obtained by Branson et Buiter (1 983 ) 
that writing the domestic price as a function of the nominal 
exchange rate will ensure a fiscal effect on outp u t . 
with this specification, the differential equations as 
es tablished in the expressions (21 ) and (22 ) are augmented with 
terms related to the change in g: 
AdPn = BdS + kay / apx" . dpx" + kay / ag . dg ( 3 7 ) 
CdPn = DdS+ (-aYn/ap/ + a~/ay.ay/apx" ) dpx" + a~/ay.ay/ag.dg (38 ) 
with the same notations for the coefficients A, B, C and D as 
in section b). In particular, we recall that: 
B-A > 0 
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C-D > 0 
The way the real exchange rate will change following a change 
in the exogenous variables P x* and g can be derived: 
_ [ B-A odn c3y + C-D k~] dg (39) 
BC- AD oy og BC- AD og 
It appears clearly from equation (39) that an increase in the 
Government deficit, everything else being equal, will appreciate 
the real exchange rate. 
We may define the equilibrium real exch ange rate as the level 
of the real exchange rate when the variable g equals zero, 
corresponding to a balanced Government budget for example or to 
the reduction of the external debt back to a predetermined level. 
Then any non-zero level of g implies a mi salignment of t h e real 
exchange rate. In terms of diagram 6.13, the presence of the 
fiscal imbalance (g > 0) drives the economy to the location at 
point El from the equilibrium point Eo . The distance E1Eo 
illustrates the extent of the overvalu ation. 
Conclusion 
The 50% devaluation of the CFA in January 1994 was long overdu e . 
Among the reasons for this long delay with its damaging 
consequences, we have chosen to develop t h e view that the 
indicator used in the past to assess the overvaluation of the CFA 
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was not the right one. The analysis is based on a version of the 
trade-theoretic model taking into account the monetary aspects 
(cf Neary & Wijnbergen 1986) in the adjustment process after a 
terms of trade shock. 
We argue that the actual real exchange did not reflect properly 
the situation of the CFA overvaluation. Instead of an assessment 
based on the actual real rate as did some studies, the comparison 
of the actual and equilibrium real rates seems more appropriate 
in the context of the FZ. The financial imbalances give ample 
evidence that the adjustment process was not complete from the 
mid-1980's on after the collapse of the world commodity prices. 
The model gives an account of the equilibrium exchange rate with 
the usual property of real appreciation when the terms of trade 
increase. It displays the inflation pressure more important under 
a fixed exchange rate than under a flexible exchange rate in face 
of external shocks. Of course the s mall economy may attempt to 
operate an internal deflation to counter this inflation and get 
back to equilibrium. The African FZ countries had tried this 
procedure but the process had proved very painful. Because the 
adjustment was not complete , this draws a distinction between the 
actual real rate and the equilibrium real exchange rate. The 
distance between the two rates gives the scale of the 
overvaluation. As a matter of fact, one can note that the use of 
the actual real exchange rate has not detected a real 
appreciation of the CFA currency on the last fifteen years while 
the external imbalances were r unning deep. With the introduction 
of the equilibrium real rate, the overvaluation appears clearly 
instead. 
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Modelling the actual real exchange rate does not raise a 
difficulty. One can add in the model the domestic expenditure 
together with the trade balance or the fiscal stance. 
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General Concluding Remarks 
From the experience of the African FZ countries, during the last 
decade, one can draw two lessons. The first one relates to the 
care required in assessing the degree of overvaluation of a given 
currency. These countries had an inflation rate comparable to the 
inflation rate of the large country whose currency is used for 
the fixed rate peg. Consequently, there was a fairly stable level 
of the bilateral real exchange rate of the small economy vis-a-
vis the large economy. Even the effective real exchange rate 
proved to be stable. But at the same time, the financial 
imbalances especially the current account deficits were 
accumulating. This suggests that the actual real exchange rate 
by itself does not always give a full account of the 
overvaluation problem. It needs to be compared to the equilibrium 
real exchange rate. 
The second lesson is about economic management policy. A number 
of authors have underlined the importance of macroeconomic 
policies 
economy. 
compared with the shocks affecting 
The former seem t 'o predominate the 
a given s mall 
latter as the 
explanatory factor for the difficult economic experiences in 
Africa and Latin America versus the more successful case of Asia. 
The specific experience of the African FZ countries tends to 
support the findings that budget deficits and misalignments are 
generally the root causes of economic crisis in the developing 
world. The misalignment very often results from high inflation. 
However this is not the only source, the case of the FZ s hows 
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that it may be due alternatively to an inappropriate exchange 
rate policy, depending on the circumstances which prevail in the 
small economy. Typically the unchanged fixed rate in the presence 
of large commodity price disturbances was causing prejudice to 
the African FZ countries. The first ever devaluation of the CFA 
currency ln January 1994 came very belatedly. 
On this and other aspects regarding the choice of an exchange 
rate regime, the different chapters above give a framework and 
an investigation designed to fit the case of a small commodity-
exporting economy. 
The question of Commodity Stabilization Funds has been 
introduced in chapter 5,and has gone some way to establish the 
economic rationale for this category of Funds. However further 
research may be necessary to establi s h undertaken on the link 
between saving rule and exchange rate rule , for example by 
dropping the assumption of no transactions costs used in our 
analysis. Chapter 5 indeed has explored the possibility of using 
the intertemporal optimization method to compare different 
exchange rate regimes. 
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Appendix 1 a 
Determination of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors 0 
A ( cf equation 12 chapter 4) 
The matrix A is rewritten as follows : 
Its determinant is : 
Oet A = -K2 / C < 0 ( 2 ) 
The different parameters i n t hese expressions re n d in 
section 4.1. Since det A has a negative value, there xist wo 
eigenvalues and two corresponding eigenvectors . The determin tion 
of the eigenvalues will i nvolve solving : 
/A - rI/ = (-K2 -r)[(1-A) /c - rJ-{A/ )K, = 0 (3) 
=> r 2 + [K2-(1-A)/E]r-K2/C = 0 (4) 
We calculate the discriminant 
!::. = [K2-(1-A)/E]2+4K 2 / > 0 (5) 
t he roots are as - follows : 
_ ( K2 - 1- A ) _!::. ~ 
E r 1 = (6) 2 
It a ppears clearly that r 1 is n g tiv 
stable manifold while r, is positiv 
u nstable mani fold . 
To determine the stable mani fold or g nv C 0 
(lJ we wri te that it satisfies t h r 1 tion h p : 
I t can be s hown that 81 is 1 ss th n Z 0 , (-1 < 8 1 < 0), implying t he "overshoot n " ° 
( ) 
° h 
o h 
h n -1 
in the system represented by equation (11) . 
From equation (9) the speed of adjustment K: ( 1-8) e quals -r l > 
o. Differentiating (4) with respect to K2 indicates that : 
dr1 /dK2 < 0 
Thus the speed of adjustment is a n increasing function of K2 • 
Consequently it will be an increasing function of ~, a and ~. 
With regards the parameter A, we note that K2 will be an 
increasing function if a-~ > 0, and vice-versa. The same will 
apply for the speed of adjustment as a function of A. The case 
of E would require more extended calculations not done here. 
Appendix 1b 
We consider 
D = (1l-a)A?-211A+(1-a)1l (1) 
as a function of A. How the sign of D will depend on A? To answer this question, let us 
calculate the discriminant ~: 
~ = 112-(1-a)1l(1l-a) = lla(1+11-a) (2) 
1) For 1+11-a < 0, /). is negative, which implies D has the same sign whatever the value of 
A. 
2) For 1+11-a > 0, ~ is positive, which means the equation D = 0 has two olutions: 
T)+[ T)a ( 1 +T)-a) ] 
T) -a 
T) - [ T)a ( 1 +T) - Q ) ] 
T) -Q 
The solution Al is positive and higher than 1 every time ll-a > O. Otherwise, it is negative. 
In both cases, Al is outside the range [0 1] in which A should be by definition. 
The investigation is then reduced to the analysis of ~. The sign of th numerator of ~ is 
given by (1l-a)(1-a). Since the denominator is ll-a, ~ has the same sign as J -a in particular 
~ is positive only if a < 1. Furthermore, one can see that ~ is always less than I . 
In summary: i) ll-a > 0 =e> 1.\ > 1 
1-a > 0 =e> 0 < ~ < 1 . D will be positive for A < ~ and negntiv for A > ~ 
(the permissible range of A being [OlD. 
ii) ll-a < 0 =e> Al < 0 
1-a > 0 =e> 0 < ~ < 1 . D will be positive for A < ~ and negativ ' for A > ~. 
iii) ll-a > 0 =e> Al > 1 
1-a < 0 =e> ~ < O. D will be negative for whatever A in th . P rmi. sihl . rang. 
iv) ll-a < 0 =e> Al < 0 
1-a < 0 ~ ~ < 0 . D will be negative fo r whatever A in th p 'rm is. ibl ' rnn ' '. 
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Appendix 2 
- Figures 6.a to 6.d 
- Tables 1 to 4 
Sources: 
1) for producer prices: "Notes d'information", BCEAO 
2) for market prices: Datastream . 
Fig 6a: Cocoa market price index and 
producer price index 
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Fig 6e: Cotton market price index and 
producer price index 
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Fig 6d: Groundnut market and 
producer price index 
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Table 1 
COCOA 
prod. price CFA (FCFNkg) 
Benin Cote d'ivoire Togo 
1972 95.00 85.00 93.00 
1973 125.00 110.00 95.00 
1974 250.00 175.00 115.00 
1975 250.00 175.00 120.00 
1976 250.00 180.00 130.00 
1977 250.00 250.00 150.00 
1978 250.00 250.00 200.00 
1979 250.00 300.00 220.00 
1980 250.00 300.00 220,00 
1981 300.00 225.00 
1982 300.00 235.00 
1983 350.00 275.00 
1984 375.00 300.00 
1985 400.00 330.00 
1986 400.00 360.00 
1987 350.00 400.00 360.00 
1988 320.00 400.00 300.00 
1989 320.00 200.00 225.00 
1990 320.00 200.00 250.00 
1991 320.00 200.00 250.00 
1992 320.00 200.00 225.00 
8 
Table 2 
COFFEE 
prod. price CFA (FCFNkg) 
Benin Cote d'ivoire Togo 
1973 98.00 105.00 80.00 
1974 98.00 120.00 90.00 
1975 103.00 150.00 105.00 
1976 110.00 150.00 115.00 
1977 115.00 180.00 125.00 
1978 135.00 250.00 145.00 
1979 135.00 250.00 180.00 
1980 160.00 300.00 200.00 
1981 200.00 300.00 200.00 
1982 210.00 300.00 215.00 
1983 215.00 300.00 235.00 
1984 235.00 350.00 290.00 
1985 235.00 380.00 315.00 
1986 280.00 400.00 365.00 
1987 280.00 400.00 400.00 
1988 280.00 200.00 400.00 
1989 330.00 200.00 350.00 
1990 160.00 100.00 175.00 
1991 160.00 100.00 175.00 
1992 160.00 100.00 185.00 
1993 160.00 60.00 140.00 
9 
Table 3 
GROUNDNUT 
prod. price CFA (FCFNkg) 
Niger Senegal 
1973 24.00 23.10 
1974 28.00 25.50 
1975 55.00 41.50 
1976 55.00 41.50 
1977 55.00 41.50 
1978 69.00 41.50 
1979 75.00 41.50 
1980 75.00 45.50 
1981 75.00 50.00 
1982 85.00 70.00 
1983 90.00 70.00 
1984 90.00 70.00 
1985 100.00 70.00 
1986 130.00 90.00 
1987 130.00 90.00 
1988 95.00 90.00 
1989 free 70.00 
1990 70.00 
1991 70.00 
1992 80.00 
1993 100.00 
10 
Table 4 
conON 
prod. price CFA (FCFNkd) 
Burkina Faso Niger 
1973 32.00 32.00 
1974 35.00 37.00 
1975 40.00 47.00 
1976 40.00 47.00 
1977 40.00 47.00 
1978 55.00 55.00 
1979 55.00 62.00 
1980 55.00 62.00 
1981 55.00 62.00 
1982 62.00 80.00 
1983 62.00 120.00 
1984 70.00 120.00 
1985 90.00 120.00 
1986 100.00 130.00 
1987 100.00 130.00 
1988 95.00 100.00 
1989 95.00 100.00 
1990 95.00 100.00 
1991 95.00 100.00 
1992 95.00 70.00 
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Appendix 3 
- Tables 5.1 to 5.11 
- Tables 6 to 8 
Sources: as indicated 
a 12 
Tables 5.1 to 5.11: Data summary, individual countries and FZ aggregate. 
5.1 BENIN 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO GGB NG NGDP TIT 
1972 6.1 -8.6 2.4 10.5 83.1 127.2 
1973 4.5 -14.3 1.5 11.2 89.0 192.4 
1974 7.0 -29.3 0.5 11.8 107.6 126.1 
1975 5.5 -53.4 -19.9 13.4 112.8 102.2 
1976 6.3 -72.8 -2.8 12.8 133.5 134.8 
1977 6.3 -60.7 -3.9 1.4 14.7 148.5 165.2 
1978 0.9 -96.4 -19.2 5.1 14.4 161.6 139.1 
1979 -2.1 -51.9 -3.6 -1 .0 17.4 193.5 125.0 
1980 -2.8 -35.7 ' -22.6 21.7 245.6 108.7 
1981 13.5 -93.4 31.2 25.2 301.0 112.0 
1982 -5.0 -377.2 -48.1 27.2 411.9 100.0 
1983 -14.9 -134.8 -37.4 35.6 439.4 103.3 
1984 -32.8 -57.1 -23.3 41.8 466.2 105.4 
1985 -38.7 4.7 -29.5 42.2 499.8 100.0 
1986 -32.8 -65.5 -71.2 43.6 502.7 72.8 
1987 -54.6 95.1 -34.3 -130.8 -51.9 73.0 469.6 93.5 
1988 -54.4 99.2 -52.0 -48.9 -46.2 63.6 482.4 89.4 
1989 -20.2 99.7 12.2 -38.5 -51.0 53.2 489.7 90.9 
1990 18.9 100.0 -29.4 38.0 -50.2 56.0 518.8 87.0 
1991 29.5 100.9 -84.6 -27.6 -42.6 56.6 539.2 77.3 
1992 52.6 104.4 -160.0 -67.7 -45.0 61.2 577.5 60.6 
1993 63.0 107.7 -52.3 61.8 -26.3 60.8 611.0 66. 1 
5.2 BURKINA FASO 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO GGB NG NGDP TIT 
1972 11.6 29.6 3.5 2.3 9.5 109.4 191.4 
1973 15.3 31.8 2.5 11.4 0.4 10.9 109.7 219.8 
1974 17.4 34.6 -5.3 16.3 2.2 13.4 131 .0 133.3 
1975 15.9 41.1 -54.3 -6.3 -1.7 23.2 137.7 116.1 
1976 12.6 37.6 -33.5 0.5 -1.3 21.2 149.4 146.9 
1977 5.9 48.9 -84.3 -19.8 4.3 26.5 184.9 135.8 
1978 -1.1 53.0 -59.5 -31.2 1.5 30.0 222.5 132.1 
1979 1.5 60.9 -63.8 8.3 -5.6 49.2 252.5 133.3 
1980 3.5 68.3 -48.7 6.6 0.9 47.4 272.0 123.5 
1981 4.9 73.5 -42.1 14.2 -4.7 60.9 324.2 109.9 
1982 1.8 82.3 -92.1 -0.2 -6.2 72.5 359.6 102.5 
1 
1983 14.4 89.2 -60.1 36.6 0.6 78.8 381.0 117.3 
1984 31.7 93.5 -3.5 35.9 -3.4 76.9 390.6 117.3 
1985 31.0 100.0 -60.1 5.7 6.3 72.6 469.3 100.0 
1986 51.2 97.4 -20.7 41.9 -0.7 503.5 93.8 
1987 71.8 94.8 -51.0 22.9 -66.9 101 .9 607.9 108.6 
1988 82.5 97.7 -31.5 30.6 -62.1 110.2 666.5 108.6 
1989 68.5 98.4 49.3 -128.9 -53.3 118.6 693.7 108.6 
1990 66.2 99.6 -94.2 -57.5 -52.9 124.3 702.6 108.6 
1991 77.8 103.5 -92.7 26.5 -55.6 130.6 776.5 108.6 
1992 91.0 101.5 -139.2 -1.6 -47.8 132.6 771.1 108.6 
1993 88.4 103.3 -117.0 -56.4 -33.9 136.6 796.0 108.6 
5.3 CAMEROON 
FFC N PCPI 8CA 80 GG8 NG NGDP TIT 
1972 8.1 22.7 -91.6 0.0 46.0 355.9 105.4 
1973 11.4 25.1 -16.7 0.0 49.0 400.5 123.9 
1974 16.8 29.4 -17.0 -19.4 57.3 492.6 101 .1 
1975 0.3 33.4 -152.5 -17.9 -13.0 68.4 580.2 85.9 
1976 -2.2 36.7 -92.2 -51.5 -15.9 74.8 657.2 127.2 
1977 -4.1 42.1 -93.0 -2.6 -3.0 81.9 789.9 159.8 
1978 -15.8 47.3 -186.9 -12.9 4.1 102.8 968.1 130.4 
1979 10.0 50.4 -126.3 59.7 31.7 116.3 11 35.4 113.0 
1980 -4.5 55.2 -445.9 78.4 7.2 136.8 1356.2 108.7 
1981 43.1 61.2 -482.0 -60. 1 -58.5 159.1 1796.4 106.5 
1982 -9.7 69.3 -386.0 -10.8 -55.2 192.0 2172.8 104.3 
1983 59.6 80.8 -411.9 116.8 33.9 248.7 2618.1 102.2 
1984 129.4 90.0 -168.9 -86.4 306.4 3195.0 104.3 
1985 155.9 91.1 -561.5 58.7 345.3 3896.0 100.0 
1986 -27.2 94.0 -550.9 -81.5 465.5 4135.0 67.4 
1987 -110.8 114.2 -1219.3 -626.9 -508.0 429.0 3854.0 60.9 
1988 -102.0 116.2 -1079.9 -367.8 -214.0 410.0 3386.2 53.6 
1989 -174.2 118.0 -817.5 -269.9 -174.1 433.7 3363.0 45.5 
1990 -130.2 119.8 -1077.0 -525.4 -276.9 429.2 3320.8 42.9 
1991 -120.8 119.0 -914.8 -668.6 -245.6 412.3 3115.9 47.3 
1992 -130.3 121.4 -965.1 -598.8 -186.3 387.1 2929.0 39.7 
1993 -220.5 116.7 -1030.9 -1075.5 -194.3 361 .6 2664.2 39.3 
5.4 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBUC 
FFC N PCPI 8CA BO GGB NG NGDP TIT 
14 
1972 0.5 24.8 1.1 -1.4 55.6 103.5 
1973 0.1 26.2 -3.0 -6.8 57.1 112.6 
1974 -2.2 28.7 -14.6 3.1 72.0 98.9 
1975 -4.0 33.3 -37.3 0.8 83.8 83.9 
1976 0.6 36.8 5.4 15.2 94.1 118.4 
1977 -1.3 40.9 -19.0 4.9 106.9 132.2 
1978 -2.4 45.6 -24.4 -12.7 120.8 110.3 
1979 3.4 49.8 -16.0 16.5 135.3 119.5 
1980 6.2 58.4 -43.1 -0.8 168.4 114.9 
1981 8.4 65.8 -4.3 -6.8 -6.7 218.1 101.2 
1982 4.5 74.3 -42.6 -34.4 248.0 103.4 
1983 6.8 84.2 -29.3 -14.1 251.5 102.3 
1984 12.9 91.8 -33.4 0.6 278.7 109.2 
1985 12.0 100.0 -48.6 -25.1 316.2 100.0 
1986 13.9 107.6 -86.5 -3.0 330.9 97.7 
1987 17.7 116.2 -47.5 20.3 -12.4 42.3 314.6 96.6 
1988 18.5 113.8 -27.1 -0.0 -16.5 43.6 326.6 105.1 
1989 19.1 118.2 -33.8 8.7 -13.0 45.5 340.9 101.5 
1990 18.9 120.2 -96.9 -20.4 -17.7 47.9 351.6 107.6 
1991 15.9 119.7 -59.6 -9.7 -21.6 48.1 354.5 97.9 
1992 18.2 122.7 -50.4 7.2 -21.6 48.4 352.8 109.3 
1993 20.2 125.3 -20.0 -22.6 -24.2 34.7 349.2 94.0 
5.5 COTE D'IVOIRE 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO GGB NG NGDP TIT 
1972 20.1 24.3 -96.6 -71.8 77.2 471.8 92.7 
1973 17.1 27.0 -219.3 -6.3 95.6 566.2 100.0 
1974 29.5 31.7 -61.0 61.6 118.7 739.0 96.9 
1975 2.3 35.3 -379.0 -92.4 141.8 834.5 83.3 
1976 -2.6 39.5 -249.3 9.0 180.3 1120.4 119.8 
1977 36.1 50.4 -177.3 118.1 209.7 1590.4 152.1 
1978 44.8 56.9 -839.1 137.3 290.4 1783.0 126.0 
1979 -37.2 66.4 -1383.3 -329.2 -168.3 353.8 1944.7 122.9 
1980 -208.7 76.1 -1826.5 -664.3 -233.2 362.4 2149.9 104.2 
1981 -366.9 82.8 -1411.4 -603.4 403.6 2291.4 88.5 
1982 -394.4 88.9 -1017.2 -306.8 432.5 2486.5 90.6 
1983 -597.8 94.2 -931.0 -699.1 439.3 2605.9 95.8 
1984 -476.8 98.2 -76.8 -478.6 453.3 2989.4 104.2 
1985 -328.8 100.0 63.7 -176.2 441.6 3134.8 100.0 
1986 -331.0 106.8 -300.5 -379.5 485.9 3171.7 109.4 
1987 -479.9 114.3 -793.4 -1127.5 -217.9 501 .3 3117.8 91.7 
1988 -570.7 122.2 -1178.6 -1853.4 -410.1 629.8 3069.2 79.1 
15 
1989 -564.1 123.4 -1057.6 -1414.3 -494.9 546.3 2985.2 68.0 
1990 -560.5 122.6 -1199.8 -1557.4 -297.9 474.8 2693.0 56.5 
1991 -541.6 124.6 -1366.2 -1347.2 -312.9 478.3 2690.2 56.9 
1992 -556.5 129.8 -1363.9 -1847.2 -304.0 474.1 2684.8 55.7 
1993 -542.3 130.8 -1017.7 -1966.5 -426.5 470.2 2633.0 57.7 
5.6 CONGO 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO GGB NG NGDP TlT 
1972 0.4 29.3 -97.8 -7.4 27.6 91.0 75.5 
1973 0.5 30.4 -78.3 -11.7 28.2 102.6 44.7 
1974 3.8 32.0 -93.1 18.8 37.8 137.0 74.5 
1975 -0.9 37.6 -248.9 -18.7 54.3 159.6 68.1 
1976 -4.5 40.3 -227.3 -22.2 61.2 173.4 73.4 
19n -9.0 45.9 -193.3 -24.2 61.2 181.7 76.6 
1978 -9.5 50.8 -180.6 -15.1 45.5 198.3 71.3 
1979 -2.7 54.9 -99.4 23.1 254.5 78.7 
1980 8.7 58.9 -166.7 47.0 -18.8 63.4 360.4 106.4 
1981 23.9 68.8 -460.7 41 .5 0.4 72.8 541.7 112.8 
1982 4.5 77.7 -331.5 -83.9 -93.4 95.8 711.5 107.5 
1983 -22.2 83.7 -400.9 -31.9 -26.7 120.0 799.4 102.1 
1984 -37.2 94.7 210.2 -61.4 141 .7 958.5 103.2 
1985 -22.9 100.0 -161.3 -80.7 159.7 970.9 100.0 
1986 -35.7 102.4 -600.7 -398.2 159.8 640.1 60.6 
1987 -28.8 104.0 -222.7 -414.9 -89.4 142.1 690.5 68.1 
1988 -34.3 108.2 -432.4 -471.3 -119.7 138.7 659.0 51.0 
1989 -39.6 112.6 -63.0 -400.1 -78.1 144.6 774.9 60.9 
1990 -4.2 114.8 -204.3 -252.8 -53.4 145.0 781.6 64.3 
1991 -15.3 115.0 -406.8 -661.7 -134.3 204.0 788.6 52.8 
1992 -15.3 117.4 -531.1 -635.6 -195.0 178.2 813.6 49.2 
1993 -15.3 118.2 -444.5 -680.3 -152.9 175.5 675.4 49.6 
5.7 GABON 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO GGB NG NGDP TIT 
1972 3.5 22.4 -3.7 -3.9 19.2 108.5 40.0 
1973 7.5 23.8 -43.0 22.8 -17.6 25.1 161 .1 38.9 
1974 15.6 26.6 219.1 50.7 -15.5 34.4 371.7 77.8 
1975 26.4 34.2 73.5 46.0 -37.0 56.5 462.4 68.9 
1976 23.0 41.1 52.3 -17.1 -158.1 76.0 719.1 73.3 
16 
1977 -18.0 46.8 98.9 -111.2 124.9 690.2 71.1 
1978 -19.3 51.8 73.9 8.2 73.8 539.2 67.8 
1979 -16.1 56.0 247.6 -16.3 -3.5 77.9 644.6 80.0 
1980 7.3 62.9 383.9 95.9 55.1 904.5 111.1 
1981 32.3 68.3 403.3 117.8 8.2 1049.0 118.9 
1982 84.1 79.7 309.4 146.7 35.1 1188.9 113.3 
1983 72.5 88.0 97.9 -89.3 -16.3 ... 1320.0 105.6 
1984 92.3 93.2 112.7 13.1 3.1 284.4 1455.6 105.6 
1985 47.9 100.0 -162.5 -60.9 1.1 306.3 1576.0 100.0 
1986 2.8 106.4 -1057.5 -195.4 268.0 1590.0 62.2 
1987 -35.3 105.3 -449.2 -522.4 -126.9 291.7 1232.7 71.1 
1988 -30.6 95.0 -617.8 -306.4 -95.3 226.0 1140.9 60.9 
1989 -9.8 101.3 -191.2 -383.5 -88.6 228.3 1344.4 74.9 
1990 45.5 107.4 214.1 -248.8 -17.8 247.2 1494.5 63.1 
1991 58.6 109.4 107.4 -211.8 27.3 255.0 1533.1 64.8 
1992 -5.1 99.1 105.6 -442.3 -32.1 266.0 1565.2 62.3 
1993 64.8 100.3 -7.1 -61.6 71.5 274.9 1603.0 83.1 
5.8 NIGER 
FFC N PCPI 8CA 80 GGB NG NGDP TIT 
1972 11.0 27.8 7.9 2.2 15.0 136.0 171 .7 
1973 11.9 31.1 24.6 5.0 15.7 128.2 151.5 
1974 10.7 32.2 -27.8 -6.4 17.4 159.0 126.3 
1975 11.0 35.1 12.1 5.7 23.6 180.4 129.3 
1976 18.8 43.4 -26.6 31.1 -5.5 28.1 237.9 135.4 
1977 23.5 53.4 -95.6 13.4 -5.3 31.0 288.8 126.3 
1978 20.0 58.8 -201.0 7.1 -12.6 34.0 359.2 136.4 
1979 18.7 63.1 -137.6 -3.5 -12.1 41.0 443.2 123.2 
1980 8.7 69.6 -275.7 -3.8 -25.2 54.0 536.2 101.0 
1981 18.9 85.6 -181.5 2.7 70.2 601.5 101 .0 
1982 -24.0 95.5 -232.8 -63.3 81.0 663.0 105. 1 
1983 -19.7 93.1 -61.8 -11.9 87.5 687.1 108.1 
1984 -2.6 100.9 1.2 -23.4 89.7 638.4 101.0 
1985 5.2 100.0 -64.0 -45.6 97.2 647.1 100.0 
1986 11.9 96.8 25.1 -48.4 102.3 659.6 95.0 
1987 19.8 90.3 -79.4 -17.3 -63.6 103.6 671.1 83.8 
1988 32.4 90.8 -61.7 -15.1 -72.2 105.0 679.2 75.3 
1989 22.9 90.1 -88.7 ·105.2 -73.1 124.4 695.3 68.2 
1990 26.2 88.3 -94.3 -57.5 -81.8 117.6 675.4 61.4 
1991 25.0 86.6 -7.3 -76.4 -23.6 100.0 656.6 56.9 
1992 31.5 85.1 -44.8 -245.2 -29.2 110.0 620.6 52.8 
1993 17.7 85.4 -29.1 -161.6 -17.0 115.9 628.7 51.9 
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5.9 SENEGAL 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO GGB NG NGDP ITT 
1972 5.8 24.1 10.7 5.3 40.8 273.6 113.4 
1973 -3.4 26.8 -101.4 -31 .7 -7.5 43.8 278.3 106.2 
1974 -5.9 31.2 -65.6 -5.9 50.0 338.8 132.0 
1975 -10.1 41.1 -85.6 -4.5 -2.2 61.8 406.4 121.6 
1976 -10.7 41.6 -92.8 -19.1 71.7 459.3 117.5 
1977 -12.9 46.3 -67.5 2.9 -15.1 77.9 487.5 116.5 
1978 -35.8 47.9 -235.8 -59.4 1.5 91.1 494.1 104.1 
1979 -63.3 52.5 -264.2 -27.0 -4.3 111 .0 581.1 103.1 
1980 -87.1 57.1 -386.6 · -58.1 5.4 140.3 627.6 103.1 
1981 -133.2 60.4 -462.3 -132.6 -22.6 150.7 669.8 105.2 
1982 -172.8 70.9 -266.6 -234.1 -52.3 173.8 844.3 101.0 
1983 -198.8 79.2 -306.1 -110.1 -55.5 177.8 924.9 102.1 
1984 -225.2 88.5 -274.1 -98.2 -82.4 206.8 1015.5 104.1 
1985 -258.8 100.0 -273.0 -89.5 213.0 1152.0 100.0 
1986 -208.2 106.2 -268.2 -37.0 224.7 1307.0 88.7 
1987 -204.7 101.8 -305.9 -52.3 -19.7 215.6 1382.3 92.8 
1988 -250.7 99.9 -286.2 -368.1 -16.8 218.1 1483.3 86.7 
1989 -220.3 100.4 -185.4 14.7 -30.9 229.8 1476.5 85.8 
1990 -191.5 100.7 -219.5 -23.9 -46.4 226.4 1552.6 81.9 
1991 -184.0 98.9 -205.3 -38.8 30.2 213.1 1590.9 74.5 
1992 -172.2 98.9 -268.2 -94.4 3.7 215.8 1661.4 73.1 
1993 -200.4 98.2 -301 .2 -355.7 -46.8 218.2 1678.4 71.1 
5.10 TOGO 
FFC N PCPI BeA BO GGB NG NGDP TIT 
1972 9.1 31.7 -12.9 -6.6 7.3 87.6 100.0 
1973 7.5 32.9 -10.6 -2.0 8.2 90.4 108.1 
1974 22.4 37.1 131 .8 34.3 10.8 130.6 205.8 
1975 5.8 43.8 -75.5 10.9 19.2 128.3 168.6 
1976 12.7 48.8 -27.6 -3.3 22.2 136.3 145.4 
1977 4.3 59.8 -87.3 -32.2 -39.2 28.6 168.8 136.1 
1978 9.9 60.1 -217.4 19.7 -58.8 29.2 189.0 115.1 
1979 9.5 64.6 -212.7 -15.6 -17.9 32.3 212.8 108.1 
1980 4.7 72.6 -95.0 -32.8 -4.7 35.4 238.4 116.3 
1981 32.1 86.9 -44.2 -46.3 -14.8 38.7 258.0 118.6 
1982 47.3 96.5' -86.8 -78.2 -4.8 41.8 269.7 108.1 
1983 52.2 105.6 -47.9 -38.1 -5.6 
1984 68.0 101.8 16.3 -20.8 -7.9 
1985 79.2 100.0 -33.5 -3.1 -6.1 
1986 63.7 104.1 -65.6 -43.1 -16.6 
1987 64.6 104.2 -61.8 -88.0 -25.6 
1988 56.5 104.5 -87.6 -31.7 -13.6 
1989 78.4 103.2 -53.6 -132.9 -16.2 
1990 81.7 104.2 -109.0 -47.3 -13.0 
1991 79.3 104.7 -82.9 -60.9 -27.2 
1992 83.7 107.2 -59.5 -25.8 -5.0 
1993 85.6 107.6 -85.0 -36.9 -44.0 
5.11 FRANC ZONE (10 country sample) 
FFC N PCPI BCA BO 
1972 283.2 25.2 -77.9 136.9 
1973 278.4 27.5 -266.1 195.2 
1974 322.3 31.4 283.0 378.0 
1975 259.2 36.7 -795.0 116.0 
1976 253.3 40.5 -519.8 126.7 
1977 225.2 48.1 -465.5 150.0 
1978 189.8 53.2 -1548.2 232.7 
1979 120.9 58.7 -1752.0 -66.1 
1980 -54.8 65.5 -2446.3 -332.7 
1981 -124.0 72.6 -2379.1 -426.5 
1982 -221.8 81.3 -2072.6 -431.8 
1983 -410.2 89.3 -2006.1 -648.6 
1984 -219.8 96.4 -56.6 -501.1 
1985 -105.1 100.0 -1014.1 -182.6 
1986 -285.3 104.3 -2798.1 -949.0 
1987 -542.0 112.1 -2967.1 -2701.5 
1988 -667.2 113.7 -3575.1 -3199.0 
1989 -644.2 115.8 -2122.6 -2526.4 
1990 -437.3 117.2 -2597.9 -2477.5 
1991 -382.6 117.6 -2887.4 -2781.9 
1992 -415.9 118.6 -3213.7 -3488.3 
1993 -438.5 117.7 -2857.7 -3975.8 
1. Source: IFS and World Economic Outlook, IMF 
and our computation 
NGDP 
1854.5 
2072.9 
2738.3 
3123.7 
3860.7 
4566.8 
4894.6 
5572.4 
6541.0 
7667.6 
8911.2 
9856.2 
11281.3 
12571 .2 
12764.2 
12262.7 
11842.8 
12117.6 
12079.9 
12067.7 
12061.4 
11586.6 
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48.3 298.0 102.3 
49.4 313.8 107.0 
44.7 338.2 100.0 
44.6 365.3 83.7 
67.7 375.4 89.5 
67.6 410.7 88.1 
70.1 431.3 84.1 
77.0 446.3 90.0 
71.4 460.8 89.0 
72.9 487.9 89.3 
76.6 358.4 85.9 
TIT 
103.4 
110.8 
107.6 
94.1 
119.6 
138.1 
118.7 
113.4 
111.4 
107.8 
105.4 
105.4 
108.4 
103.4 
84.8 
81.3 
72.3 
69.0 
63.6 
62.8 
58.8 
61.4 
2. Notations: 
FFC_N: Net foreign assets (CFA billions) 
PCPI: CPI index (1985=100) 
BCA: Current account balance of payments (millions of US dollars) 
BO: Overall balance of payments (millions of US dollars) 
GGB: General Government balance (CFA billions) 
NG: Government final consumption (CFA billions) 
NGDP: Nom~nal GOP (CFA billions) 
TIT: Terms of trade index (1985=100) 
... : data not available 
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1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Table 6: Ratios of current account (CA) and overall balance (DB) of payments 
with respect to GOP for the Franc Zone 
CNGOP DB/GOP 
-4.2 7.4 
-12.8 9.4 
10.3 13.8 
-25.5 3.7 
-13.5 3.3 
-10.2 3.3 
-31.6 4.8 
-31.4 -1 .2 
-37.4 -5.1 
-31 .0 -5.6 
-23.3 -4.8 
-20.4 -6.6 
-0.5 -4.4 
-8.1 -1 .5 
-21 .9 -7.4 
-24.2 -22.0 
-30.2 -27.0 
-17.5 -20.8 
-21.5 -20.5 
-23.9 -23.1 
-26.6 -28.9 
-24.7 -34.3 
Source: IFS and World Economic Outlook, IMF 
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Table 7: Franc Zone (10 country sample): external trade (millions of dollars, 1985) 
Exports Imports External trad e Share in trade amon) 
industrial countries 
Total 8809.22 6816.71 15625.93 
Industrial countries (IC) 6668.22 4943.38 11611.60 100.00 
USA & Canada 1614.68 585.67 2200.35 18.95 
Japan & Australia 92.93 322.30 415.23 3.58 
France 1831.91 2397.76 4229.67 36.43 
Germany 317.70 368.04 685.74 5.91 
Italy 517.48 259.89 777.37 6.69 
UK 222.51 232.46 454.97 3.92 
Other IC 2071.01 777.26 2848.27 24.53 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1992 I MF 
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Table 8: Exchange rate in the Franc Zone 
(1972=100) 
nom. eff. rate effect. real rate 
100.00 
95.95 
94.30 
90.84 
98.61 
98.06 
93.70 
93.06 
100.38 
113.77 
124.89 
142.80 
151.09 
134.33 
125.76 
118.12 
126.00 
120.89 
116.66 
116.64 
117.07 
121.03 
(ratio of foreign & domestic 
CPI in domestic currency) 
100.00 
95.83 
93.92 
87.11 
94.26 
85.33 
79.20 
77.60 
83.15 
93.00 · 
98.03 
106.15 
108.28 
96.77 
88.54 
79.61 
86.38 
84.48 
84.48 
87.67 
90.06 
95.11 
Source: IFS and World Economic Outlook, IMF 
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bilat. real rate 
(ratio of France and FZ CPI) 
100.00 
98.37 
97.96 
93.78 
93.04 
85.84 
84.63 
84.87 
86.17 
88.18 
88.05 
87.80 
87.45 
89.13 
87.57 
84.21 
85.31 
86.63 
88.49 
90.99 
92.42 
95.10 
and our computation (with the use of weights in table 7) 
